Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights:
Putin’s “five-year” war program for Xi Jinping, the political potential of former presidential candidate Duntsova, the Russian economy and sanctions.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- For the first time in the last two years, Elvira Nabiullina, the head of the Russian Central Bank, gave a large interview to the Russian media outlet RBC. In the interview, she stated that Russia has been living under sanctions since 2014; hence, its financial system has been preparing for potential Western sanctions for years. At the same time, Nabiullina noted that Russia “survived well” in the year 2022 but warned that Russia needs to prepare for tougher sanctions. It’s worth noting that it was the Russian government’s economic team, as well as Nabiullina herself, who steered the Russian economy through the sanctions shock; thus, it’s necessary to pay attention to her statements and understand the importance of introducing new sanctions as well as improving and monitoring the sanctions that have already been implemented.
- Politico, a U.S.-based magazine, placed Nabiullina on the list of Europe’s 28 most influential people, awarding her the title “Disrupter No. 1”. “During the decade she’s sat at the helm of Russia’s central bank, Nabiullina’s hawkish monetary policies have repeatedly saved the ruble and kept the country’s economy afloat”, wrote the magazine.
- It has become known that the previously “lost” Russian “opposition leader” Alexey Navalny, is in the penal colony No. 3 “Polar Wolf”, located in the village of Kharp in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District. This was reported by Navalny’s press secretary, Kira Yarmysh. This prison has a reputation of being notoriously tough. According to Ivan Zhdanov, the head of the Anti-Corruption Foundation, it is impossible to deliver letters there through the FSIN (Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia) system, while Zonatelecom (a system providing digital services in penal colonies) is not available there. Right now, it is highly likely that the Russian authorities prefer to remove Navalny from the information space during the presidential campaign to prevent any potential statements that could affect the political debate.
- We are witnessing continuous actions taken by the Russian authorities to control the domestic political environment ahead of the presidential elections. For example, the second fine was imposed on retired GRU Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov in an administrative case for “discrediting” the Russian army. Kvachkov has been in the Strelkov-Girkin informational orbit for a long time and encountered the first restrictive actions of the Russian authorities during the same period as Girkin. Currently, Kvachkov may face criminal proceedings. This way, the Kremlin wants to control representatives of radical political circles who operate outside of the official system and are potentially capable of undertaking destabilising activities.
- Russian journalist Ekaterina Duntsova, who tried to participate in the presidential election openly voicing anti-war rhetoric and was subsequently not allowed to collect signatures for her nomination by the Russian CEC, decided to create her own political party. Duntsova said that in January-February 2024, she will organise meetings of supporters in the regions and elect delegates to the constituent congress. Duntsova aims to set up the party to participate in the September 2024 elections on the so-called “single election day”. This initiative seems unrealistic since Duntsova’s rhetoric appears to be completely anti-system – the one which the Kremlin absolutely wouldn’t allow. It is necessary to continue to monitor this decision. Indeed, if Duntsova does not face any bureaucratic obstacles, it will likely mean that the Kremlin approves her strategy. In turn, this will mean that the Russian authorities oversaw the process of nominating Duntsova for president for the sake of her powerful PR. Thus, potentially, we are dealing with another case of creating new “pocket” Russian “liberals”.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Japanese media outlet Nikkei published an article in which it cites its own sources, claiming that in March 2023, during Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow, Putin told the Chinese leader that Russia intends to fight in Ukraine for at least five years. According to Putin, a protracted war benefits Russia, which will eventually ’emerge victorious’. It is reported that it was done to keep the Chinese leader from changing his position and continuing to support Russia. If true, this publication once again confirms the repeated warnings of Ukrainian Prism about the Kremlin’s efforts to negotiate a “ceasefire”, which the Russian authorities will subsequently use to reinforce their army and continue the war. Nikkei made a similar conclusion, saying that Putin’s signals of “readiness for the ceasefire”, which he sent through diplomatic channels, “should not be taken at face value”. Japanese outlet was potentially referring to The New York Times December 23 article about the existence of Putin intermediaries’ “signals” to Ukraine and the Western countries about his “readiness” for a “ceasefire” and a freezing of the war on the current frontline.
- Latvia has introduced a number of measures aimed at countering Russian information warfare. For example, the National Electronic Media Council of Latvia (NEPLP) blocked Russian websites linked to the Yandex network. This primarily concerns the Yandex.Music service, which allowed the Russian company to distribute sanctioned Russian content, including pro-Russian propaganda materials.
- EU is reportedly preparing new sanctions against Russia. This was announced at a briefing by a representative of the German Ministry of Economy.
- “We have now approved the 12th package of sanctions in Brussels, and new packages will follow. This means that the sanctions system will be expanded and improved, and opportunities to circumvent restrictive measures will be identified and stopped.”
- This means that we should expect decisions to monitor the sanctions already in place. Such a strategy has been adopted by the United States, which has announced tighter sanctions against banks involved in the supply of sanctioned military goods to Russia. This path is potentially more favourable, especially regarding decisions related to targeted sanctions against the so-called Russian ‘shadow tanker fleet,’ which the country uses to sell its own energy resources.
- The informal summit of CIS leaders took place in St. Petersburg. This meeting occurred on the eve of Russia’s organisation’s presidency for 2024. The details of the meeting are currently unknown. It is likely that the Kremlin is trying to consistently demonstrate the “unity” of the organisation and the lack of diplomatic isolation of Russia.
