The debate on the hypothetical participation of European military forces in the fighting for Ukraine is gaining momentum. Even if no one is sending anyone anywhere yet, the European media sphere is in turmoil. Is Macron on the right track by erasing the red lines from official discourse? How much money should the member states allocate for European defence if the U.S. stops defending Europe? Where and with whom should new weapons be manufactured? These and other questions are constantly being discussed in the EU’s political and expert circles.
***
“The British believe that Macron is right,” noted Philip Turle, a journalist from Great Britain, during a joint live broadcast. “Putin only understands strength; the only way to get through to him is to show a clenched fist. If we remain silent, the war will come to our doorstep.” This comment did not surprise the audience at all. From the first days of the full-scale offensive, the British have massively shown the most sobriety on this matter.
Recently, the French unexpectedly joined in. Even more surprising was the vote to support a security agreement with Ukraine in the National Assembly and the Senate. In both chambers of the French parliament, the document easily garnered an overwhelming majority, even as the Communists and extreme left from La France Insoumise (“France Unbowed”) voted against it, and the far-right abstained. With the upcoming elections to the European Parliament in sight, Macron’s opponents eagerly used the parliamentary platform to rally their electorate. Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who tried to avoid the Ukrainian matter in the first two years of the major war, have now once again leaned towards aligning with Moscow.
Expressing “respect and support for the heroic Ukrainian people” from the podium of the National Assembly, Marine Le Pen, however, noted that “anti-Russian sanctions have reached their limit” and “no new bilateral security agreements with Ukraine are needed” because, in her opinion, they harm French interests and weaken France’s military potential. Le Pen spoke out against Ukraine’s accession to NATO and reminded that “this war will inevitably end with peaceful negotiations.” As for Mélenchon, who gladly marched along Moscow’s Red Square in 2018 as part of the “immortal regiment,” he now openly calls for Ukraine to capitulate.
Is it fair to say that the supporters of both politicians, making up to 60% of the French population, align with their stance on Ukraine? Sociological surveys indicate this might not be entirely accurate. According to a recent Ipsos poll conducted for the weekly La Tribune Dimanche, 44% of French citizens believe that sending humanitarian aid to Kyiv should continue, with 32% in favour of increasing it. The survey also revealed that 41% support the continuation of French arms deliveries to Ukraine, with 21% in favour of increasing them, contrasting with 38% who oppose such actions.
“Being ready for any scenario is essential,” says Macron, echoing the sentiments of numerous experts, politicians, and military personnel.
“We can’t turn a blind eye to the Russian cyberattacks on hospitals and official institutions, nor can we disrupt the global market for grains and oilseeds to cater to Russia,” noted former French ambassador to Russia, Claude Blanchemaison, in a TV broadcast.
“The purchasing power of our citizens is crucial, but let’s not lose sight of other factors. If Odesa and Kharkiv fall and Kyiv face the threat of capture, we’ll be forced into combat. Naturally, we don’t desire this, but we’ll have no alternative.”
French military experts often stress that out of all Western European countries, only France and Britain are capable of defending themselves independently and can mobilise 15-19 thousand troops if needed. It’s frequently mentioned that Russia has ceased to be a “great power” and is now considered a “middle power” with nuclear bombs and a relatively low GDP. “If France were to be attacked, several Russian cities would be levelled within a matter of hours,” remarked a French general in an interview with The Ukrainian Week, who chose to remain anonymous.
Now, Macron’s hypothesis about the potential involvement of EU troops in combat operations in Ukraine is open for theoretical discussion among the Finns, Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. However, Germans, Spaniards, and Italians are currently expressing opposition, likely influenced by electoral realities. “Anyone who says they want to send their citizens to die for Ukraine loses elections,” notes Alin Le Bay-Kremer, co-founder of the Stand With Ukraine movement. “Now Macron is resorting to a strategy of ambiguity; he promises nothing, but he also doesn’t rule anything out. With its own nuclear weapons and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, Paris can afford this today.”
Alin Le Bay-Kremer calculated that France, Germany, and Poland together make up 200 million inhabitants.
“That’s significantly more than in Russia,” she emphasizes. “And the GDP is also higher. We don’t have to fear the Russians because together, we are strong.” Such sentiments are not uncommon in expert circles.
Colonel Michel Goya sees “nothing staggering” in his president’s statements, while General Jerome Pellistrandi speaks of the “realistic position” of the French head of state. “Macron wants to become the leader of the European defence project,” noted the well-known political scientist Bertrand Badie in an interview with Le Parisien magazine.
The Élysée Palace is gradually acclimating the French to the notion that Ukraine’s loss in the war would have dire consequences for Europeans. This logic appears to be gaining acceptance among the public, even if not enthusiastically.
Macron can afford to experiment with public support: he will not seek a third term. It is quite likely that, influenced by the stark realities, his arguments in favour of strengthening European security will garner new supporters.
