This article provides a glimpse into personal impressions of the diverse Russian opposition in exile and the accusations it has levied against Ukrainians in the two years since the large-scale invasion. While categorising “good Russians” may not be a current priority for Ukrainians, neglecting their activities in the Western capitals and decision-making centres of our allies is akin to shooting oneself in the foot.
“People listen to those who speak. They listen even more attentively to those who have the microphone. Given that Russians often seize the microphone more than we’d prefer, we shouldn’t underestimate the influence of a timely asked, uncomfortable question in the ongoing narrative struggle. Asking the right question at the right moment can be a powerful tool.
It often appears that there are no fewer Russians in Washington than in Moscow. Every week, there’s at least one event discussing the past, present, or future of Russia. Furthermore, the voices of those residing closer to home in Europe contribute to American media and think tanks.
The dissidents belonging to the sixth wave also dream that their country will finally become a better version of itself, but they will likely die in exile, like most of their predecessors. As long as life continues, the power games continue, such as the struggle for a place in the sun and the fight for funding. Therefore, one must sell what sells… namely, hope.
The topic of post-Putin Russia confuses minds and prompts wild speculations. A significant part of the “Russian landing force” in Washington asserts that after the regime’s downfall (formerly betting on a rebellion, now on the death of the dictator), the Russian people, “held hostage by a tyrant”, will rise against the political elites or democratically elect a representative of the opposition, either among those currently imprisoned or among those helping the West to “understand Russia”, a country that currently has no place for them.
It’s not entirely clear how to hold democratic elections in a country that hasn’t seen them since 1996, given the persistence of a repressive apparatus. However, most people don’t delve into such details, speculating on illusions as if democracy is a natural state of affairs. Although the narrative of the “end of history” is no longer relevant, it falls on the fertile ground of a certain narcissistic love of the country that still remembers the sweet feeling of its righteousness, rising from the ruins of the Soviet Union.
Another calculation is on the rationality and Russian political elites’ selfless love for money. In 2022, the top hundred richest Russians lost over $120 billion, but by 2023, they had restored their fortunes by $50 billion. Is it more profitaBle to dealwith the West, where dirty money and rules have reemerged, or is it safer to keep exploiting the resources of a country whose population has silently consented to such a social contract for a long time? Only time will tell.
If the fate of frozen Russian assets is still being considered, and Russia is preparing a symmetrical response to potential confiscations, sanctions against certain individuals on the list may still be subject to negotiation in exchange for, if not normalisation, then ‘re-normalisation’ of Russia’s relations with the civilised world.
Simply watching Russia drift towards China seems to be a strategic mistake in the eyes of the United States. Therefore, the struggle for Russia’s ill-famed “mysterious soul” will continue long. The question of whether the West should abandon Russia and its democratically-minded population is more rhetorical, as no effective strategies to win their hearts have been identified thus far. Nevertheless, the suggested solution—returning to Ronald Reagan’s policies—is not a favoured answer among many.
Recently, a forum organized by Khodorkovsky took place in Washington, discussing constitutional reform in Russia. Institutional changes are important, but, as Ukraine’s experience demonstrates, democracies need democrats. Depending on who occupies each specific seat of power, the same institution can function as a democratic one, controlled by the centre or driven by the greed of its representatives. The system of checks and balances functions effectively only when the levers of this system are operated by individuals with genuine values, despite how lofty it may sound.
Among the interesting topics from the lengthy event was the assertion that post-Soviet countries tend toward autocracy, citing Ukraine as an example. Another claim was made that Ukrainian courts are more corrupt than Russian ones. However, when questioned about the source of this information, as the Corruption Perceptions Index does not confirm this information, the accusation was withdrawn. The most intriguing moment was the dramatic reaction to my correctly phrased question about whether the Russian population supports the liberal views of the speakers and whether they widely reject the war. The speaker, a Russian journalist, started shouting at me: “Come on, come on, just say already that we [Russians – ed.] are subhumans.”
