Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Massive prisoner swap between Russia and the West, the current situation with mobilisation in Russia and Shoigu’s visit to Iran
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Current situation of mobilisation in Russia. Over the past week, there has been a surge in news about mobilisation and recruitment for the war in Russia. Several regional authorities have announced substantial increases in one-time payments for signing a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defence. These payments now reach 2.1 million roubles in St. Petersburg and 1.9 million roubles in Moscow. Federal payments for signing contracts with the Ministry of Defence have also doubled, from 195,000 to 400,000 roubles. To qualify for these payments, a contract must be signed between 1 August and 31 December of this year.
- These continual increases in payments highlight a shortage of Russians willing to sign contracts, compelling the authorities to keep raising the incentives. It appears that the number of people willing to go to war voluntarily is decreasing. Official statistics confirm this trend. An analysis of budget spending on one-time payments to Russian soldiers shows that in 2023, an average of 28,800 men signed contracts each month. By the first quarter of 2024, this number had already fallen to 24,500 per month. Given the recent massive increases in payments, it’s clear that the number of contract signings has significantly decreased even compared to the first quarter of 2024.
- Last week, the Russian authorities introduced a series of measures aimed at addressing the shortfall in mobilisation:
- The push to enlist foreign migrants in the war against Ukraine has been revitalised. For instance, the Russian Interior Ministry has proposed streamlining the process of granting Russian citizenship to the families of contract soldiers. The new decree suggests that migrants’ families will face fewer hurdles to citizenship, including exemptions from language requirements and the need to have resided in Russia for five years.
- In addition, the authorities are advancing their technical preparations for a potential new wave of mobilisation. The focus remains on the development of a new electronic military registration database, which is expected to be fully operational by autumn 2024. Recently, the Federation Council, Russia’s upper house of parliament, approved a law allowing employers to submit military registration details directly to military offices via this new system. This replaces the previous method through the state service portal, which had been marred by bureaucratic inefficiencies.
- In addition to practical measures for recruiting new soldiers, preparations for a second wave of mobilisation are also being made through media efforts. State-run TASS has published an extensive article highlighting the effectiveness and speed of Russia’s mobilisation during World War I. The piece emphasises the positive aspects of that historical mobilisation, aiming to convey that it not only contributed to Russia’s development but also was executed with maximum efficiency.
- Arrest of Senator Dmitry Savelyev. Senator Dmitry Savelyev from the Tula region has been arrested in Russia on charges of attempting to organise the contract killing of a business rival. The arrest was carried out publicly, with law enforcement detaining him at his workplace, marking a significant event. Since the 1990s, Savelyev has been closely associated with Sergei Kiriyenko, the current deputy head of the presidential administration who oversees Russia’s domestic policy. Both men began their careers at a company under the major oil and gas firm Lukoil in the Nizhny Novgorod region, where Kiriyenko served as director and Savelyev as his deputy. Savelyev was later appointed director of Transneft by Kiriyenko, who briefly served as prime minister in 1998. Given this background, the arrest of Savelyev could potentially be a political setback for Kiriyenko, reflecting broader implications for the Kremlin.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Large-scale prisoner swap between Russia and Western states. Russia and several Western nations have orchestrated the largest and most unprecedented prisoner swap since the Cold War. Moscow has released 15 individuals, including three American citizens—Evan Gershkovich, Paul Whelan, and Alsu Kurmasheva—who were accused of espionage and violating Russian laws. In a remarkable move, Russia also contravened its own regulations by exchanging approximately a dozen Russian political prisoners for eight Russian citizens who were serving sentences for espionage, murder, and hacking in various Western countries. Among those swapped was Vadim Krasikov, a Russian intelligence agent serving a life sentence in Germany for the murder of Chechen commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili. Krasikov emerged as the focal point of the swap, with President Putin repeatedly emphasising his desire to secure his return.
- Notably, the list of Russian opposition figures released includes Ilya Yashin, Vladimir Kara-Murza, and Andrei Pivovarov. Media outlets are highlighting these individuals as key players who could potentially bolster the anti-Putin movement. This consideration likely played a major role in the negotiations, as suggested by U.S. Senator Tom Tillis, who noted that their release could invigorate the democratic movement within Russia. Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, echoed this sentiment.
- In reality, such a prospect is unlikely. Firstly, neither Ilya Yashin nor Vladimir Kara-Murza possessed the political and media influence of the murdered opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Both were primarily known for their arrests and long prison sentences, and their leadership capabilities are also questionable. Neither has significant experience in leading a major political force. Currently, there is no unified Russian opposition. No single leader commands enough authority to forge such a cohesive structure. Yulia Navalnaya, the late Navalny’s wife, was presented as a promising leader after her husband’s death but understandably did not emerge as one. The Russian opposition has yet to propose a viable project for the future that it aims to implement. Instead, it has left us with numerous public statements and comments rather than practical actions.
- An even greater issue is the lack of effective tools for the Russian opposition abroad to influence both Russians and Russian politics. Their media presence on YouTube is limited and not very promising. Furthermore, since July 2024, Russian authorities have been actively working to restrict the platform’s operations within Russia. Consequently, this swap and the release of Russian opposition figures are unlikely to impact Russia’s domestic or foreign policy.
- Visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Shoigu to Iran. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu recently visited Iran, where he met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Akbar Ahmadian, and Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Mohammad Bagheri. Official statements from Russia indicated that the purpose of the visit was to discuss bilateral cooperation. However, Reuters, citing its sources, reported that Shoigu carried a message from President Putin urging a “restrained response” to the elimination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Additionally, Iran reportedly reiterated its request for the supply of Russian Su-35 fighter jets, a long-standing demand. The timing of Shoigu’s visit, coinciding with heightened tensions in the Middle East, suggests that Moscow is aligning itself with Tehran in the ongoing conflict.
- In light of expectations regarding a potential Iranian attack on Israel and Sergei Shoigu’s visit, various media outlets, including those in Israel, have reported on the possible transfer of Russian Iskander missile systems to Iran. Additionally, the New York Times, citing Iranian sources, noted that Tehran, in anticipation of a possible conflict with Israel, has requested air defence systems from Moscow. The report suggests that these supplies have already commenced. However, it is important to consider that the current situation on the front lines, coupled with intensified Ukrainian attacks on Russian air defence systems, means Moscow is unlikely to be able to provide a significant quantity of such systems to Iran. Meanwhile, Ukraine, aware of these potential transfers, should leverage this information to strengthen its relationship with Israel.
