German writer, publicist, and intellectual Marko Martin recently delivered a thought-provoking speech at the residence of Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier to mark the 35th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. In his address, Martin criticised Germany’s naivety towards Russia, the rise of populism, the lingering “East German nostalgia,” and even Steinmeier’s own role in these issues. The speech sparked widespread debate, was translated into Polish and French, and ignited discussions on a variety of topics, ranging from history to politics to society.
The Ukrainian Week sat down with Marko Martin to discuss global multipolarity, Europe’s challenges, the rise of far-right parties, support for Ukraine, and the continuing appeasement of Russia.
***
– During the recent Munich Security Conference, there was much talk about the world’s shift towards multipolarity. What challenges does Europe face amid growing competition between the US, China, and Russia?
– Let me start by saying that I’m neither a military expert nor a specialist in Eastern Europe – let alone a “global strategist.” But as a writer and intellectual, I do have my own perspective, one that seeks to cut through the confusion in public discourse with as much clarity – and humility – as possible.
Writing off the United States or resigning ourselves to the inevitability of Donald Trump’s return would be a dangerous mistake. Without a free, liberal-democratic, and engaged America, Europe risks being gradually squeezed between the rigid authoritarian regimes of Moscow and Beijing.
What Europe needs, first and foremost, is to strengthen its own defence capabilities. But just as crucial is an honest, continent-wide discussion about why this readiness isn’t just a matter of policy but of existential necessity.
At the same time, Europe must find ways to engage with the US beyond Trump. That will take wisdom – perhaps even a little strategic cunning – but it’s vital to remind American society, or at least its more rational segment, of our shared commitment to a free and open West.
– In Europe, we are witnessing a surge in far-right parties. After all, Alternative for Germany recently came in second place in the elections. Given this, what do you think awaits Europe in the coming decades? Is there a risk of these right-wing parties and movements becoming more radicalised?
– Even if it’s uncomfortable for many progressives to admit, unless uncontrolled mass immigration is addressed, the far right’s share of the vote will continue to grow, election after election. Implementing the necessary restrictions, without slipping into xenophobia or stoking cultural hatred, will be a major challenge for both centre-right and centre-left parties.
On top of this, Russia remains deeply invested in destabilising and dismantling Europe’s democratic order from within, offering both direct and indirect support to these pro-Putin parties. Many well-intentioned protesters opposing the far right in our countries, unfortunately, still fail to recognise this connection.
– In Germany, the divide between East and West remains strikingly evident in voting patterns during these parliamentary elections. In your speech on the 35th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, you spoke about widespread post-communist nostalgia in East Germany. How do you explain this phenomenon, and why has it not been overcome?
– Interestingly, the older generation in the East still largely votes for democratic parties. This challenges a theory I too long adhered to—that the legacy of the German Democratic Republic is the main driver behind far-right voting preferences.
However, it’s the younger generation—engaging in a kind of authoritarian rebellion, not just in the East—that is mainly turning to the far-right Alternative for Germany and The Left, which emerged from the former communist state party. Though The Left presents itself as progressive and fashionable, its refusal to support military aid to Ukraine aligns it with the same pro-Putin stance as Alternative for Germany.
Could it be that the education system has failed here, and that many young people simply do not grasp the fundamental difference between democracy and dictatorship? In any case, this is a question that German society as a whole must confront.
– In your speech, you also spoke about German naivety toward Russia and how Berlin’s Russia policy bears significant responsibility for Putin’s war against Ukraine. In your view, is Germany ready to abandon this policy in the near future, and why? What is needed for such a shift?
– Well, the shameful Nord Stream project is, thankfully, behind us—at least, I hope so. But once again, despite party divisions, certain figures are emerging from the shadows. For now, they are proceeding cautiously, merely asking questions and testing the waters, but already they’re talking about supposedly “cheap Russian gas” as if it were a cure-all for the economic crisis.
However, so many horrific events have unfolded in Ukraine that German society has likely built up an immunity to such pro-Russian siren calls. Still, the task of the public, the media, and intellectuals is to sustain this process of awakening, which is far from finished.
Of course, not in the sense of “militarisation”—which, ultimately, I only see in aggressive Russia—but with an understanding of one very simple truth: right now, Ukraine is defending the freedom of all of Europe. The continent is therefore duty-bound to support this struggle, even if we set aside moral considerations for a moment.
– European unity is a crucial factor in winning the war against Russia. Is such a consensus possible among European countries? And is Europe, in general, ready to take on a leadership role?
– In the Baltic states, Scandinavia, Poland, the Netherlands, and, of course, in resolute and vigilant Britain, I see a much greater willingness to resist Putin’s fascism. That’s why I’ll say it again: awakening society in other countries is our shared responsibility.
The writings and analyses of Ukrainian authors like Sofiia and Yurii Andrukhovych, Andrii Kurkov, and Volodymyr Yermolenko, published in Western media, are vital in confronting the West with the harsh realities of today. We in the West must listen to these voices and amplify them. Because, yes, I believe in a pan-European Enlightenment, I believe in free speech, and in the opportunities it offers to identify and bridge the gaps in Western perception.
Of course, this also requires the urgent development of a common defence industry. Repeating this isn’t just rhetoric—it’s what our freedom depends on, and with it, the very dignity of our lives in the truest sense.
