Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: the Chinese Premier’s visit to Russia, signs of Russian nuclear blackmail effectiveness at the Kursk NPP, and the rise in terrorist attacks in Russia
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Terrorist attacks are on the rise in Russia. Last week, yet another incident underscored the growing threat. In a penal colony in the Volgograd region, a group of attackers seized a building and assaulted the guards. According to Russian media, all the assailants were affiliated with the Islamic State terrorist organisation. They recorded video messages during the attack, claiming their actions were in retaliation for the detention of Muslims linked to the Crocus City terrorist attack. The violence resulted in the deaths of four prison officers, as well as all the attackers.
- The situation is further complicated by the fact that this marks the second seizure of a penal colony in Russia within three months. In June, six inmates took control of a colony in Rostov-on-Don. Authorities reported that the assailants were affiliated with the Islamic State, as evidenced by the symbols they displayed, which they had obtained within the facility. Following the earlier incident, Russian law enforcement officials announced that security measures had been strengthened. However, the latest attack reveals that these assurances were largely rhetorical, with no substantive actions taken to mitigate the terrorist threat within the colonies. Both incidents highlight significant deficiencies in inmate management, as the perpetrators were able to acquire cold steel weapons inside the facilities.
- The events in the Volgograd colony serve as a stark confirmation of the escalating terrorist threat in Russia, particularly from Islamist factions. This growing danger is primarily attributed to the massive and poorly regulated influx of migrant workers from Central Asian countries. Since the Crocus City terrorist attack, Russian authorities have repeatedly claimed they are tightening control over the migrant population, with public announcements about the development of electronic systems to track migrants’ residences. However, despite official assurances that various security measures are being enhanced, the effectiveness of these efforts remains deeply questionable in light of the recent incident in Volgograd.
- It is crucial to recognise that unchecked migration, the rising activity of terrorist groups within Russia, and the government’s recent moves to involve migrants in the war against Ukraine could sow the seeds for future social unrest. If Moscow continues to rely solely on public rhetoric without implementing meaningful action, the risk of large-scale terrorist attacks in the medium term could increase significantly.
- Putin’s visit to the Russian regions of the North Caucasus. Last week, Vladimir Putin visited several regions in the North Caucasus, including a significant stop in North Ossetia. For the first time since 2008, he returned to Beslan, the site of one of the most devastating terrorist attacks in modern Russian history, which occurred in 2004. In a rare move, Putin met with representatives of the Mothers of Beslan, a non-governmental organisation that unites the relatives of those killed in the tragedy. Russian state media focused exclusively on Putin’s speech during this visit, effectively using the lingering public outrage over Beslan to serve domestic political and propaganda purposes.
- In his address, Putin claimed that “attempts were made from abroad not only to justify the terrorists but also to provide them with support, including moral and ethical assistance.” He subtly equated the Beslan terrorists with Western countries and Ukraine, suggesting that Russia’s ongoing conflict with these entities is akin to the fight against terrorism. He also referenced recent events in the Kursk region, reinforcing this narrative. It is evident that Putin is leveraging this rhetoric to deepen Russian animosity towards Ukraine and to bolster public support for the war.
- Putin’s subsequent visit took him to Chechnya, a trip that was more than just ceremonial; it was a clear nod to the growing influence of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, both in his own region and on the national stage. During their meeting, Putin made several highly symbolic stops, including a visit to the so-called “university of special forces,” where Kadyrov boasted of a military reserve comprising tens of thousands of soldiers ready for deployment. This showcase of alternative military forces under Kadyrov’s command highlights his unique position in Russia’s internal power dynamics and underscores his special relationship with Putin.
- Kadyrov capitalised on this relationship by accompanying Putin on every media-covered visit, further cementing his standing. The aftermath of the visit saw significant federal appointments for Chechen officials, notably Ruslan Edelgeriyev, a former Chechen prime minister and current aide to the Russian president, who was named head of the Russian delegation to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change meetings. These developments signal that Kadyrov continues to wield considerable influence, successfully placing his loyalists in key federal roles. Moreover, despite recent criticisms from Russian “war correspondents” regarding the Chechen Akhmat battalion’s performance in the Kursk region, it is evident that Putin’s confidence in Kadyrov remains unshaken.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Moscow’s nuclear blackmail tactics persist: IAEA Director General visits Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi recently visited the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant following two weeks of intensified Russian propaganda that falsely alleged threats to the facility from Ukrainian armed forces. During his inspection, Grossi acknowledged the “danger of a nuclear incident” and expressed “serious concern” over the ongoing hostilities in the region, highlighting the plant’s vulnerability due to its lack of a protective shell against drone and artillery strikes. These remarks likely reflect the narrative Moscow has been feeding the IAEA. Early in the military operations around Kursk, Russian authorities claimed to have found missile fragments on the plant’s grounds, further fueling their narrative.
- Grossi’s visit underscores the effectiveness of Russia’s continued strategy of nuclear blackmail, which relies on disinformation to shape international perceptions. It is likely that Moscow will persist with accusations against Ukrainian forces regarding attacks on both Russian nuclear facilities and the occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP, using this narrative to influence the IAEA and global opinion.
- Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Russia. Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited Russia last week for a two-day trip, during which he met with key Russian leaders, including President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. According to official Russian reports, the discussions focused on enhancing bilateral trade, economic cooperation, and humanitarian initiatives. However, Li Qiang’s visit unfolded against a backdrop of ongoing challenges, particularly regarding financial transactions and specific infrastructure projects.
- Since President Putin’s visit to China, Russia has struggled to resolve issues with bank payments for goods, a problem exacerbated by U.S. sanctions. These sanctions have made it difficult for Russian exporters to process payments through Chinese banks. Despite Putin raising this concern directly with President Xi Jinping, the situation remains largely unchanged.
- A significant challenge remains the future of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline project. Russia has long sought to advance this project, but progress has been stymied by several factors. China, aware of Russia’s limited alternative markets, is pushing for gas prices on par with domestic Russian rates. Additionally, according to Russian media, China is unwilling to finance the construction of the pipeline on its own. The project’s viability was further questioned when Mongolia announced on August 19 that it had not included the Power of Siberia 2 in its development plan through 2028. Despite these setbacks, Russia is determined to push the project forward, and it is highly probable that this issue was a focal point of the negotiations with Premier Li Qiang. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova indicated that the project is nearly ready, with practical implementation set to begin once price and gas volume agreements are finalised. These negotiations likely centred on resolving these two critical issues.
