Olha Vorozhbyt Deputy editor-in-chief of The Ukrainian Week, international politics analyst

Bundestag MP Roderich Kiesewetter: “Germany has many Chamberlains and Daladiers, but no Churchills”

PoliticsWorld
4 February 2025, 08:00

German MP from the CDU party Roderich Kiesewetter is one of the most consistent supporters of Ukraine in his party and in Germany as a whole. On the eve of the German parliamentary elections, he spoke to The Ukrainian Week about the Ukraine issue in the electoral campaign, how politics of Donald Trump and his supporters in the United States affect the German political agenda, and the importance of historical awareness among youth.

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– The first week of Donald Trump’s presidency is over. He has been very active in the US, with a large number of executive orders and statements. How does American policy affect the German political agenda? Especially on the eve of the elections in February?

– In recent weeks, Donald Trump has proven to be what we have seen before—a master of unpredictability, a role he fully embraces. The second observation is that he thinks more like a businessman than a statesman. While both statesmen and businesspeople have interests, statesmen (and stateswomen, of course) also feel a responsibility for societal cohesion and cooperative politics. As a businessman, Trump takes a strict approach to asserting his own interests—those who follow him benefit, those who resist are sidelined, and those who oppose him face disadvantages.

When it comes to Germany itself, Trump is ruthlessly exposing the country’s long-overdue need for reform—too little investment in research, minimal progress in digitalisation, a fractured education system in complete disarray, a patchwork of 16 federal states with little coordination, a lack of security, and weak resilience. In a way, he is acting as a catalyst, pushing Germany to finally reform itself.

In foreign policy, it is, of course, difficult to grasp why Trump is questioning the very right to exist—or rather, the sovereignty and territorial integrity—of Canada, Greenland, and Panama. At the same time, his refugee policy seeks to confront Mexico with 11 million people.

None of this aligns with Europe’s political principles, but it is the reality. We must face this new reality without losing ourselves—but to regain strength and credibility.

For that, Germany must first reform itself as quickly as possible, ensuring it remains internationally competitive in education, research, and security, as well as in what we call the sovereign credibility of our country—something that has suffered greatly under Scholz.

– Donald Trump also confronts countries that are allied with the US, such as Denmark. What implications may this have for Germany?

– Now it all depends on what Trump actually implements and how. If he pushes for a referendum in Greenland, it is important to note that around 56,000 Greenlanders live in Greenland, while another 50,000 to 60,000 reside in Denmark. So, the majority may well vote against joining the U.S., but the move would still divide Greenlandic society. A far better approach would be to reach a cooperation agreement with Denmark on resource development and invest in Greenland together rather than attempting to make it the 51st state.

This also has implications for Germany, where we have a strong radical right-wing opposition—the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Sahra Wagenknecht’s Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, BSW). While BSW presents itself as left-wing, many of its core positions align with the far right. According to their narrative, the U.S., once the leading Western power, is no longer reliable—and, in any case, too far away. Now, they argue, is the time to finally take Putin’s hand and combine German engineering with Russian resources to forge a new European sovereignty. In essence, AfD and BSW promote alternative models that were relevant 150 years ago—when America had yet to rise as a global power, and Germany was too large to remain quiet in Europe but too small to dominate it.

As a result, Germany has always pursued an unsteady policy toward Moscow—or, in the past, St Petersburg. In this context, there is a serious risk that if the political visions of AfD and BSW gain a majority in Germany, the countries between Germany and Russia will once again be left behind, forced to align themselves with one or the other. That is why the CDU/CSU, along with the SPD, Greens, and liberals, must do everything possible to keep Germany anchored in the West.

We must also make it clear to America that such a policy is actively harming Ukraine. In Trump’s terms, Ukraine must be seen as an attractive deal—its “golden nuggets” need to be made clear to him.

And I can name three. First, a population that understands what it means to fight for peace, freedom, and self-determination—one that is willing to make sacrifices rather than accept dictatorship or the illusion of peace. Second, Ukraine has natural resources that can be used to repay its debts rather than letting them fall into Russian or Chinese hands. And third, Ukraine possesses military expertise, artificial intelligence, drones, and much more—capabilities that few armies in the world have, not even the Israelis at this scale, nor the Americans, let alone any European military. If this military knowledge were to fall into the wrong hands, it would be a serious disadvantage for Trump as well. In this sense, it is up to sensible Europeans to make him understand that Ukraine is a good deal for him. Personally, I find the term “deal” terrible, but Trump must see that Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO brings added value—rather than being told to wait another 10 or 20 years.

– Elon Musk, the richest man in the world and Trump’s ally, openly supports the ‘Alternative for Germany’. To what extent does his support strengthen the party?

