Despite the ongoing full-scale war, Ukraine continues to advance towards EU membership through the implementation of reforms and other integration efforts. But how fast is this progress? What are the main challenges? And how has the recent situation concerning the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption bodies, NABU and SAPO, affected the level of trust between Kyiv and Brussels?
The Ukrainian Week discussed these and other issues with Maja Cvitan Grubišin—a lawyer, former Deputy Minister of Justice of Croatia, and EU expert who has worked on European integration not only in her homeland but also in Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Kosovo. She is currently supporting Ukraine’s EU integration through the EU Project Pravo-Justice.
— Recently, Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated that Ukraine will be ready for negotiations on EU accession across all clusters by the end of the year. Do you think this assessment by the Prime Minister is realistic?
— Well, it’s a good question and there is a long answer. But, to put it shortly — yes, it’s possible. First of all, we need to clarify that the negotiation rules and the way negotiations work are not engraved in stone. From country to country, from year to year, new realities appear, and the process of EU integration is always mutating. In this context, it is possible that the mechanisms will be such that all the efforts Ukraine has made (and there have been quite a lot of efforts in a short time, which is important to mention), and the circumstances will be set in such a way that it will be possible to officially open and start the negotiations, as was announced recently.
However, I see several challenges on the EU side. While we can discuss Ukraine’s readiness — that is one part of the answer — the other question is how this process will actually be implemented. At the moment, the European Union still lacks a clear response, since a unanimous decision from all member states is required to start this process.
Right now, some governments have already announced that they will not give their consent. This is part of the political game, and it is not unusual — similar situations have occurred at different stages of past negotiations.
Such objections may disappear for the time being, only to resurface later and block the next step. This is a political question. I believe lessons have been learned from previous experiences, and given the current geopolitical reality, Ukraine is likely to receive the necessary support and eventually be granted this opportunity.
This is something that everyone needs to learn in this process, especially the country that is negotiating. The EU is not turning a blind eye to certain issues. And let’s mention these areas. For Ukraine, the conditio sine qua non is the rule of law, the anti-corruption track, consolidation of public finances, and human rights — especially considering there is a war now. So, there is a lot to discuss before Ukraine is ready.
There was a change of government in the summer, and now we can see that things have slowed down. Yet, there had been remarkable enthusiasm in achieving the goals reached so far — most notably the adoption of the rule of law roadmap, the last document awaiting confirmation from the EU side.
The work has been very strong and determined. Some political aspects are well shaped at the moment. They will have to be elaborated later, but for now there has been a good compromise in this rule of law roadmap, and it is a good start. But with the change of government, we have to see how this new leadership will address the pace and define the key reforms they will embrace, because there are a huge number of them. So, we are at a crossroads.
— You have mentioned the streams (namely anti-corruption and human rights) that could complicate Ukraine’s situation during the negotiations. In your personal opinion, how much has the recent scandal involving the anti-corruption bodies (NABU and SAPO) affected Ukraine’s position in the negotiations?
— I will speak in my personal capacity here. I was in Kyiv when it happened, and the response of civil society, especially young people, was very emotional and strong. But for us — those working within the system, engaged in the overarching idea of the EU integration reform process and fully aware of its scope — it resonated immediately on every single level, from the Commission all the way to field projects. Questions poured in: Why did this happen? How was it possible?
There was no clear answer then, and the question remains unresolved. But the reaction of the president and his team was also swift. I imagine the phones were burning with calls, as there had clearly been a serious underestimation of the impact these decisions would have.
Although the incident cast a shadow, the president’s quick action (halting the decision, though not reversing it completely) was the best possible move under the circumstances. From now on, every single move from the Ukrainian side will receive close attention. It sends a clear message to policymakers: even the smallest provision in any law will now be carefully examined — not only by society, but also by the European Union, diplomats, and especially civil society actors and ordinary citizens.
Ukrainian civil society demonstrated its strength during those few days of protests in Kyiv. Had the president failed to act, or chosen the wrong course, I am certain the demonstrations would have continued. In the end, the president’s decision brought about what I would call a very good resolution.
Now let’s move on. Everything is open. We’re proceeding clearly towards integration in the right way. Every decision, every little detail is now being watched, and I think we can hope that it will work very well in this direction.
