Polish international affairs expert and head of the Poland-Ukraine Research Centre (Fundacja Centrum Badań Polska-Ukraina), Dariusz Materniak, spoke to The Ukrainian Week about the upcoming presidential election in Poland, the role of Ukraine in the campaign, and Russian propaganda.
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— Poland heads to the polls on May 18 for its presidential election. Current polls suggest the race will likely come down to Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, representing the ruling Civic Coalition, and opposition candidate Karol Nawrocki, who are both leading the pack. What are the main issues shaping their campaigns—and in your view, who has the edge?
— Broadly speaking, the campaigns of these two candidates—both seen as frontrunners for the second round—are built on sharply contrasting messages and a steady stream of mutual criticism. This is particularly true for Karol Nawrocki, who is aligned with opposition forces linked to the Law and Justice (PiS) party. Trzaskowski casts himself as a pro-European liberal, while Nawrocki underscores his conservative stance, expressing a degree of scepticism toward the European Union—not advocating for an exit, but favouring a looser model of integration. He also places greater emphasis on strengthening ties with the United States, rather than deepening relations with France or Germany.
— Ukraine has figured prominently in the campaign. Trzaskowski supports its EU membership and has pledged to maintain the “800 plus” benefits programme for Ukrainians. Nawrocki takes a different line, accusing Ukraine of failing to acknowledge past crimes—citing the Volhynia tragedy—and arguing that such issues disqualify it from joining alliances. How much has Ukraine influenced the course of the campaign?
— Ukraine-related issues surfaced early in the campaign, largely in the context of refugees and the social benefits they receive. That’s where the debate over the “800 plus” programme and similar initiatives began. But the topic hasn’t provoked strong emotions or shown any real potential to shape the election’s outcome. Migration from Africa or the Middle East remains far more polarising. Most Ukrainian immigrants are employed and make a positive contribution to the Polish economy, which means they tend not to stir controversy in that context.
Some candidates—particularly from the far right—have tried to revive historical grievances, notably the Volhynia tragedy, but these efforts haven’t translated into meaningful gains in support. The same goes for the anti-Ukrainian incident involving Grzegorz Braun, who, during a rally, removed a Ukrainian flag from a town hall in Biała Podlaska and, in early May, staged an anti-Ukrainian protest at a burial site for UPA soldiers on Monastyr Hill.
— Do you expect support for Ukraine to change after the election? If so, how?
— No, it appears that regardless of who wins the presidency—whether it’s Trzaskowski or Nawrocki, as polls suggest—there won’t be any major shifts in Poland’s policy toward Ukraine. The broad consensus, outside of far-right and openly pro-Russian factions, is that supporting Ukraine and Kyiv in the war against Russia is vital to Poland’s own security. There’s little indication that current policies will change significantly. It’s also important to note that the Law and Justice party, now in opposition, has played a significant role in supporting Ukraine.
— Reuters recently reported, citing Poland’s Minister of Digital Affairs, that Russia is mounting unprecedented efforts to interfere in the country’s presidential election. The minister has said that Poles are being recruited through the dark web, offered between €3,000 and €4,000 to spread disinformation. How successful has the Polish government been in countering these attempts?
— Yes, Russian propaganda in Poland is certainly visible, especially online. But it doesn’t seem to have much sway over public opinion. Openly pro-Russian candidates who promote anti-Ukrainian narratives or organise anti-Ukrainian events command very little support—likely just 2 to 3 per cent of voters—with no real chance of expanding their base.
Efforts to counter these Russian influence attempts are being led by both the Internal Security Agency and Poland’s cyber defence forces. So far, these measures are regarded as quite effective.