– First of all, the AfD opposed the establishment of the Tesla factory in Brandenburg. Yet despite this, Musk still supports the party. Like Trump, he favours authoritarian-style leadership and parties of that kind because they bypass democracy and eliminate lengthy decision-making processes. This allows him to push through his company’s expansions and research projects without regard for regulations or legal oversight.

He is winning over a lot of young people, especially in Germany. The AfD is particularly popular among young Germans, with 18 to 30-year-olds voting for the party at rates of around 25 to 35% (perhaps even higher in some cases). This is partly because they lack an awareness of history and because the AfD promises quick, simple solutions: leaving NATO, exiting the EU, abandoning the eurozone, and using German engineering with Russian resources, after which other countries would realign themselves with Germany. It’s cheap, simplistic, and highly dangerous logic.

For Musk, the AfD represents a party that breaks rules and reinterprets them to suit its own needs—a notion that is appealing to him as an entrepreneur, as it might allow him to make investment decisions under an AfD-led government.

There’s another factor at play here. We hear that Trump is, of course, also looking for a successor. Musk is being discussed as a potential future U.S. president, among others, and if he aligns with reliable partners like Le Pen in France, Kaczyński in Poland, Orbán in Hungary, Fico in Slovakia, Kickl in Austria, and Weidel in Germany, then the European Union could be torn apart and authoritarian regimes would rise. This is not the model that brought peace, freedom, and self-determination to Europe after 1945. It’s also not the model that Ukraine is fighting for. In other words, Musk is jeopardising everything that allowed Europe to be peacefully free and self-determined after the Second World War.

– We are speaking on the day of the 80th anniversary of the Auschwitz liberation [interview was recorded on January 27th — Ed.], so I would like to ask about the history awareness that you mentioned. We live during a period when there are an overwhelming number of historical manipulations. We, in Ukraine, feel them especially strongly, as Russia uses them in its narrative. Do you see any solutions to the situation we have with manipulations of history? 

– History must not be manipulated. If I’m correct, it was a Ukrainian division of the Soviet army that liberated Auschwitz. When it comes to Ukraine, it could be worth reminding the media today that a Ukrainian division played that role, to make it clear once again. The Germans killed 8 million people in Ukraine, and that is also Germany’s responsibility.

German children need to be told over and over again who started WWII: Nazi-Germany. The debate we’re having in Germany today deeply worries me, because around 40% of people under 30 don’t know what happened in Auschwitz, and around 10% of young Germans don’t know about Holocaust at all. 

This needs to be constantly addressed. The last survivors of the extermination camps are now dying. For a decade, Germany refused to pay pensions to the survivors. And now that there are only a few left, Germany has started to come to terms with this, paying the so called Ghetto-Rente since 2014 . So, we have to be very self-critical here and we should not be surprised that some young people do not recognise the history if we ourselves have postponed coming to terms with the past for so many years. 

Germany is also a country of immigration, with many people from Turkey, Italy, and the Arab world, particularly among those under ten and in their twenties. This means our political education must evolve, so these young people understand they live in a country that once carried terrible guilt. They need to develop a sense of historical awareness and not dismiss it by saying, “it wasn’t us.” I believe it’s crucial to deepen their knowledge of history.

– It seems that German aid to Ukraine is becoming part of the election campaign ahead of the upcoming vote. To what extent does the Ukraine issue and the Russian-Ukrainian war influence the direction of the election campaign in Germany?

– Unfortunately, yes, very much so. And I have to take a very critical personal view of this. The SPD is divided. As Defence Minister, Boris Pistorius is fully on Ukraine’s side, but he isn’t receiving enough financial support from Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The Chancellor also refuses to release the latest Ukraine aid, which is very frustrating. But Pistorius is in the minority within the SPD. In the CDU, which will likely form the next government with Friedrich Merz, there are also significant reservations about supporting Ukraine, as they want to govern alongside with the SPD, which is critical of further aid to Ukraine. I belong to a minority in the CDU that still wants to support Ukraine with all our strength. Friedrich Merz has sent very mixed messages over the past year—sometimes in favour of more and steadier support, sometimes against it. Now he’s in favour again, but this wavering stance is confusing many.

Olaf Scholz can claim that he’s always supported Ukraine and that Merz is sending mixed signals. But in reality, it’s the other way around.

Friedrich Merz is actually fully on Ukraine’s side but is facing resistance within his own ranks, particularly in East Germany, where people struggle to understand why Ukraine is being supported. That’s very concerning. The Union is not showing enough courage. I, myself, have been heavily criticised, including by Friedrich Merz, for saying that we cannot accept the fact that the CDU in East Germany is no longer openly supporting Ukraine.

