Allen Gindler is an independent scholar specialising in the Austrian School of Economics and political economy. His academic work has appeared in the Journal of Libertarian Studies and The Independent Review. He has also written opinion pieces for Mises Wire, American Thinker, the Foundation for Economic Education and Biblical Archaeology Review.
He spoke to The Ukrainian Week about the path to Ukraine’s post-war economic prosperity, the challenges of joining the European Union, and how to ensure a steady flow of Western investment.
– Thank you very much for joining me today. To begin, could you tell us a bit about yourself? We know you were born in Ukraine and now live in the United States — tell us more about that journey.
– Yes, that’s right. I was born in Ukraine in 1966 and grew up there. I studied in Ukraine, and 32 years ago I moved to the United States. Now I work as an independent scholar — meaning I’m not affiliated with a university or college. I publish research in academic journals and write op-eds for different outlets. Recently, I became a regular contributor to The Independent Institute think tank, where I write on an ongoing basis. As an economist, I follow the Austrian School of Economics and promote the ideas and principles of that tradition.
– Since gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine’s economy has had a rocky path. It has never really functioned as a true free market — the state and bureaucracy have always played a major role. A large share of GDP is channelled through the government budget, particularly through pensions and other entitlements, and now there’s also the immense strain of the war. If we imagine the war ends tomorrow, what reforms would you suggest to help Ukraine build a genuinely prosperous free-market economy?
– Before I offer specific advice, let me briefly outline the foundations of libertarianism. Austrian economics is closely connected to libertarian philosophy, but libertarianism itself has several strands — or, if you like, different shades. Broadly speaking, there are three: classical liberalism, minarchism, and anarcho-capitalism.
They differ mainly in how much room they believe the state should have in economic and social life. Anarcho-capitalists argue that there should be no state at all. Classical liberals accept that the government has certain necessary roles. Minarchists believe those roles should be extremely limited — essentially confined to law and order, national defence, and a few core functions.
I align with the classical liberal tradition. That is also the tradition associated with Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and other leading figures of the Austrian School.
Let me take a moment to explain what the Austrian School of Economics is really about and why it’s different. At its core, it argues that prosperity comes from free markets, strong private property rights, individual choice and, above all, limited government. And these aren’t just nice-sounding slogans. There’s a consistent philosophy and a clear economic logic behind them.
That said, the Austrian School is deeply philosophical and not always easy to translate into day-to-day policy. For decades, its ideas remained largely in the realm of theory. Only now are we seeing a serious attempt to apply them in practice — and that is happening in Argentina. What is unfolding there amounts to a real-time experiment. The philosophy of the Austrian School is now in the hands of Javier Milei, who is trying to turn those ideas into concrete policies through a broad reform agenda.
Before we met today, I had a look at what Argentina is actually doing right now — and the numbers really are striking. In 2023, inflation was running at 300% or even higher. Now, in 2025, it’s down to 31.5%. That’s roughly a tenfold drop. And they’re projecting 10% in 2026. Poverty has fallen from 57% to 27%. The budget deficit, which used to be around 15%, is expected to reach zero by 2026. GDP growth stands at 5%.
So in many ways, what Argentina is doing is exactly the kind of reform Ukraine would need — in peacetime. But here’s the key point: Austrian School economics, or any free-market model — including the Chicago School — simply doesn’t work during a war.
History shows that very clearly. During the Second World War, the United States essentially shifted to wartime socialism. Take the Jeep. It was first developed by a small company, but the government stepped in and ordered them to hand over all the designs and technology to Willys and Ford because the military needed mass production. The same thing happened with the Manhattan Project. Imagine you’re a professor at Columbia University, living a comfortable academic life, teaching your classes — and then someone shows up with an order saying, “You’re moving to the desert.” That’s not the free market. That’s wartime mobilisation.