In assessing the moods of Russian society, Ukrainians and Russians employ different calculations. Russians assert that only around 15% of the Russian population actively supports the war, approximately 20% actively oppose it, and the rest belong to the so-called “silent majority,” not actively resisting the war. According to Russian logic, the silent ones are added to the 20% minority. Ukrainians, however, assert that about three-quarters of the population supports the decisions of the Russian leadership, relying on data from the Levada Center and simple logic: in times when one must choose between what is easy and what is right, indifferent observers become accomplices to evil.
Why is this important? Because the reluctance to acknowledge the deep crisis within Russian society (a society supposedly ‘well-versed’ in Dostoevsky, Pushkin, and Tolstoy) poses a significant challenge for Ukrainians. At the same forum, during a break, I overheard Americans saying: “I don’t believe that Russians want this war. They are so much like us”. Remember Joseph Biden’s speech in Poland, where he addressed the Russian people, describing the horrors of Ukrainian realities and urging them to consider the suffering of civilians? “This is not who you are,” he said.
Experienced humanists, who haven’t personally experienced the “humanity” of Russians, remain indifferent to Ukrainian messages about the deep crisis in Russian society. Alas, Ukrainians are traumatised, they say, so they may exaggerate… On the flip side, Russian dissidents dismiss Ukrainian accusations as “victim-blaming”.
Following the panel discussion, the previously mentioned Russian journalist approached me to continue his verbal attack. At this point, the conversation delved into the question of the political responsibility of the Russian people—not the personal criminal responsibility of those who committed war crimes, but the recognition that the nation has veered off course and needs to reassess itself. Our exchange clearly showed that not everyone is ready to face challenging questions. However, there are individuals who not only endorse this perspective but also actively advocate for it, such as representatives of “Memorial”.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky himself outlined a more realistic vision of the country’s future, a place where he spent ten years in jail. He envisions the possibility of a less bloodthirsty autocrat assuming power in Russia. Gradually, he says, Russia would transform into a complex formation, with some parts embracing democracy, others leaning towards authoritarianism, and some adopting a clan-based system. Supporting a figure capable of negotiating with various factions is key to mitigating U.S. concerns about the collapse of Russia.
Despite a series of ambiguous statements by Khodorkovsky since the beginning of 2022, he continues to fund lobbying efforts for anti-Russian sanctions and opens his foundation in DC. One of the key contributors to such proposals is the Russian economist Sergei Guriev, who is scheduled to speak in DC this week.
Both of them are co-founders of the Anti-War Committee—an organisation created by Russians in exile to help victims of the regime and support its overthrow. They emphasise that “there is a clear distinction between Russians—involuntary participants in Putin’s adventures—and those who consciously assist the Putin regime in fratricidal aggression”. It’s worth noting that the committee has not emerged as a flagship of resistance among Russians within their country, revealing the disunity and limited influence of the Russian diaspora on their compatriots.
Another member of the committee and founder of the Free Russia Forum, where the disintegration of Russia is actively discussed, Garry Kasparov, developed a detailed legal rationale for confiscating Russian assets; he also actively calls to close the skies over Ukraine. “Russia should be brought back to the Stone Age so that the oil and gas industry and any other sectors vital for the survival of the regime cannot function without technical support from the West,” Kasparov said.
Ilya Ponomarev describes the activities of the Russian opposition in exile as the preparation of a political alternative that will use its chance during moments of change. He does not rule out a revolution because, in his words, there were three in Russia throughout the 20th century.
Some openly say that changes in Russia are possible only as a result of Russia’s military defeat. Calls to provide weapons to Ukraine make a special impression when made by Russian human rights activists.
There are other unsettling ideas, for example, such as granting Russia candidate status in the EU since the West allegedly pushed Russia away. If ‘attention and respect were given to Russia’, everything could be different. This idea was expressed by economist and former Russian Deputy Minister of Finance Sergei Aleksashenko at an event dedicated to the potential development of post-Putin Russia.
In response to the observation that it might be time to explore different approaches, given the long history of Western assistance to Russia – including considerations such as allowing its opinion, establishing the G8, refraining from imposing significant sanctions for the annexation of Crimea and the onset of the war in Donbas in 2014, not to mention the earlier instances where countries fell victim to Russia, and the lack of plans to grant NATO membership to Ukraine in the foreseeable future – which, when considered collectively, resulted in the transformation from an authoritarian regime to a totalitarian one and the initiation of the largest war in Europe in the last 80 years, the speaker aggressively threatened a detailed analysis of historical facts. And we all know that the interpretation of history is not the Russians’ strong suit.
It is not surprising that many Russian opposition figures have a fragile nervous system, considering that they often like to refer to themself as the “first victims of Putin’s regime”. Certainly, it is challenging to overlook the horrors of the atrocities committed by the Russian security forces against individuals like Artem Kamardin, a poet who dared to recite anti-war poems, or the years of imprisonment handed down for expressing political views on social media to Kara-Murza, who was the first to receive the maximum term under a political charge. Additionally, heavy metal poisonings have manifested a wave of attacks on Russian opposition figures across Europe. These individuals are not only victims of the Russian regime but also of the broader passivity within the Russian population. Ultimately, they are the ones who, at some point, must raise questions about collective political responsibility among their fellow citizens.
But the most poignant aspect of these discussions is the constant need to remind everyone that Ukrainians did not receive democracy as a gift. The price of securing independence has been paid in blood since 2014. The Revolution on Granite, the Orange Revolution, Euromaidan, and the Revolution of Dignity are just the most notable events in the struggle for what Russians surrendered without a fight for the sake of “order and stability,” dreams of “greatness”, and a life fueled by oil dollars. However, some in the Russian opposition argue that it was the Russians who took to the streets against the Communist Party during the 1991 coup, securing freedom for other union republics. Yes, thank you, thank you very much!
The narrative of the West’s responsibility for Russia’s fate and the obligation to assist Russians without demeaning them through sanctions is arguably the most enduring. Perhaps the egotism of individuals who lost their country in both a literal and metaphorical sense is the main cause of ideological confrontation with Ukrainians.
If so far, this hasn’t annoyed you enough – brace yourself, as it’s going to get intense. Some Russian liberals express outrage that Ukrainians did not see them as their situational allies. The rule of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” did not click this time. Below, I will share more thoughts on why it happened this way.
Russian opposition journalist Yulia Latynina, who writes for Western and Ukrainian publications, sums up her claims against Ukrainians better than others. In her recent article for The Hill, in addition to a fairly realistic portrayal of Ukraine’s complex situation, she still managed to:
▪ Accuse Zelensky of messianism;
▪ Mock his remarks that discussions about Ukrainian corruption are Russian propaganda (Ukraine persists in its battle against corruption, often referring to it as a second front. Yet, the scale of corruption in Russia is considerably larger but receives considerably less attention);
▪ Sarcastically noted that Ukrainians imagine any discussion on potential elections in Ukraine to be an operation of Russian special services (despite the fact that the largest civic organisations in Ukraine dealing with election issues, including OPORA, have signed appeals to Western partners, explaining all the threats of holding elections during an active phase of the war);
▪ Remind that Zelensky’s focus on the borders of 1991 is a guarantee of endless conflict (although Russians should rather concentrate on their internal political issues),
▪ She also didn’t forget to mention the so-called “growing Ukrainian nationalism” (well, it’s such a classic ‘Great Russia’ narrative), somehow taking offence at Danilov’s words about Russian Asian roots and humanity being the key difference between Russians and Ukrainians, expressing deep concern for the fate of the Russian-majority population of Crimea, in case peninsula returns to Ukraine (yet, Latynina failed to explain what led to a sharp change in the peninsula’s demographics – the ethnic cleansing and the cultural genocide of Crimean Tatars orchestrated by the Soviet Union).
The full list of Russian ‘grievances’ against Ukrainians goes much longer. In another article discussing how decolonisers aided Putin, Latynina criticized Ukrainians for their inability to convert the protests of tens of thousands of Russians (among 12 million residents in Moscow alone) and the pleas of well-known Russian figures addressing Russian soldiers. Perhaps the journalist was unaware that a significant portion of Ukrainians, in the initial days, urged Russians to take decisive action, reaching out to relatives, acquaintances, and friends in Russia. Unfortunately, barely anyone heard anything beyond the propaganda on Russian TV.
According to Latynina, Ukrainian bot farms and political opportunists, in their pursuit of likes and political points, discussed “decolonisation,” reparations, trials of war criminals, and even delved into what she deemed madness – calls for the denuclearisation of Russia and discussions about a potential collapse of the country. She seems to think that the depiction of Russians as entirely imperialistic is a fabrication of Ukrainian propaganda, and advocating for the ‘cancellation’ of Russian culture and imposing sanctions on all Russians is excessive; it’s akin to Putin cosplay.
Hence, Latynina contends that Ukrainians have brought several defeats upon themselves. That’s why she says Navalny no longer calls for protests against the war; Ukrainian criticism directed at the Rain TV channel, Ovsyannikova, and similar figures has allegedly led to a decline in the number of those willing to speak out for the truth in Russia. Furthermore, according to her, Russian soldiers who might have responded to Ukraine’s call to defend democracy are now deterred due to the intimidation tactics employed by Ukrainian radicals.
Latynina acknowledges the influence of orders in the army but overlooks the right not to obey criminal orders, the “I Want to Live” project facilitating the surrender of Russians into captivity, and the example of a Russian pilot who flew his plane to Ukraine. The author suggests that Ukraine could enhance its human capital by welcoming refugees from Russia. It is challenging to envision Russians who, in protest against Putin, relocate to the Saltivka district in Kharkiv, which is constantly bombed by the Russian army.
The journalist argues that, following a lack of significant achievements on the front, the decolonisation movement became the primary reason for reducing Western assistance and the United States’ decision to allow Putin to remain in power. However, this assertion is not entirely accurate; to be precise, it lacks accuracy altogether. The notion that Ukrainians impede the overthrow of the Putin regime represents the epitome of Russian liberal creativity.
In contrast to Latynina’s perspective, the book “War and Punishment: Putin, Zelensky, and the Path to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine” by another Russian journalist, Mikhail Zygar, challenges her position. In the preface, Zygar addresses a Ukrainian friend who hasn’t spoken to him since the invasion. The book serves as both an apology and an effort to demonstrate that the virus of Russian imperialism does not taint the author. It stands as one of the initial endeavours by Russian intellectuals to initiate a discourse on reevaluating Russia and justifying the call for decolonization.
Another compelling piece is an article by Andrey Soldatov, a Russian investigative journalist, and Irina Borogan, analysing the structure of the emerging Russian diaspora and offering recommendations on how to support them. “Western governments lack a comprehensive understanding of the new Russian diaspora and a cohesive policy for dealing with it, ensuring its protection, and integrating it into the collective effort to shape a better future for the West, Ukraine, and Russia itself”. These voices could wield significant influence on their compatriots with the necessary support in the form of visas, financial aid, and other assistance. But this seems like a wild guess considering that two years after the full-scale invasion, there has been no significant progress in terms of Russian-Russian dialogue.
A novel factor altering the dynamics between the West and the Russian diaspora, unknown during the Cold War, is duly emphasised – the public opinion of Ukrainians abroad. Consequently, numerous public events involving Russians were cancelled, irrespective of their political stances (although some still took place). While the authors refrained from overtly criticising Ukrainians for their perceived lack of discernment, the implicit critique is discernible between the lines.
In general, the article deserves attention as it offers a comprehensive analysis of various groups of recent Russian immigrants. A particularly intriguing case involves IT specialists, whose integration into the West is depicted as a blow to Putin’s regime and a diminishing factor in Russia’s capabilities in cyber warfare and weapon production. To illustrate, the article presents the story of Mikhail, an IT engineer and graduate of the Moscow Aviation Institute.
In an effort to evade mobilisation, Mikhail moved to Yerevan at the end of 2022 but returned to Moscow within a few months due to his dissatisfaction with the living conditions in a small apartment in Yerevan. Subsequently, he secured a position at the Skolkovo Innovation Center as a drone developer, granting him a draft deferment.
The lesson for the West is clear: it is crucial to attract and retain such specialists rather than allow them to fall into Putin’s hands. For Ukrainians, the revelation is poignant – the lives, ethical and moral considerations, and seemingly inconspicuous aspects deemed insignificant by many Russians hold less value than the prospect of a free life in a modest apartment with a clear conscience. While there is lamentation about mercenaries willingly coming to harm Ukrainians for a few thousand dollars from remote Russian villages, the article underscores that highly educated professionals, capable of earning through peaceful pursuits, are willing to exchange lives for a few extra square meters of living space. I hope Mikhail now enjoys a satisfying window view from his Moscow apartment.
Individuals like him are the very ones Russians suggest channelling resources to, resources that could otherwise support Ukraine. The resistance against the boycott of everything Russian persists, with even Russian scientists entering the discussion. This ongoing debate is intricate and prolonged, ultimately circling back to the question of collective responsibility. Regrettably, Ukrainian perspectives in the West are notably underrepresented, and initiatives to incorporate Ukrainian voices are lacking.
Despite being highly fragmented, divided, and marked by contradictions, the Russian opposition in exile remains vociferous and dynamic. An attempt to delve deeper into its complexities comes from the work of American journalist and researcher Sam Greene. In his writings, Dr. Greene reflects on Ukrainian observations: “…one of my Ukrainian colleagues said the Russian oppositionists—for all their fine words—seemed morally bankrupt. While the Russians accepted passive moral responsibility for the war and the crimes Russia was perpetrating in Ukraine, they were not prepared to accept active moral responsibility for bringing it to an end. Why are so many Russian activists content to confine their responsibility to the past and their agency to the future when Ukrainians are dying in the present?”
For a comprehensive understanding, one must acknowledge those genuinely assisting Ukrainians—not only through active participation in the Armed Forces of Ukraine but also by spearheading initiatives such as fundraising for drones and ammunition, aiding in the search for abducted Ukrainian children, extending support to Ukrainian refugees, and openly opposing a regime marked by overt or latent imperialism. Russian researcher Yuriy Terekhov has identified nearly 100 organisations, illustrating the grassroots initiatives within the Russian anti-war movement.
Certain Russians in exile, such as Ilya Zaslavsky, have dedicated years to meticulously researching and sounding alarms about the Kremlin’s soft power influence in the West. Simultaneously, others delicately navigate the intricate dynamics between Ukrainians and the anti-war Russian movement, seeking to depict this complexity without undue criticism.
So, the conclusions are as follows: Ukraine’s victory hinges primarily on success on the front lines, but the battle for the country’s future is being waged in the corridors of Brussels, Berlin, London, Paris, Washington, and other Western capitals. As researcher Natalia Bugayova from the Institute for the Study of War points out when discussing the impact of Russian narratives on Western agendas, “reflexive control serves as an effective alternative to military potential against the United States.”
To counter sometimes deceptive, sometimes openly harmful ideas from individuals with “good intentions” and a lack of self-critical perspective or thinly veiled mercantilism, it is crucial to launch sustained efforts to shape a non-Russia-centric view of our region in the West.
What about the concept of “good Russians”? A good Russian is an individual who, with integrity, harbours no grievances, stipulations or ultimatums against Ukrainians and is willing to critically examine their country, their people, and their role in the broader historical context. Even more commendable are those who actively contribute, at personal cost, to rectifying their own mistakes.
In response to the assertions of Russian activists, Russian opposition figure Lyubov Sobol succinctly conveys, “Get off Ukrainians back!”