— In the EU Project Pravo-Justice, you lead the EU integration component focused on the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions, specifically Chapter 23 of the acquis. In a previous interview, you mentioned that negotiations on this chapter open first but close last. Why is that?
— It is the most difficult chapter of the reform package, as it relates to the judiciary and fundamental rights. Since it was introduced, Croatia has been the only candidate country to both open and close it. It requires very strict reforms of all judicial bodies and a very clear anti-corruption framework.
Post-Yugoslav countries all struggle with corruption, which is why none of them have been able to close chapter 23. State mechanisms, political culture, economic instability, and other similar factors influence the level of corruption and political instability.
So, in order to close the chapter, you need to reform your anti-corruption institutions and judicial system. These institutions must be structured to ensure independence at every stage and in every mechanism — from how judges are selected, to how their performance is evaluated, and how appeals are handled. This also includes how you organise the first and second instances of the courts, write procedural laws, implement IT systems, conduct investigations, and so on. There are a huge number of small mechanisms, and each one is already a significant task. When combined under one chapter, it becomes an extremely powerful anti-corruption tool.
When all of this is brought together in one place, politics often slows the process down, as actors try to shape reforms in ways that leave room for maneuvering. It is, in a sense, a normal human reaction: policymakers may agree on the need for reform but still attempt to design it so they can retain some influence. This tendency creates a constant struggle within the reform process.
That is why opening and closing Chapter 23 requires strong political will. If the determination now being declared is genuine, I believe Ukraine can look forward to a positive future. Establishing the rule of law is the foundation for peace and prosperity. With a stable judicial system that guarantees equality and protects everyone’s rights, there is real hope for building a just society. This could lead to a very positive outcome — but we will have to see how it unfolds.
— What has made Croatia more successful than other Balkan states in the reform process?
— Every country has its own path. In our case, we faced a war at the very beginning of independence, in the 1990s, which set back our economy and institutions. Only afterwards did we have the chance to recover and begin building a functioning state. Compared to Ukraine, we were smaller and already further along in the reform process — which makes our situation quite different.
Still, I would not say our experience was entirely successful. From the moment we applied for candidacy until accession, more than ten years passed. By contrast, Ukraine’s initial phase has moved much faster than that of other states, which is a positive sign.
But now, what matters most is maintaining a clear and structured commitment to reforms. In Croatia, the decisive reforms came during the final two years of negotiations, when it became clear that we had to accelerate, deliver results, and be ready. That is when we reformed our system, though it took a great deal of time.
During that time, there were many changes of government, and each new administration pushed forward by making decisions that its predecessors had avoided. This was a positive dynamic: democratic change and the rotation of political leaders proved beneficial for the reform process. To win support, parties had to promise reforms, and once in power, they had to deliver. Step by step, this advanced our reforms. The same will be important for Ukraine — reforms must continue regardless of political changes.
— Croatia was the most recent country to join the EU, which makes your experience especially valuable given its time span. Which aspects of Croatia’s accession process do you consider most relevant for Ukraine today?
— I see anti-corruption and the war experience as the most valuable lessons. With anti-corruption, the hardest part is setting up — both legislatively and organisationally — a system that protects the judicial bodies responsible for prosecuting, investigating, and trying corruption cases. You need a system that can detect, prosecute, and enforce justice independently. This was crucial because corruption was eating our society from the inside, and it was appalling. I remember my grandmother would not go to a doctor without bringing ham, coffee, or chocolates — it felt like something truly indispensable. People without connections had no chance to thrive or reach their full potential. They didn’t have an equal place in society.
This house of cards began to collapse after the 1990s, and it became clear that it was happening thanks to reforms. Over 10–15 years of judicial reforms, we focused on building independent, strong bodies capable of doing this properly. As a result, for example, our Prime Minister [Ivo Sanader — Ed.] was arrested for corruption. Recently, he was released from jail. [Ivo Sanader was Prime Minister of Croatia from 2003–2009. In 2012, he was sentenced to 18 years for corruption but was released on parole in July 2025.] The system had reached the point where it could investigate, prosecute, and sentence a prime minister for high-level corruption. This was the final proof that Croatia had succeeded. It also meant that the courts could provide fair trials, and gradually, people began to trust the judiciary.
