Tensions between Ukraine and Hungary hit a new high this week. After Budapest blocked EU aid to Kyiv and the Druzhba oil pipeline was halted, the situation escalated further with the detention in Hungary of cash couriers from Oschadbank.
To keep tens of millions of dollars and euros, along with gold bars, in the country, the ruling Fidesz party fast-tracked a separate bill through parliament, while Viktor Orbán’s government issued a special decree. In response, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha accused Hungary of “descending into a spiral of lawlessness” and trying to “legalise” an unlawful confiscation.
The back-and-forth comes amid a dispute over a visit by a Hungarian group to Kyiv to discuss restarting the Druzhba pipeline. Ukraine insists the group has no official status.
“Anyone can enter Ukraine from Schengen countries for tourism in the same way. This group has no official status in Ukraine and no scheduled meetings, so it’s definitely wrong to call them a ‘delegation.’ Foreign citizens are welcome as long as they respect Ukraine and follow the usual rules for visitors, including for tourism,” said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi.
Budapest, however, accuses Ukrainian authorities of lying. Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó specifically claimed that his government had sent a diplomatic note to Ukraine about the delegation’s visit on March 10.
Opposition Tisza party pulls ahead of Orbán in polls
All of this is playing out ahead of Hungary’s elections on April 12. The latest polls show Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s Tisza party leading Fidesz, Orbán’s ruling party, with 53% support compared with 39% for Fidesz.
If the results hold, Tisza could secure 115 of the 199 seats in parliament, while Fidesz would be limited to around 78. The far-right Our Homeland party is the only other contender likely to cross the 5% threshold and enter parliament.
In recent weeks, Orbán’s rhetoric toward Ukraine has grown increasingly aggressive. He has labelled the country an “enemy” of Hungary and warned that his defeat could bankrupt the nation and send Hungarian youth to the front lines.
In a comment to The Ukrainian Week, Hungarian political scientist and historian Sándor Földvári recalled an incident in which Volodymyr Zelensky threatened that “one person” blocking a €90 billion EU loan for Ukraine — clearly referring to Orbán — could have his address passed on to “the guys from the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”
“Zelensky was genuinely alarmed by Hungary blocking the loan, because Ukraine cannot defend itself effectively in the war without it. But desperation is a bad adviser. After this statement, Hungary’s opposition, the Tisza party, could do nothing but support Orbán by protesting the so-called ‘threat from the Ukrainian president.’ Why? To win favour with voters. If Péter Magyar had defended Zelensky, Fidesz would have labelled him an ‘agent of the Ukrainians.’ Orbán is running on the claim that he will ‘protect Hungary from the Ukrainians.’ That’s why voters fall for it: they believe Ukraine will attack and he will protect them. Radio, TV, and almost all media are controlled by Fidesz-linked business circles spreading this narrative,” Földvári said.
Russian influence surfaces in Hungary’s election campaign
The Financial Times has reported that the Kremlin is running a disinformation campaign aimed at helping Orbán secure re-election. Meanwhile, VSquare, citing several “European national security sources,” said Moscow had tasked a team of political strategists with meddling in Hungary’s parliamentary elections to benefit the incumbent prime minister.
“Sergey Kiriyenko was appointed Putin’s head of domestic policy in 2016 and has since greatly expanded his powers, including interfering in elections abroad. His most recent and aggressive operation was in Moldova, where operatives under his command organised voter-bribery networks, troll farms, and local influence campaigns aimed at undermining the pro-European stance of President Maia Sandu,” the report notes.
VSquare’s sources describe the Budapest contingent as a three-person team acting on behalf of the GRU. “The group arrived in Budapest several weeks ago, though it’s still unclear whether it has begun its influence activities. Hungary is highly accommodating toward Russian military diplomats suspected of GRU ties, some of whom have built connections in pro-government Hungarian media — for example, German-Hungarian propagandist Georg Spöttle, who maintained close relations with the Russian military attaché,” the outlet added.
Sándor Földvári points out that none of this would have been possible without at least tacit approval from the Hungarian authorities.
“All of this followed Hungarian Foreign Minister Szijjártó’s visit to Moscow, after which the Russian side ‘unconditionally’ released two Russian prisoners of war who were Hungarian citizens. Putin, however, quickly made it clear that this unconditionality would last only as long as the Hungarian (and Slovak) governments behaved ‘reasonably,’” Földvári told The Ukrainian Week.
According to the Hungarian political scientist, several conclusions can be drawn from these developments. First, close and regular Russian-Hungarian political and intelligence cooperation has become overt: Orbán speaks directly by phone, while Szijjártó personally discusses further collaboration with Moscow. In Földvári’s view, the release of prisoners of war and energy issues are little more than a fig leaf hiding the real agenda.
“There isn’t just political cooperation — the relationship is starting to take on the substance of an alliance. Moscow is no longer merely trying to keep Orbán in power; it openly sees Hungary as part of its sphere of influence. If Budapest turns away from the European Union, Hungary could become a Russian foothold deeply embedded within the EU and NATO, further destabilising both and providing direct access to the Balkans,” Földvári told The Ukrainian Week.
What could go wrong?
Hungarian political scientist Sándor Földvári says the likelihood of a fast-tracked court case against Tisza is rising again, potentially giving authorities a way to bar the party from the elections.
“Under current law, a party can be dissolved only for very serious, unconstitutional actions — like an attempted seizure of power by force. But combining that with the so-called ‘Ukrainian threat,’ the previously mentioned ‘Ukrainian financing,’ and the arrest of the cash couriers could give the authorities a pretext for a rapid, conceptual court case. The real question is how they would push this through Hungary’s judicial system,” he told The Ukrainian Week.
Földvári also warns that the chances of a state of emergency or martial law are growing, which would effectively prevent the elections from taking place.
“The sudden spike in Russian-Hungarian political cooperation suggests that events have been driven both by panic within the Hungarian authorities and by Russia’s strong interest in keeping Orbán in power. The key question now is what might happen — and what steps should be taken — if the authorities move to make the elections impossible,” he added, warning that a scenario of military dictatorship in Hungary, similar to Lukashenko’s rule in Belarus, cannot be ruled out.