And I continue to do so, but the problem is that we have a “Moscow connection” [“Die Moskau-Connection. Das Schröder-Netzwerk und Deutschlands Weg in die Abhängigkeit” is a book by two Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung journalists Reinhard Bingener and Markus Wehner, which reveals how former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his circle cooperated with Vladimir Putin and Russia — Ed.] in the CDU/CSU and the SPD. You can see, for example, that the CSU, the Bavarian sister party, is always making it clear in the background that Ukraine has no chance of joining the EU because of agricultural interest, and that it should not join NATO because Bavaria has a 1,000-year history with Russia and does not want 2,000 kilometres of new NATO border.

That’s why in our motion to deliver Taurus, which I’ve initiated, we’ve consistently emphasised both NATO and EU perspectives. The only ones who truly stand firmly on Ukraine’s side, without any influence from Russia, are the Greens. And now, everyone is attacking them, which almost certainly means there won’t be a coalition between the CDU/CSU and the Greens. Instead, the ‘Moscow connection’ in the SPD, as the authors of the book called it, is now eagerly anticipating a much more Ukraine-skeptical CDU/CSU as a coalition partner. This deeply worries me. Since I’m almost certain to be re-elected, I’ll continue to be a reliable voice for Ukraine after the election. But I can’t guarantee that the Union, or a Union-led government, will keep advocating for Ukraine’s potential EU membership if the conditions are met. The best security guarantee for Ukraine remains NATO membership. Unfortunately, those advocating for this are currently very quiet, as there is not enough clear stance or direction.

We don’t have a Zeitenwende (a turning point) in our attitude. We lack a clear stance or direction on this issue, and instead, we’re leaning towards appeasement. I want to stress that Germany has many Chamberlains and Daladiers, but no Churchills. The Baltic and Nordic states, more than anywhere else in Europe, now understand what Churchill did for Europe in the 1940s and 1950s. But if we truly want to fulfill the turning point, Germany needs its own Churchill moment. Russia continues to destroy pipelines and cables, uses its shadow fleet, and sends drones over German training grounds, even capturing the mobile phone numbers of Ukrainian soldiers. Russian drones are flying over energy plants, and yet nothing happens. We let them get away with it, afraid of alarming our population. DHL containers are burning, but no one is talking about it. It’s incredibly bitter how we’re trying to suppress Russia’s hybrid war against us. The victims here are, first and foremost, the truth, and secondly, Ukraine.

We must point out again and again that the Union is the party for peace, freedom and self-determination and must not give up this stance in favour of a settlement with Russia. If the strongest economy in Europe opts for appeasement with Russia, the other European states, lacking the economic power to support Ukraine on the same scale, will be unable to provide the necessary assistance—whether it’s air defence, long-range missiles, or fighter jets—despite all their political will.

In February last year, I was the one who said in an interview with a German channel after an air strike in Kyiv that we must enable Ukraine to take the war to Russian soil. Since then, I have been seen as a warmonger, yet other states have now done nothing else but finally allow Storm Shadows and others to be used on Russian soil. Using an allegory, I can say that we supplied Ukraine with water pistols instead of fire hoses. And not enough, we only allowed Ukraine to use on their own territory, and the people with the flamethrowers were on the other side of the border. Today, unfortunately, the voices are getting louder, saying that Ukraine must finally accept defeat because Russia is stronger. We are caving in to the stronger instead of promoting the strength of the right. That is bitter, and that is why I will continue to fight so that we, in Germany, would reorganise and increase our support, but I cannot promise anything.  

– You have already mentioned about the Russian hybrid war against Europe.  But it seems that Germany does not take it seriously, doesn’t it? 

– The Chancellor proclaimed a Zeitenwende (a turning point), but that was only a turning point for the armed forces, not for the mindset or strategic culture. It hasn’t been a turning point for prioritising resources for greater defensive capability, resilience, or support for Ukraine.

The troubling part is that the Chancellor claims we are the second-largest supporters of Ukraine. But that’s only because he’s not putting Ukrainians to work in Germany; he’s placing them on citizens’ benefits. Only 20% of Ukrainians are working in Germany, while in Poland (yes, without a language barrier) or the Netherlands, around 70% are employed. We need to recognise Ukrainian qualifications much more quickly.

70% of German aid stays in Germany, with only 10-15% allocated to military support. We’re ranked 17th in the European Union for the percentage of gross domestic product devoted to military aid for Ukraine, meaning Germany is also letting down the rest of Europe. The Danes, for example, provide about 16 times as much aid to Ukraine based on their GDP as Germany does. The Nordic states, the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, and even the UK all contribute significantly more in terms of GDP. Germany’s arrogance isolates us in Europe, while making the German population comfortable, as they believe we’re the second-largest supporters of Ukraine. Sadly, this misinformation is diminishing the willingness to support Ukraine in Germany.

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