During our integration process, we also had to face the consequences of war. This was a major challenge, because war crimes, by their very nature, represent some of the most horrific experiences a generation can endure.
They were committed on both sides. A large number of cases were initiated against the aggressor, the Yugoslav Serbian side, but there were also indictments against Croatian generals. Some of these cases were dismissed and the generals acquitted, while others were not, creating significant controversy. After all the reforms, the cases against Croatian generals were finally transferred from the Hague Tribunal back to Croatia, allowing us to complete the trials under our own jurisdiction. This was a clear sign that we had implemented the necessary reforms and had become mature enough as a system to prosecute such cases ourselves.
The reform process was extensive, and by the time we held a referendum on EU accession, there was a high level of euroscepticism. We did pass it, but euroscepticism remained significant.
At the same time, many Croatians were dealing with the trauma of war, the challenges of reconstruction, and the painful reality of widespread corruption. Post-war privatisation, in particular, became a breeding ground for corruption as the country transitioned from a Yugoslav socialist system to a modern capitalist economy. As a result, the fight against corruption became a central part of our integration process. Many ministers ended up in jail, which is why anti-corruption measures became so unpopular among politicians.
Croatia is a small country of 3.8 million people, where everyone is highly interconnected. Influence and connections spread like a web, with one link easily touching another. There were many controversies, numerous judicial proceedings, and some individuals managed to evade verdicts by fleeing to Bosnia. Many Croatians hold dual Bosnian citizenship, so the extradition of these individuals was not possible, as they claimed to be Bosnian.
— What is the current situation with Euroscepticism? Has it faded, or has it grown stronger, as we see in some other EU states?
— Once you are in the EU, the benefits of membership become so clear that you realise there’s no other way you would want it. If you think of Brexit, citizens there immediately began feeling the consequences of leaving the EU. In Croatia, there were many reconstruction projects funded by the EU, including major investments in communal and city infrastructure, historical sites, and schools. You can see all of this with your own eyes as a citizen. I don’t think Croatians would want to go back on that.
There is also much greater security in terms of the rule of law. As an EU member, we belong to a system where core decisions on human rights and the acquis are monitored and must be maintained at a certain standard. And you know what? Honestly, I’ve thought and worked a lot on this idea, and I see the European Union today as the only place in the world where human dignity and human rights are central elements of the system itself.
Whereas in other systems, like the United States — an obvious point of comparison — financial considerations often take priority, the European Union places human dignity, rights, and equality at its core. Even though some things do not always work as we would like (for example, the EU’s approach to solidarity during the pandemic was not exactly what we expected), I don’t think Croatians would want to return to a system where everything was in the hands of a very small group of powerful people. The EU adds additional layers of oversight that we did not have before.
— At many events on the EU accession process, I’ve often heard concerns about a shortage of bureaucrats to help bring Ukraine closer to the EU. How is the situation now?
— Civil service is always a challenge, especially under reform. It requires more than a typical civil servant — someone who only knows the language of their country and performs routine tasks. Civil servants in Ukraine, and in all countries undergoing major EU reforms, need to be much more than that. Not only must they understand their regular job responsibilities, but they also need the capacity to grasp the EU reform process, know English, have strong social skills, and be knowledgeable across many areas because they are working on a wide range of topics. You need to understand these issues fully, because you are guiding the process.
The requirements for a civil servant working under these conditions are very high, which narrows the pool of people you can rely on. But in Ukraine, I see positive change, and there are very good individuals who are constructive and dependable. They have institutional memory, and I enjoy working with people like that, because with them, you can always achieve results.
However, after 10 years, people simply get tired and give up. We have to train young people who are just starting their careers, but the biggest challenge is that they are often offered better conditions by other organisations. So, how can we financially attract younger professionals who are up to the task? This challenge remains.
EU Project Pravo-Justice is an international technical assistance project implemented by Expertise France with the financial support of the European Union.
Since the Revolution of Dignity, EU Project Pravo-Justice has been a key driver in promoting the rule of law in Ukraine, aligning the country’s legal framework with European standards, shaping a strategic vision for reforms, advancing judicial reform, and ensuring the proper enforcement of court decisions.
The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of The Ukrainian Week and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
