While most EU countries are working to wean themselves off Moscow’s oil and gas, Budapest and Bratislava are holding on tightly to these blood-soaked energy supplies. The question is: what really drives our western neighbours — hard economic realities or a lingering soft spot for the Kremlin?
Hooked on the pipeline
The EU’s 19th sanctions package proposes fresh restrictions on Russian energy imports. Most notably, it calls for a full ban on purchases of liquefied natural gas from Russia by 2026 — a year ahead of schedule. Brussels also wants to outlaw all transactions with state-owned oil giants Rosneft and Gazprom Neft.
But there’s a glaring exception: pipeline imports. And that’s where the pushback comes in. Hungary and Slovakia are blocking efforts to extend the ban, insisting they simply cannot give up Russian pipeline supplies. Alternatives, they argue, would be far too expensive.
Although Budapest and Bratislava’s position has been a sticking point for years, it recently got a fresh twist. US President Donald Trump, whom Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico see as an ideological ally, publicly urged them to ditch Russian energy. At the UN General Assembly, Trump said: “[Orbán – ed.] is my friend. I haven’t spoken to him yet [about importing Russian oil – ed.], but I think if I asked him, he would stop it. I think he will do it.”
So what’s really keeping Orbán and Fico clinging to the Kremlin’s energy lifeline? Is it truly impossible for their countries to break free from Russian imports, or is it simply a matter of will?
Economic survival or Kremlin loyalty?
After Trump’s remarks, several Hungarian officials quickly defended their country’s stance. Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office Gergely Gulyás insisted that “Hungary will not give up its energy purchases” and added that Europe should also pursue long-term economic cooperation with Russia. Minister for EU Affairs János Bóka noted that their American partners understand Russia’s war economy doesn’t depend on Hungary or Slovakia, pointing out that the two countries account for just 15 million people and 2% of the EU’s gross income. Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó was even more blunt, saying, “Hungary openly buys Russian oil because we have no other choice. Other European countries do it secretly.”
Across the border, Robert Fico avoided directly responding to Trump, instead framing a cut-off of Russian energy as “economic suicide” for Slovakia, arguing the country would struggle to secure oil and gas at reasonable prices elsewhere.
Still, the EU’s official goal remains clear: a full phase-out of Russian energy by 2027. Member states have until the end of 2025 to lay out their plans to get there. If any country fails to deliver, Brussels could slap import duties on Russian energy — and it wouldn’t take a unanimous vote, just a simple majority.
Central and Eastern Europe expert Andrius Tursa argues that Hungary and Slovakia would face no greater challenges in shifting to new energy markets than their EU peers.
He suggests their hardline stance is less about economic necessity and more about the interests of powerful groups supporting the Orbán and Fico regimes. The big question, then, is this: are Hungary and Slovakia truly unable to give up Russian oil and gas, or are they simply unwilling to do so?
Dear to Russia’s heart: gas
While most EU countries are working to cut ties with Moscow’s energy, Hungary has actually ramped up its purchases of Russian oil and gas since 2022. Budapest keeps pointing to its lack of access to the sea, yet neighbours in the same position — Austria and the Czech Republic — have managed to significantly cut their Russian imports.
For Hungary, dependence on Russian gas shouldn’t be a problem at all. The country is well integrated into Europe’s gas transmission network, making it relatively easy to secure liquefied natural gas, especially with prices dropping thanks to higher production in the US and Qatar. By 2026, LNG could even be cheaper than gas flowing through Russian pipelines.
Slovakia tells a similar story. Robert Fico is clinging to a Gazprom contract that runs until 2034 instead of turning to Western suppliers. Alongside Orbán, he refused to explore alternative markets, even when Ukraine cut off gas flows through its territory.
Today, both countries rely on the TurkStream pipeline from the south to meet their energy needs.
Slovakia’s gas supplier SPP insists that losing Russian gas could easily be offset through existing agreements with foreign energy companies like BP, ExxonMobil, and Shell. This could have been arranged as early as late 2024, when Ukraine announced plans to block the Russian pipeline. Instead, Fico chose to head to Moscow to sort things out with his patrons.
Can we really count on Croatia?
The oil picture is trickier. Both countries remain heavily dependent on Russian supplies via the Druzhba pipeline, which meets 90% of Hungary’s needs and 87% of Slovakia’s. Interestingly, Slovakia’s only refinery, Slovnaft, is owned by Hungary’s MOL — everything is connected. Slovnaft says it simply cannot supply the market with enough fuel at affordable prices without Druzhba.
Energy expert Radovan Potokar, however, points out that Slovakia has plenty of alternatives: the Adria pipeline from Croatia, reverse flows from the Czech Republic, or oil delivered through the port of Odesa and pumped into Druzhba via the Odesa–Brody pipeline. Last year, Slovakia even pulled out of a joint pipeline project with Austria connecting Bratislava and Schwechat.
Hungary currently gets about 1.2 million tonnes of oil a year through the Croatian Adria pipeline. The operator has said it’s ready to boost supplies to Hungary and Slovakia to 12 million tonnes — more than enough to cover their refining needs. Yet Hungary’s MOL continues to express doubts about whether Croatia can reliably deliver those volumes over the long term.
The real sticking point, though, is the cost. Russian oil is still being sold at a steep discount compared to alternatives.
Between early 2022 and March 2025, Hungary saved €2.3 billion thanks to the price gap between Brent and Russia’s Urals crude — a huge sum for a small country. But that advantage could vanish if Brussels moves forward with import tariffs in response to Hungary’s refusal to follow the EU plan.
Brussels’ Stockholm Syndrome
When it comes to dealings with Russia, economic security clearly takes a back seat for Hungary and Slovakia. Dependence on Moscow for energy is risky — the Kremlin can cut off supplies at any moment, and it has done so more than once. Diversifying energy sources from the West would be a far smarter move, and one other Central European countries are already making.
The dominance of Russia-friendly, oligarchic networks in Hungary and Slovakia — and now perhaps even in the Czech Republic — effectively holds Europe hostage.
Is it really wise to give veto power to backers of a state that openly threatens the EU’s survival? Brussels officials have plenty to think about. Already, they can’t fly freely with Russian drones hovering over their airports. And things are only going to get worse.
