On February 27, 2022, Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, in a speech before the Bundestag, announced a “Zeitenwende” — a Change of Times – when the world will no longer be as it was before. The speech primarily addressed the change in Germany’s approach to its own security and defence, as well as the understanding of the threat. Two years after that epochal change in German politics’ rhetoric, Der Spiegel was interested in German politicians, journalists, and experts on how the perception of the world in German society changed when the myth of a cultural and great Russia was deconstructed due to its barbaric war against Ukraine.
Olha Vorozhbyt from The Ukrainian Week gathered insights from five Bundestag deputies and journalists on this shift.
Roderich Kiesewetter, a member of the Bundestag from the Christian Democratic Union and a retired Colonel of the Bundeswehr:
The worldview of German society had been shaped by three ‘sweet lies’: Firstly, there was a belief that we were surrounded by friends and partners, ensuring our social cohesion. Secondly, there is an idea that our economic stability and competitiveness were sustained by inexpensive security under NATO protection, affordable energy from Russia, and cost-efficient value chains from China. Thirdly, all of this was neatly packaged in the narrative of ‘change through trade’ [Wandel durch Handel — a policy initiated by the German government under Chancellor Willy Brandt as part of the so-called German ‘Eastern Policy’ (Ostpolitik). This policy involved establishing connections and bringing about political and value changes in the GDR and Eastern Bloc countries, and later with Russia through increased trade volumes — Ed.].
Moreover, Germany has a deeply ingrained and long-standing romanticism (or naivety) and friendliness towards Russia, firmly rooted in a certain segment of our society. Germany only began to react to the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, despite it having started as early as 2014. In the days following the aggressive full-scale war against Ukraine, the German government hinted at overcoming these ‘sweet lies’ in what became known as the Zeitenwende speech [Zeitenwende — a Change of Times — Ed.]. However, the Chancellor could not fully grasp this shift, and consequently, nor could a portion of society.
However, the majority of German society now understands the kind of terrorist state Russia has become and is much more critical of it as a result. Many former “Russia sympathisers” have undergone a significant shift in their perspective and are now self-critical. It is crucial, however, for effective political communication to finally occur across the entire federal government (already initiated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense) so that those who have yet to make this mental shift receive clear guidance. For some, the myth of the “good” and invincible Russian army still lingers, particularly in regions of the former GDR, where scepticism towards the U.S. and a deep distrust of the state and its democratic structures already exist.
So, we find ourselves with three distinct segments of society. There are those who have always held scepticism towards Russia and were alarmed by its evolution into a terrorist state under Putin’s rule; their convictions have now solidified. Then, there are those who were somewhat naive before but have undergone a clear shift in their attitudes and perspectives following February 24, 2022. Finally, there are those who remain steadfast in their loyalty to the terrorist state, believing in an invincible Russia and advocating for unity with it as a “better” option. Some of these individuals could also be considered part of the German fifth column. Unfortunately, there are those among them who will never be receptive to changing their views on Russia, as Russian propaganda and misinformation find a receptive audience in Germany.
Mari-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, a member of the Bundestag representing the Free Democratic Party and serving as Chair of the Defense Committee:
From what I’ve seen, it’s evident that many citizens are deeply affected by this [war — Ed.] and are beginning to question their longstanding beliefs. They used to believe that a lasting peace, coupled with freedom in Russia, was attainable and that our solid trade relations with Russia could contribute to this goal. For a lot of people, Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine has been a harsh wake-up call. Yet, there are still those who remain hopeful, believing that dialogue with Putin could lead to lasting peace.
Tony Hofreiter, a biologist and member of the Bundestag representing the Green Party:
By February 24, 2022, the majority of Germans had realised that under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, Russia had turned into a brutal dictatorship. The warnings had either been overlooked or disregarded for too long. The full-scale invasion marked the end of the widespread tendency to mistake wishes for reality.
Caroline Tutzer, a journalist and head of the foreign policy section at the German newspaper Die Welt:
As the war in Ukraine unfolded, many Germans came to realise that the concept of “Wandel durch Handel” [“Change Through Trade”], which aimed to export values like democracy and liberalism through economic cooperation, simply doesn’t hold up. They recognised the need to rearm in order to deter unpredictable enemies, including Russia, right now. The invasion of Ukraine served as a troubling wake-up call for them. During Chancellor Angela Merkel’s tenure, they had operated under the assumption that peace and security in Europe were assured—a belief that has now proven to be mistaken.
Ricard Hertszinger, German journalist
The extent to which German society’s perception of the world has changed remains unclear. Surveys show that the overwhelming majority support increasing arms supplies to Ukraine and strengthening the Bundeswehr. However, most Germans consider it essential to avoid becoming a “war party” at all costs. Few in Germany realise that Putin’s Russia views its war of annihilation against Ukraine as merely the opening salvo in a broader conflict against the entire Western world.
The incomplete awareness of this threat within German society is highlighted by the ongoing nationwide mass protests defending democracy against the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD). It’s often overlooked that this party serves as a tool in Russia’s hybrid war strategy aimed at destabilising liberal democracies.
Similarly, this observation extends to the Left Party, particularly the newly established left-right alliance, centred around Kremlin propagandist Sahra Wagenknecht. Unlike the AfD, however, these groups are not widely seen as a threat to democracy by the majority of German political and media circles. Approximately 30% of voters plan to support pro-Kremlin parties in the upcoming parliamentary elections. This serves as a troubling signal, underlining the vulnerability of German society to aggressive autocracies.
