Valur Ingimundarson, Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Iceland and Chair of the EDDA Research Centre, specialises in international history, geopolitics, Arctic politics, and Iceland’s foreign, defence, and security policies—particularly its relations with the United States and NATO. In an interview with The Ukrainian Week, Ingimundarson discussed Iceland’s security challenges, the prospects of establishing a national armed force, the debate over EU membership, and reaffirmed Iceland’s support for Ukraine.
—Iceland, one of NATO’s founding members, has long relied almost entirely on the United States for its defence, spending just 0.2% of its GDP on it in recent years. What’s changed since Donald Trump returned to the presidency?
— No fundamental change has taken place. Given its strategic location, Iceland has provided territory for NATO and U.S. military operations since the early Cold War. As Iceland remains unarmed, this has been considered its contribution to Western collective defence. Unlike Greenland, Iceland has not featured in Trump’s rhetoric about territorial expansion in the North.
The current centre-left government has taken a firm pro-NATO stance without altering the status quo in its defence relationship with the United States. U.S. troops continue to be deployed to Iceland on a rotational, year-round basis.
However, given its pro-EU position, the government could place greater emphasis on strengthening defence ties with European NATO members and Canada. Soft security arrangements already exist with the Nordic countries, the UK, and Canada, and these could become more significant if the Trump administration reduces its commitment to Europe or adopts an anti-European foreign policy (any action involving Greenland would likely signal such a shift).
—In recent years, hybrid maritime threats from Russia have become increasingly visible. In 2023, the Icelandic government allowed key allied vessels into its territorial waters as a deterrent measure. What does the current situation at sea look like, and what’s needed to strengthen deterrence?
—Iceland has long served as a hub for NATO anti-submarine warfare exercises such as Dynamic Mongoose, which regularly feature P-8 aircraft from allied nations. What’s new is Reykjavik’s 2023 decision to allow U.S. nuclear-powered submarines to make periodic service stops in its territorial waters—provided they aren’t carrying nuclear weapons. One docked at an Icelandic port for the first time just last week.
The move builds on the resumption of regular U.S. anti-submarine patrols in the North Atlantic and Arctic, flown out of Iceland since 2016. Those operations picked up after a ten-year hiatus following the closure of the U.S. base there in 2006, prompted by renewed concern over Russia’s behaviour after its annexation of Crimea.
— There has been recent media speculation about whether Iceland should consider establishing its own army. How realistic is that idea in your view? And based on what you’ve seen, would the Icelandic public support such a move?
—There’s no public backing for the idea, and no Icelandic politician has come out in support of it. Iceland hasn’t had an army for centuries, and its unarmed status is widely seen as sacrosanct—an integral part of its national identity. The country joined NATO on the condition that it wouldn’t be required to establish a military, and no foreign partner has pushed it to rearm. With a population of just 390,000, such a move would be largely symbolic.
Instead, the Icelandic government has committed to investing 1.5% of GDP in infrastructure projects, in line with NATO’s 3.5+1.5 target. This includes long-overdue funding for the Coast Guard, dual-use infrastructure such as ports and roads, and cybersecurity initiatives—but not direct spending on a domestic military force.
— The Economist has reported that Iceland is once again discussing the possibility of joining the European Union, with a referendum planned to resume accession talks. What is the current level of public support for EU membership in Iceland, and what would be the potential benefits and drawbacks of such a decision for the country?
— While the government started out cautiously on this issue, it used the opportunity – when Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the EU Commission, recently visited Iceland – to announce the start of negotiations on a defence and security partnership agreement with the European Union. This move has brought Iceland’s EU membership back on the political agenda, even if the government, had stated that it did not plan to start accession talks during the current legislative period in case of a favorable outcome of the referendum, which will probably take place in 2026 or 2027.
According to recent opinion polls, a plurality of respondents, or 45%, are in favour of joining the EU, while about 35% oppose, with the rest undecided. A majority favours resuming accession talks (around 60%). Iceland’s potential EU membership has been a hotly contested domestic political issue, with the center-left broadly in favor but the center-right against.
The EU’s common fishery policy could prove a major impediment since there is broad political support for keeping full sovereign control over Iceland’s rich fishing grounds — its most important natural resource. Therefore, it is far too early to make any firm predictions on the issue.
— This year, Iceland funded the production of Ukrainian weapons following the so-called «Danish model». It has also supported Ukraine’s energy sector in the past and expressed readiness to send peacekeepers. Prime Minister Kristrún Frostadóttir has previously warned that if Russia prevails in Ukraine, it may shift its focus to the North. How do Icelanders generally view support for Ukraine, and has public opinion shifted during the full-scale invasion?
— There is still overwhelming public support for Ukraine; public opinion may not be as firm as it was in the beginning, but I see no real shift in attitudes. Only those on the far left and right are critical of the West, sometimes blaming it for triggering the Russian invasion.
It should be mentioned, however, that there has been some domestic criticism (which, for example, came up in the presidential election last year) of Icelanders — as an unarmed nation — buying ammunition shells for Ukraine. Instead, Icelanders should — the argument goes — focus on non-lethal aid to Ukraine. Yet the government has not budged from its stance that Iceland should contribute financially to Ukrainian military defense and no policy change is in the offing.
