Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: the rise of Kovalchuk’s clan, rumours of reshuffles after the presidential election, and the scandal over EU ambassadors’ refusal to meet with Lavrov.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Rumours of potential reshuffles in the Russian government on the eve of the elections. Discussions and speculation surrounding a potential government reshuffle have once again taken centre stage in the Russian media, especially with the upcoming election on the horizon. Towards the end of 2023, Ukrainian Prism delved into similar talks regarding Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s resignation. These discussions often emphasised the perceived futility of such a move, citing the proven effectiveness of Mishustin’s team and the broader Russian economic bloc. Now, the focus has shifted not only back to the Prime Minister but also to the enduring presence of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. There are emerging reports hinting at the possibility of Lavrov being replaced, with Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak being touted as a potential successor. Novak, responsible for overseeing energy matters and serving as Russia’s key negotiator for OPEC+ agreements and other oil and gas supply deals with various nations, is a prominent figure in these speculations. Adding to the intrigue, it’s known that Lavrov himself has expressed a desire to step down on multiple occasions. Yet, President Putin has remained steadfast in not accepting these requests for resignation, further deepening the intrigue surrounding the political landscape.
- Last week, Ukrainian Prism noted that the Russian system established by the Russian dictator, Putin, no longer permits him to implement significant changes, as demonstrated by the absence of the head of the Accounts Chamber since November 2022, as well as the absence of any news for two weeks regarding the appointment of a new head of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Such appointments can potentially destabilise the balance of political power in Russia, a fact that is unacceptable to Putin. Regarding Mishustin’s situation, we see a repetition of the same arguments from last year: the consensus seems to be that the Russian government is performing adequately, thus providing no grounds for his dismissal.
- The most we can realistically anticipate are isolated changes, likely focusing on social welfare, to align with Putin’s outlined “innovations” following his recent federal address. That is why we should not count on major staff changes at the moment. It’s important to grasp that the dissemination of such information seems to be a calculated move by certain Russian elites, banking on the expectation that Putin might indeed modify certain political figures. This tactic has been witnessed previously, most notably with the dramatic resignation of the entire Russian government on the eve of constitutional changes in 2020.
- Russia’s Kovalchuk clan is strengthening–there is a potential for them to control the new top position. Boris Kovalchuk, son of the well-known Russian oligarch and leader of one of the most influential political groups, Yuri Kovalchuk, a close confidant of Putin, has stepped down from his position as the head of Inter RAO. This company, effectively state-owned, plays a key role in supplying electricity to Russia’s domestic market. He had held this position for 15 years, and it is clear that this news means that he is potentially being “promoted.” According to Kommersant, a government-controlled newspaper, there’s speculation that Boris Kovalchuk might be considered for several roles: head of Gazprom, Rosneft, or even deputy prime minister. This last possibility ties in with earlier discussions regarding rumours about Novak’s potential reshuffle, as Kovalchuk’s expertise in the energy sector aligns closely with Novak’s responsibilities. Regarding the roles of Gazprom or Rosneft heads, the situation is equally unclear due to the fact that both of their current leaders, Miller and Sechin, hold significant political clout. If either were to resign, it would signal substantial changes within the Russian power structure. Such a move doesn’t seem to align with Putin’s current direction in the realm of human resources. Another potential scenario discussed by Kommersant is the role of St. Petersburg governor, which could potentially be filled by someone other than Alexander Beglov. Beglov was known for his notable conflicts with the late leader of the Wagner PMC, Prigozhin. However, in comparison to the previously mentioned positions, this “promotion” appears to be less significant. Politically, it would likely have the least disruptive impact on the overall Russian political system. The most likely and, more importantly, the most painless option for the Kremlin would be to appoint Boris Kovalchuk as governor of St. Petersburg or a deputy prime minister, with Novak promoted as Lavrov’s potential replacement. In essence, this news signifies a bolstering of the so-called “Kovalchuk clan,” indicating a further amplification of their already substantial influence.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Indian citizens in the Russian army: implications of the scandal for relations with Russia. News broke of an illegal scheme where Indian citizens were lured to Russia under the guise of studying at private universities, only to be coerced into joining the Russian army in its war against Ukraine. Initially brought to light by local Indian media, the issue gained international attention through major Western outlets. As a result, the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was compelled to respond, pledging efforts to repatriate its citizens caught in this troubling situation.
