The Ukrainian Week spoke with Jacek Kluczkowski — Polish diplomat, Poland’s ambassador to Ukraine from 2005 to 2010, and coordinator on Ukrainian affairs at the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw. Jacek Kluczkowski is also the author of the book Przypadki i wpadki dyplomaty (Incidents and Blunders of a Diplomat), which explores diplomatic and political life in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
— You’ve spent years closely connected to Ukraine. Looking back, what impressions have stayed with you, and how do you see the country today, in the midst of war? What changes stand out the most?
— Over the past 20 years, Ukraine has undergone profound changes — and that process is still ongoing. Much of it has been shaped by the war, by Russia’s open aggression. The aggressor, having trampled on international law and attacked Ukraine, has inevitably forced change. I see it in the way people behave, in how cultural and academic institutions operate, and even in the way we now engage with Ukrainian politicians and diplomats.
In fact, these changes have been unfolding since the early 1990s, when Ukraine gradually moved away from the shared norms of the Soviet era, embraced democracy, and worked to preserve it despite numerous challenges.
I have tremendous respect for the Ukrainian people and their determination to defend both their independence and democratic values.
That’s why, even though these changes were evolutionary, they included defining milestones: the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity. And 2022 became a year that showcased the extraordinary resolve of Ukrainians to protect all the gains achieved over three decades of independence.
— The fighting is taking place on Ukrainian soil, but in truth, we’re facing a common enemy. This war is already reshaping global politics, and we’re seeing shifts everywhere — for example, the rise of right-wing populism around the world. How is this trend affecting Eastern Europe, and does it make it harder to push back against Russian influence?
— I would say the issue is more complex and goes beyond Russian influence alone. The main driver behind the rise of far-right forces in Europe is migration, particularly in Western Europe. This type of populism encourages people to view economic processes not through the lens of real mechanisms, but through the prism of what they wish them to be.
There are many sources of this phenomenon. I wouldn’t even say it’s solely about right-wing populism, because in some countries similar dynamics appear under left-wing radical slogans. But populism, demagoguery, and the urge to solve everything with simple fixes — these are hallmarks of our time. I think people in Germany or France would be surprised if you told them this was purely a “Russian front.” In reality, it stems primarily from disappointment with economic policy, recurring crises across various sectors, and migration flows that spiralled out of control back in 2015.
The popularity of radical populist forces rests on the illusion that banning migration can solve everything. But that raises a crucial question: where will Europe find its workforce? Many Ukrainians work in Poland, for example, yet even that is not enough.
Migrants arrive from various countries, but serious challenges with assimilation persist. And here, Russia actively stirs the pot, spotting these tensions and trying to set these groups against the broader society.
Today, the Russian authorities are no longer associated with communism. On the contrary, they are more often linked to far-right radical circles. It is with these groups that Putin now works most closely, although he still maintains ties with left-wing forces when it serves his interests.
— It has certainly become easier for Putin to secure the support of far-right forces now.
— Yes, he backs them because he knows they can rely on broader public support. For him, this is a way to destabilise political systems in the West, including in Poland.
— Do you think this trend will continue, or are there signs of change?
— For the younger generation, the path of modernisation, gradual reform, and resolving conflicts through compromise seems unclear. In Poland, we’re seeing youth radicalisation — it is often young people who vote for far-right parties. So it’s unlikely this trend will be reversed anytime soon.
Still, I am confident that democratic values and liberal democracy will ultimately prevail. For now, though, we are witnessing a surge of far-right movements.
— How would you assess Ukrainian-Polish cooperation at this point in history? There’s a mix of moments — from tensions, like the Polish farmers’ protests or the recent Max Korzh concert with a large Ukrainian audience, to strong support from Poland since the full-scale war began. How can these frictions be managed while still strengthening the partnership?
— First, if we look at the tangible side — economic cooperation — it is developing dynamically and quite successfully. Exports from Poland to Ukraine and imports from Ukraine to Poland are both growing, even amid the conditions of war. And this involves not just agricultural products but a range of goods. For Ukraine, Poland is one of the key economic partners in the West, while for Poland, Ukraine ranks among the most important partners outside the EU.
In political terms, Poland’s support for Ukraine remains steady. We continue to assist the Armed Forces of Ukraine, providing yet another package of military aid. True, our economy is not as large as Germany’s, but we act within our means, understanding that Ukraine is defending not only its own independence but also holding the aggressor from reaching our borders.
So across the spheres of economy, politics, and military cooperation, there are tangible achievements — and overall, that paints a positive picture.
But there is another dimension — social and ideological, the broader atmosphere of relations between people. It is here that problems sometimes emerge. This is particularly true for young Ukrainians in Poland, especially men who could return to Ukraine or at least register there. We even attempted to create a “Ukrainian Legion” for migrants in Lublin: the plan was to recruit thousands, provide training and arms. Yet only a few dozen people responded, raising questions about how strongly some migrants feel connected to Ukraine.
You mentioned the concert of a Russian-speaking rapper from Belarus. Ninety percent of the audience were Ukrainians, and it came as a surprise that he managed to fill a stadium of 70,000. The issue wasn’t the concert itself, but the behaviour of some fans: there were fights, clashes with security, and incidents involving drugs and alcohol. This harmed the image of the Ukrainian community in Poland. Around a hundred people were arrested, and it created the impression that some Ukrainians, who should be on the front lines, were instead causing trouble in Poland. This has negatively shaped perceptions of the Ukrainian diaspora, particularly among the younger generation.
— As for the “Ukrainian Legion” in Lublin — has this idea gone anywhere?
— For now, it hasn’t. Those who want to return to Ukraine do so, but a significant number of men aged 18–60 remain abroad. By various estimates, around 800,000 Ukrainians in this age group currently live in EU countries. Some register, some study — and the Ukrainian authorities usually allow them to complete their education.
For Poland, this is partly a positive: Ukrainians are active in the workforce, often even more so than Poles (about 60–70% of Ukrainians in Poland are employed, compared with roughly 55% of Poles). But there are challenges as well: the behaviour of some migrants comes under criticism.
That’s why it’s important to understand that political disputes or historical issues don’t shape the daily lives of Poles and Ukrainians as much as people’s actual behaviour. And unfortunately, recently, there has been more intolerance and irritation.
— Can the Ukrainian-Polish alliance serve as the foundation for a new security model in Central and Eastern Europe — and what might that look like?
— Regional security is crucial. That’s why it’s essential to address all contentious situations as quickly as possible — even those that don’t yet appear as conflicts but could escalate.
For us, the key is to maintain NATO as the primary guarantor of security. Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine have established the Lublin Triangle, with the presidents of the three countries agreeing on cooperation, military training, and familiarisation with new equipment. This is important, but the central pillar of security — not just for Europe, but for the entire free world — remains the NATO Alliance and close cooperation between Europe and the United States.
At the regional level, of course, additional alliances are taking shape. Our calculations show that even Germany does not have enough weapons to resist Russian aggression on its own. While the European Union is the world’s largest economic power, its military potential still needs to be developed. So to claim that the EU alone could deter Russia would be an overstatement.
Regional frameworks, like the alliance of Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine, strengthen NATO’s position and add resilience locally. This is the right approach: to cultivate all possible forms of regional cooperation while keeping NATO and unity with the United States as the top priority.
