“There is a category of people for whom bad news from the frontline has already become routine. Such news doesn’t surprise them anymore. Yet, it is harder to get used to the absence of good news from the rear. It is incredibly challenging to see so many mindless, indifferent people”, wrote Igor Lutsenko on his Facebook. Igor is currently a serviceman in the Armed Forces of Ukraine; he is an aerial reconnaissance officer in the 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade. In the past, he served as an MP, worked as a journalist, and was a Euromaidan activist. In 2014, Igor participated in the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) as a member of the Azov Battalion. In an interview with The Ukrainian Week, he talks about the differences between the front and the rear, the prolonged war, and the necessary changes expected by Ukrainian soldiers.
— Do you think the state has been functioning effectively during the war?
— On the contrary, rather ineffectively. The state cannot provide Ukraine’s defenders with what it should – it’s almost as if there was money, but there is no smart way to spend it. I’m not even talking about eggs or jackets now [referring to several scandals involving Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence with regard to the purchase of food and clothing, including jackets, at inflated prices. — ed.]. Let’s remind ourselves about one recent, explicit example of a shocking inefficiency — Mr Rozenblat [Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence made an advance payment of UAH 650 million for a batch of questionable UAVs supplied by a company owned by the former MP, Borislav Rozenblat. — ed.]. We and I mean aerial reconnaissance specialists, need aircraft, drones, and unmanned vehicles. The Ministry of Defence happily explains that its procurement capabilities are limited. Then, one day, it turns out that UAH 650 million went straight to Rozenblat. And those cases are hardly rare.
— The issue of differences between the front and the rear is very complex. Is it worth discussing? Aren’t we risking creating societal division?
— If we don’t discuss the differences, then there won’t be any chance to minimise or solve them. It definitely needs to be brought to light.
— What is the key difference between the front and the rear?
— We are now facing a very challenging situation when some citizens have been in the army since 24 February 2022 while others are not planning to join the Armed Forces at all. To the outside observers, it may seem that our fighters are obliged to serve until they are deemed unfit for service, at best, and at worst until they are killed in combat. The others, thanks to those in the military, will have a chance to lead a peaceful life and earn money. Technically, they’ll be doing all the right things, yet in stark contrast to what’s happening on the front. This is how I see the general picture. If we look into this, we’ll realise that most people who went to the front in February-March 2022 were on an adrenaline rush. They did not expect that there would be no end to this war.
In reality, many of those who picked up riffles and joined the army in February 2022 have already dropped out. This clearly indicates that a significant number of people were not prepared to face the fact that they may have to fight for decades.
— Is the war dragging on?
— Yes. Now, we are entering a phase where we are likely to fight for decades. Strategic decisions need to be made for long-term combat. It is true that several discussions are ongoing, but so far, the military has seen no proposals offered by the state authorities. Our society lives in a semi-relaxed state. Some action is badly needed right now because many soldiers are simply losing it. They become disillusioned. If, at the beginning of the full-scale war, they were mobilised, now, on the contrary, they are demobilised. There are those who are prepared to die, yet they don’t want their death to be pointless. For example, I know a guy in the air defence unit who would like to transfer to the infantry. He doesn’t want to run somewhere; he’s ready to charge enemy positions. People like him need to be offered some solution.
— How can we change this situation?
— The only way to solve this is through grassroots initiative and public pressure. We need a broad public movement. I emphasise that this has to be a civic movement, not a political one, a movement which will be unrelated to controversies like change or continuity, holding elections or not. The task of this movement would be to bring about changes to the way we are defending Ukraine right now.
It’s about changes in dealing with military personnel, arms procurement, and developing new weapons. In other words, the legislative framework regulating our war needs to be changed. To put it simply, it’s a change in the rules of the game that a broader grassroots movement can bring about.
— Where should we start?
— First of all, we need to reach a consensus and agree on a program that will be understandable to everyone, even if it has only ten points on a list. For example, we have to implement different protocols in combat medicine. After all, everything that needs to be changed is quite evident. Recently, we’ve achieved the right to transfuse blood not only in hospitals but, if needed, literally in the trenches. Why was something so straightforward, something that could save a person’s life, prohibited until recently? Such cases occur right and left, and not only in medicine. Hear one of my favourite dilemmas: why can’t an officer fight in a soldier’s position? After all, he can perform no less important function than if he were an officer. There are many problems associated with this.
We ended up in a situation where whatever is absolutely obvious to the ordinary soldiers is somehow less evident to the top military commanders or politicians. This has to change; otherwise, we will continue to die in droves.