So yes, during the war, we’re stuck with a command-style economy, and there’s no way to put Austrian School principles into practice. Going back to Ukraine, I was actually surprised a couple of years ago when I checked the Constitution and saw that it defines Ukraine as a “social state.” Is that really the case?
– Yes, Article 1 of the Constitution clearly states that Ukraine is a sovereign and independent, democratic, social, law-based state.
– Yes, they managed to fit everything into one sentence. It sounds flattering. But in European legal language, “social” usually points to a welfare state. From an Austrian or libertarian perspective, you could even say it leans towards socialism — not in the Marxist sense, but in a softer, evolutionary sense.
– Like Scandinavia?
– Scandinavia is a slightly different case. What I have in mind is what was once called evolutionary socialism, associated with Eduard Bernstein. He was part of the German Social Democratic movement and had a major debate with Karl Kautsky. Rosa Luxemburg even criticised him for not being Marxist enough. Bernstein argued that socialism would evolve gradually, through reforms. That version survived. You can see elements of it today in the United States and across Europe.
If it were up to me, I would remove the word “social” from the Constitution, because in practice it opens the door to a permanently expanding welfare state.
Even after the war ends, the country will still be thinking in terms of what I would call “war socialism”. Soldiers will be coming home, and the state will feel — understandably — that it must take care of them. But at some point, perhaps five years down the line, when things stabilise and the focus shifts to growth, Ukraine will have to cut regulation and give entrepreneurs room to breathe. That’s essentially what Javier Milei has been trying to do.
Every regulation is basically a bureaucratic way to take money from business owners and make it harder to start and run a company. Even in the U.S., under Trump, this happens — there are so many rules that building anything takes forever. So yes, cutting unnecessary regulations is absolutely necessary.
Second, taxes need to be simple. A flat rate of 10 to 15% would be ideal. It broadens the tax base and makes compliance straightforward. Any loopholes must go, because they usually just protect connected people. In the U.S., the tax system is so complicated that “optimising” taxes often just means finding ways to avoid them, which undermines trust and morale. With a simple flat tax, you earn, pay 10%, and that’s it. You own something, you pay, you forget about it. It’s better for the country, and nobody tries to game the system.
We also need to cut red tape when opening a business. A shop or a factory should be up and running in days, not weeks or months. Ukraine’s Diia app is perfect for this — I’ve seen it through friends — and honestly, it’s an excellent example of government actually simplifying things, even better than the U.S. It’s exactly the kind of tool that helps entrepreneurs get started quickly and legally.
– I wanted to ask your take on European bureaucracy and standardisation. Some argue that EU standards are a good thing, ensuring high-quality goods. Others say they’re a huge burden on business, stifling innovation and removing incentives. Should Ukraine be eager to join that “standards society,” or stick to its own free-market rules?
– Look, I think for Ukraine, the push to join the EU has been as much emotional as economic — a way to prove you belong to Europe, to show the world you are part of the European community and separate from those who attack you.
From a purely economic standpoint, EU bureaucracy and regulation can be a real burden for business. Membership doesn’t replace your existing system — it adds another layer on top of it. That means more rules to comply with and, inevitably, additional financial contributions to support the wider EU structure. You would have to align with their standards and policies, and while some may be beneficial, others could constrain entrepreneurs and slow growth rather than encourage it.
I’ll give you an example: energy production. I know what’s happening in Ukraine right now — you need to get your power back online as quickly as possible. You can’t rely only on renewable green energy. The fastest, most efficient way is to use coal and gas to get those power stations running. Yes, it’s not “green,” but you don’t have the time or the money to wait for solar panels or other slow solutions. You can, of course, build nuclear or hydro plants, but that takes years. Coal and gas get you energy fast. China is opening a new plant almost every week. It’s dirty, yes, but even there, “clean coal” technology exists.
The EU won’t let you do that. They push green energy and their standards, but Ukraine isn’t wealthy enough to follow them to the letter. Those rules could actually slow you down. And energy is the foundation of everything. The same goes for requirements like “clean trucks” and similar regulations. Right now, you’re not starting from zero — you’re starting from negative, after the war. To rebuild, you need freedom to act quickly, without waiting for European bureaucracy to tell you what and how to do it. Once the country is back on its feet and wealthier, then you can worry about greener energy sources.
They also have their own rules about how much you’re supposed to spend on things like the military or pensions. Ukraine can’t afford that. You need more economic freedom to make decisions for yourselves. And you’ve already tested some of these rules, right? You opened markets, applied quotas — and within a month, the quotas had already expired. I’m talking about agriculture here.
You simply can’t take on another layer of taxes and regulations from countries that haven’t fought a war in decades, that usually rely on the US for security, and spend heavily on social programmes. Ukraine doesn’t have the money for that, and you certainly shouldn’t be sending it to the EU bureaucracy.
Take Brexit. Britain didn’t slam the door on Europe or sever all ties — it chose to reclaim more room to make its own decisions. Brussels no longer sets the rules on issues like migration quotas. For Ukraine, that’s something to think about. EU membership comes with common policies, including on resettlement. That would mean accepting quotas and obligations shaped at the European level, not in Kyiv. For a country rebuilding after war, with its own social and economic strains, that’s a serious consideration — and a potential risk.
– We share the same concerns. Politically, EU membership has some value during a war, but once the war is over, joining should be carefully considered.
– Exactly — carefully considered, and don’t be shy about asking for exceptions. You can probably negotiate them: “Hey, we just came out of a war; we need this, we need that.” Basically, try to get a “free ride.” Don’t overpay, don’t follow every rule blindly, just deal with them formally. And at home, keep your laws simple and market-friendly.
The EU countries are essentially “nanny states.” People there have relied on government support for generations; they don’t know how to take initiative or celebrate success. They often punish innovation. That’s not the kind of economic environment that will help Ukraine grow fast.
– Let me bring up two long-standing concerns about privatising state-owned industries. Over 35 years of independence, Ukraine has had large enterprises, and those pushing for privatisation faced two main worries. First: these industries could end up under Russian control through shell companies or offshore structures, allowing Moscow to sabotage the Ukrainian economy. Second: the oligarchs. Big business in Ukraine has often been used to advance political interests rather than make a profit. How would you deal with this?
– I get what you mean. It’s a really tough question. I remember the early years, when former Communist Party members and even some criminals rushed to privatise everything. People had no idea what was happening; the changes came very fast. Unfortunately, Ukraine ended up doing what Russia did. They didn’t explore other options, even though examples were right there — like in Germany or Japan after WWII, where oligarchies didn’t form. Ukraine, sadly, made a huge mistake.
The reality is that you now have an oligarchic system, with entire industries controlled by well-connected individuals. So what can be done? There are several options.
The most radical approach would be to take those assets back under state control — at least temporarily — and then relaunch privatisation through genuinely open, transparent auctions. In an ideal scenario, shares would be distributed among the workers at those plants and factories. The main objective is to ensure that privatisation does not simply morph into another round of cronyism. Parliament should adopt clear, tough rules: no offshore schemes, no shadow intermediaries. Countries that act as aggressors should be barred from ownership altogether. And due diligence must be rigorous — full checks carried out before anyone is even allowed to participate in an auction.
Another approach is to tell the oligarchs: “You’ve had 30 years of luck. Now it’s time to give something back.” You demand a one-time payment of billions of dollars from each enterprise, redistribute shares among the workers, and start fresh.
The third approach is much slower: any new enterprises still in government hands could go to auction, but the oligarchs who already got their “slice of the pie” would be banned from taking part.
Most people never had a chance to participate in the first wave of privatisation. This time, it has to be on a massive scale—you need to redistribute ownership to as many people as possible. Argentina managed it fairly easily because they didn’t have the problem of Russian oligarchs inside the country. They were just very poor, grappling with hyperinflation, so Milei could simply take the industries and put them up for sale. For Ukraine, it’s trickier. Your concern about property falling into Russian hands is real—they’re still your neighbours, and they remain hostile.
– Speaking about rebuilding Ukraine, there’s hope based on promises from the EU and the US to invest after the war, whether or not Russia pays reparations. Do you think they’ll actually follow through? And will it really benefit them to invest?
– If all you get is a ceasefire, the only investment coming in will be loans and government aid. Private companies aren’t going to risk their money in a country that’s not truly at peace. Some American firms have already lost capital because of Russian aggression.
What Ukraine needs is peace backed by real guarantees. That’s what Zelensky has been pushing for. A deal without security guarantees, he argues, is little more than a piece of paper. A guarantee may also be written on paper, but it carries political and strategic weight. Countries that put their signatures to such commitments are generally expected to stand by them.
Look at WWII: when Germany attacked Poland, Great Britain had to declare war. They didn’t want to, but they honoured their commitment. Interestingly, though, when the Soviet Union invaded Poland, Great Britain didn’t declare war on the Soviets. Stalin claimed, “We aren’t attacking Poland; we’re defending it from the Germans.”
Right now, I don’t see private companies rushing to invest. You might get firms backed by governments, but that’s not the same thing. Take that infamous deal on rare minerals with Trump, for example—let’s say they send five tractors. That’s not nearly enough.
Zelensky is insisting on a peace deal with firm security guarantees — and that’s the crux of it. Without them, foreign investors will look at the map, see that Putin is still in power, and decide it’s not worth the risk. You might see some cautious money flowing into relatively safer cities like Lviv or Ternopil, but beyond that, investment would likely stall.
– To wrap up our conversation, I’d like to share a statement I believe is true: that the best security guarantee for Ukraine is having factories like Rheinmetall and other military companies producing ammunition, tanks, and planes inside the country. Do you agree with that?
– Partially. As I said, any company that sets up in Ukraine could lose its capital if another war breaks out. It doesn’t matter whether they’re making tanks or producing oil. A factory itself doesn’t guarantee security—the real factor is confidence: the belief that they will actually benefit. Right now, companies are calculating based on cheap, skilled labour. They’re thinking about profit, which is fine—profit is a signal.
Ukraine has huge potential in agriculture and IT. At the moment, we’re in the AI phase. To really ride the AI wave, you need energy. AI data centres consume enormous amounts of power—in the US, electricity costs are rising because of this. If Ukraine wants an AI boom, it will need reliable energy and proper cooling infrastructure. You’ve got the talent and skills; now you just need the power to make it work.
My point about the EU is this: they won’t let you build fast enough because they’ll argue that a coal plant is “dirty” and bad for the climate.
No one in the world wants you to defend the “indefensible.” They want Ukraine to wave goodbye to Crimea and Donbas and stop fighting. That’s the message I hear from politicians in the US and Europe—and it’s what Trump wants too. De facto, that territory might be lost, but you should insist that no one recognises it as Russian. Look at history: the US never recognised the Baltic Republics as part of the Soviet Union, and the same goes for the Kuril Islands and Japan.
The reality is, the major world powers are not 100% on Ukraine’s side.
– Our view is that we’re supported only as long as we can defend ourselves. The moment we show weakness, our allies step back. They back a strong Ukraine.
– Absolutely. And I think that view is starting to shift a bit. Four years of war against a country that was supposed to have the “number two” army? At first, Russia made advances in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, but once Ukrainians began pushing back, their progress stalled. Russia was expelled from Kyiv and Kharkiv.
Ukraine has huge potential. I don’t know what the Europeans are thinking. They should be supplying everything needed for the war—you provide the soldiers. If Trump believes Russia is a threat to American or European security, then Ukraine is the country actively fighting that threat and weakening it every day. Not supporting that effort is hypocritical. I hope Ukraine stays strong and doesn’t give an inch to Trump or anyone else.
