The Ukrainian Week spoke with Dr. Jade McGlynn, Research Fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and author of the books Russia’s War and Memory Makers, about the evolution of Russian propaganda, the tensions between ethnonationalists and the Kremlin, and the role these groups play in Russian politics.
— Has Russian propaganda changed over the past four years? And if so, in what ways?
— Broadly speaking, I would say it has not changed dramatically in the sense that many of the core narratives have been in place for a very long time. When it comes to narratives about Ukraine, the idea of the “good Ukrainian”—happy to be Russia’s cheerful younger brother, speaking Russian and perhaps pronouncing a softer ‘h’ instead of a ‘g’—versus the “bad Ukrainian,” who speaks Ukrainian and is seen by Russia as a traitor or extremist, has been a recurring theme for centuries. It has certainly persisted since independence and especially since 2014.
Some elements of Russian propaganda have remained remarkably stable in broad outline: collective narcissism, which permeates almost all of it; the blind belief that Russia is an inherently “great country,” a “civilisation-state” that has been mistreated; and the conviction that it must act aggressively to restore its supposedly lost status. These elements have become increasingly pronounced since 2014. The language has definitely grown more ideological. At the same time, however, some small changes have occurred.
As a British, I also pay close attention to the threats Russia may be directing at the UK. Most recently, with the Americans having shifted their stance on what appears to be their entire value space, one of the things I’ve noticed is a marked increase in hostile messaging about Britain. A major part of this is that Russia cannot malign the United States to quite the same extent. There is plenty of mockery of Trump and of the US in general, so typical Russian trolling, but it operates within certain limits.
Toward Britain, however, the tone is far more violent and aggressive. The UK is now framed as a civilisational adversary, even “enemy number one.”
You can see how these shifts correspond to broader geopolitical changes. But, on the whole, this narrative has existed for a very long time, which raises the question why didn’t more of us (myself included) raise more alarm earlier?
— Since you also research Russian propaganda targeting Britain, have you noticed any specific forms of mockery or particular narratives related to Russia’s war against Ukraine? Or perhaps elements that weren’t used before the full-scale invasion? How has this propaganda evolved?
— I think what we’ve seen is really an evolution in intensity rather than a dramatic shift. I think “evolved” would be the right word. We reviewed coverage from the period before January 2022 through August 2025 and identified ten core narratives in total. Some of them were fairly “standard”: the British are portrayed as “hypocrites”; the British “are always involved in covert operations”; the British “are Russia’s historical enemies.”
Where I would say there was a noticeable increase is in the portrayal of Britain as a civilisational enemy of Russia – the idea that Russia cannot live in peace until Britain is destroyed. I ended up calling this group of narratives “Let’s destroy Britain,” simply because there wasn’t a more fitting label. Within this group, you see discussions about using biological warfare to wipe out the British population, and similar extreme rhetoric.
From my perspective, I do sometimes worry that the British public is not fully aware of the depth of Russian hostility toward us. Regarding the war, there was also something quite striking: Russian propagandists were remarkably manipulative in the way they weaponised emotions around the horrors Russia itself inflicted on Ukraine, redirecting that blame back toward Britain. I recall one segment on a Russian state television roughly saying: “Ukrainians will never forgive Britain for what has been done to their cities. Look at this destruction. Ukrainians will take revenge on Britain for the devastation inflicted on them.”
The implication was clear: Britain was to blame for backing what Russian propaganda refers to as the “Kyiv regime.” That, of course, is not how the British see it. We see it as supporting the Ukrainian people. But in Russian propaganda, because Britain supports what they call the “Kyiv regime”, Britain becomes responsible for the destruction Russia carried out. This is another example of Russian propaganda’s extraordinary ability to outsource responsibility for its own actions.
— Has the level of propaganda increased in recent months, or has it stayed mostly stable?
— I primarily study domestic propaganda, so propaganda within Russia rather than Russian propaganda aimed at external audiences. I also examine Russian propaganda in the occupied territories, which is technically external but still very different from, for example, what appears on Russia Today. Propaganda targeting Britain has definitely increased, particularly since the recent political shift in the United States.
In September, we had a number of protests in the UK related to illegal migration. Looking at Russian propaganda on this topic, many Telegram channels presented themselves as British or as English-language channels targeting a UK audience. It’s quite interesting because it’s unusual for me to read English-language Telegram channels. That’s normally not what I read there.
Yet, these channels pushed a very “English” content, something along the lines of “these are our pubs, get out of them, illegal immigrants,” or narratives centred around the St George’s flag. And then, completely out of the blue, you could see a post claiming that “last night Russia bombed the deep-state institution of the British Council,” accompanied by celebratory language. It’s very strange: you’re reading intensely patriotic English rhetoric, and suddenly there’s a post applauding Russia for bombing a British institution. I should add that almost nobody in the UK is even aware of it because the British Council is aimed at foreigners. British people don’t use it. So the manipulation is quite obvious.
The Resilience and Reconstruction Group in the UK, led by Stephen Lacey, has recently conducted excellent research on this, which I believe will be published soon [this interview was conducted in September 2025 – ed.]. They carried out interviews and opinion polls across different segments of the British public on Ukraine, including conversations with Tommy Robinson, a far-right UK figure who has visited Moscow several times, as well as with followers of Russian propaganda and various conspiracy theorists.
To be honest, compared with what we sometimes see elsewhere in Europe, I wouldn’t say these people were extremely pro-Russian. Many were simply anti-Ukraine, or they disliked our own government so intensely that they resented the fact we were supporting Ukraine. But even among this group, when researchers talked to them about issues like the deported Ukrainian children, people became very emotional and genuinely upset. So I don’t think even they are fully “lost” to Russian propaganda. They clearly still have some basic moral compass. If you explain what is actually happening, they are appalled, which made me feel somewhat optimistic because it means we can still reach out to them.
However, one of the biggest challenges is simply a lack of information. Apart from The Telegraph’s Ukraine: The Latest podcast, much of the British media, unfortunately, does not cover events in Ukraine in a way that is genuinely helpful. There is a tendency toward “celebrification”, so focusing on personalities, especially Donald Trump, and I can see it even in the kinds of questions I receive from British journalists.
— You also research ethnonationalism in Russia. There’s clear tension between ethnonationalist groups and the current Russian leadership—Putin and his inner circle. Is it a strong tension? And under these circumstances, is any kind of coup possible?
— I don’t think a coup is possible, because the Kremlin has done a very effective job of preventing any prominent leader from emerging within the ethnonationalist movement. In my view, what seems possible is destabilisation. Russia essentially has a war economy, or at least a highly militarised economy, that desperately needs workers. At the same time, there is an acute labour shortage because the state continues sending its men to kill and die in Ukraine.
So what do you do when there’s a labour shortage? You bring in migrants. Wages can be raised to some extent, but more often than not, countries fill the gap with migrant workers. Yet in Russia, anti-migrant sentiment runs deep. Migrants are frequently mistreated, and racism is widespread—even toward groups native to the Russian Federation who aren’t Slavic Russians.
As a result, you have organisations like Russkaya Obshchina (Russian Community – ed.), a highly ethnonationalist group that is quite obviously controlled by the FSB. At the same time, senior figures such as Sergei Kiriyenko publicly encourage migration and argue in favour of it. Meanwhile, there are frequent, very localised violent incidents: murders and fights involving migrants. This is where the ethnonationalists will play a destabilising role. They exist in a different media ecosystem, one that is intensely ethnonationalist and far more connected to the reality of the war. The majority of Russians can still pretend that the “special military operation” happening somewhere far away doesn’t affect them and that everything remains normal, as state propaganda claims. Ethnonationalists do not inhabit that bubble. Again, this is one of those contradictions I mentioned—one that doesn’t inevitably lead to destabilisation, but certainly has the potential to do so depending on how things unfold.
I think Russian ethnonationalists will play a major role after Putin, not least because they enjoy support from parts of the elite, as is already evident. They may even become influential before Putin leaves the scene, but I don’t expect a coup. They are much more likely to act as a destabilising force that the Kremlin will have to either absorb or accommodate.
When people discuss the collapse of the Soviet Union, they often overlook the role of Ukraine, Estonia, and other nations colonised by the USSR, as well as the role of Russian ethnonationalism and the way Yeltsin tapped into that sentiment.
Personally, I would support any effort that encourages isolationist tendencies within Russia, no matter the narrative form they take. Ethnonationalists are particularly interesting because, horrific as their views may be, they actually believe in something. That makes them more politically engaged—and in some ways more analytically intriguing—than Kremlin apparatchiks and technocrats, who often seem to believe in nothing at all.
— How do you see Russia after Putin? Will the next leaders come from the apparatchik camp or from the ethnonationalist groups?
— I think that, initially, it is more likely to be a technocrat – an apparatchik. I imagine this could be Sergei Kiriyenko, and he will try to present himself as a Khrushchev-like figure following Stalin. And my greatest fear is that some in the West might actually believe it. We have made serious mistakes in our approach to Russia in the past. It is difficult to predict, but given how Kiriyenko has been involved in Mariupol, in the deportation of children and in many other horrific war crimes, it would be extremely hard to accept him as some sort of “reformer.”
Any successor will need to build their own legitimacy, just as Putin did. Unfortunately, Putin does have popular legitimacy among Russians. It isn’t electoral legitimacy, but I see no evidence that the majority of Russians oppose him. So at some point, tensions will emerge simply because the new leader will need to establish legitimacy of their own.
I don’t think many people in the Russian elite are as ideologically committed to the war against Ukraine as Putin is. However, most elites do share the broader worldview that underpins the war: the belief that Ukraine has no right to exist, that it is part of Russia, that Russia must control Ukraine to restore its lost status. The ideological foundations of the war will remain intact—even if Russia ends up being led by the most technocratic of technocrats.
And I suspect that is when we will begin to see real tensions between the technocrats (and the segment of society that has managed to ignore the war) and the ethnonationalists, who will start to move into the foreground, if not sooner.
— Do you think it is worthwhile for Ukraine and the EU to engage with Russian ethnonationalists?
— My view is that, of course, there are some Russian ethnonationalists who are pro-Ukraine, but most of them are already in Ukraine or actively supporting it. More broadly, I don’t think you can “convert” the Russian population to a Ukrainian perspective—or even to a broader European worldview.
However, you can act in your own interests: to subvert or influence these groups, steering them in directions that align with Ukraine’s strategic goals. That’s simply how geopolitics has always worked. I think we’ve reached a point where every European country—including the UK, Ukraine, and the EU states—needs to focus squarely on what is in Europe’s self‑interest. And that self‑interest is clear: Russia must not win this war. And this war won’t truly end if it stops on Ukrainian territory. In that case, it may pause, but it won’t be over. The war ends only if it ends inside Russia. And no one is going to destroy Russia in a 1945‑style scenario. Only Russia can destroy Russia.