- Subsequently, Indian law enforcement agencies, notably the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), announced the dismantling of a “significant human trafficking network.” This network had been enticing young men to Russia with the false promise of employment, only to coerce them into participating in the war against Ukraine. Despite this troubling development, it is unlikely to have a significant impact on the bilateral relations between India and Russia. Primarily, economic interests, particularly India’s reliance on affordable Russian energy resources, overshadow such publicised negative occurrences. The most optimistic outlook is that Indian authorities will take proactive measures to prevent widespread participation of its citizens in similar schemes in the future.
- A scandal in Russia over EU ambassadors’ refusal to meet Lavrov. Last week, news surfaced about an overt provocation orchestrated by the Kremlin targeting EU ambassadors in Russia. Reports revealed that earlier, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov had invited European diplomats to a meeting. It was apparent that the intention was to stage a public display of “confrontation” with the West, particularly concerning the forthcoming presidential elections in Russia. The diplomats were reportedly urged not to meddle in these elections. In order to support this stance, the Russians planned to present the EU ambassadors with alleged information regarding the preparation of “mechanisms to support non-systemic opposition.” This was presented as justification for accusing the diplomats of interference in the electoral process.
- The EU ambassadors declined the invitation and opted not to meet with Lavrov. From a diplomatic standpoint, this move is understandable since the Russian side failed to provide any proposed agenda for the meeting, effectively presenting the diplomats with a fait accompli. This rejection sparked a hysteria in Russian political circles. Former Russian President Medvedev even went as far as to threaten the withdrawal of the ambassadors, while the “expert community” highlighted the unprecedented nature of such a refusal. It seems likely that the Russian Foreign Ministry did not anticipate this turn of events, which would have allowed them to once again assert their “strength” and assertiveness toward Europe. It is expected that instead of the intended course of action, Russian authorities will use this “demarche” as evidence that EU states are planning to “interfere” in the elections, although the effectiveness of this strategy appears to be limited.
- Armenia’s new actions to distance itself from Russia. Armenia is persisting with its clearly evident shift away from Russia. Just last week, the secretary of the country’s security council, Armen Grigoryan, disclosed that Armenian authorities had formally requested the cessation of Russian border guard operations at Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan. However, on that very day, Putin’s press secretary, Peskov, clarified that no decisions had been made to withdraw Russian border guards from the airport. This development likely did not catch the Kremlin off guard–they seem to have anticipated this scenario.
- Back on March 2, Lavrov weighed in on discussions within Armenia regarding the necessity of Russian military forces’ presence in Zvartnots International Airport. He reiterated the argument that this aligns with the current stance of the Armenian government, insisting that certain “forces” are aiming to push Russia out of the South Caucasus. Such a move by Armenian authorities represents a direct challenge to the Kremlin’s reputation, hinting at potential repercussions from Russia. It’s not far-fetched to consider that Azerbaijan’s recent demands for the return of four settlements, which are located on internationally recognised Azerbaijani territory and were seized by Armenian forces in 1990 during hostilities, could be seen as a “request” from Russia. This is especially relevant given the ongoing efforts towards signing a peace treaty, as such an escalation does not bode well for Azerbaijan’s desired outcomes.
- New arrest warrants for Russian officials. News has emerged that the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for two Russian officials on charges of war crimes against civilians. The individuals in question are Sergei Kobylash, commander of the Aerospace Forces’ long-range aviation, and Viktor Sokolov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet. It is anticipated that more arrest warrants will follow for other Russian military officials.
