Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Terrorist attack in Moscow, potential introduction of the death penalty, new Russian aggressive rhetoric and EU sanctions
Domestic policy takeaways:
- A major terrorist attack in Russia. The deadliest terrorist attack in decades unfolded in Russia on the evening of March 22. Several armed individuals stormed the Crocus City Hall mall near Moscow, indiscriminately shooting at civilians. The attackers targeted people at the mall’s entrance, inside, and even in the concert hall, where several thousand individuals were present. As of now, the confirmed death toll stands at 144, though the number of injured and fatalities could rise, with dozens still hospitalised.
- Following the attack, Russian propagandists and government officials swiftly pushed the narrative of Ukraine’s alleged “involvement” in orchestrating the incident. Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, stated that if any ties to the “Kyiv regime” were discovered, it would necessitate the elimination of all those responsible, including Ukrainian authorities.
- Margarita Simonyan, a Russian propagandist, denied ISIS’s involvement in the attack and squarely blamed the Ukrainian special services. Andrei Kartapolov, head of the Defence Committee, also directly pointed fingers at Ukraine. On the afternoon of March 24, Putin himself commented on the attack, mentioning that a route had been prepared for the terrorists to escape to Ukraine. He reiterated this statement the following day during a Security Council meeting. The suspects who were apprehended turned out to be Tajik citizens. Western countries, including the United States, had been forewarned about the potential for terrorist attacks. It was also stated that Western intelligence services had information pointing to the direct involvement of the Islamic State of Wilayat Khorasan terrorist group in the attack.
- However, Russian media persists in pushing the narrative of Ukraine’s involvement in the terrorist attack. Conversely, Ukrainian security services and government officials vehemently deny any connection between Ukraine and the events at Crocus City Hall. This leads to the conclusion that, despite the lack of concrete details about the orchestrators of the attack, Russian authorities are intentionally pushing the narrative of Ukraine’s involvement. This seems aimed at stoking tension within Russian society and portraying Kyiv negatively to international partners.
- Currently, there isn’t substantial evidence suggesting that the terrorist attack was orchestrated by Russian special services in favour of the Putin regime. However, such a possibility remains open. Some indications include the slow response of Russian security agencies after the attack, the absence of additional security measures following warnings from Western countries, and the swift blame placed on Ukraine within the Russian information sphere.
- A candidate for the position of the head of the Supreme Court of Russia. The sole candidate for the position of the new head of the Russian Supreme Court has been announced. She is Irina Podnosova, a former deputy of the late Chief Justice Vyacheslav Lebedev, who held the position for 30 years and effectively merged the Russian security forces with the judicial system. Podnosova is notably recognised for being a former classmate of Putin’s, as both graduated from the law faculty of Leningrad State University. Russian officials openly acknowledged, through the Kommersant newspaper in 2020, before her appointment as deputy, that “she is a rather respected person because everyone understands who stands behind her.” We can already anticipate that Podnosova’s appointment signifies the continuation of a consistent functioning judicial system, indicating that decisions will continue to align with the interests of the security agencies. It’s noteworthy that she is a member of the judiciary herself, ruling out any concerns of bolstering a specific political faction or weakening another. Podnosova’s association with Putin shouldn’t come as a surprise, given that the Russian leader appoints only individuals he trusts to key political roles.
- Potential introduction of the death penalty in Russia. Following the terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall mall, the Russian media, along with propagandists and some political figures, have initiated a campaign advocating for the potential imposition of the death penalty. The current situation and the information frenzy could serve as a backdrop for the Russian authorities to consider implementing this measure. However, it is premature to make definitive statements at this point. Going back to the outset of the full-scale invasion and Russia’s expulsion from the Council of Europe, the controversial Deputy Chairman of the Security Council and former President Dmitry Medvedev openly mentioned “a good opportunity to restore a number of important institutions to prevent, particularly serious crimes,” referring to the death penalty. Currently, a number of politicians within the government, including the head of the pro-government United Russia faction in the State Duma, Vladimir Vasilyev, Dmitry Medvedev, and the deputy head of the State Duma Security Committee, Yuri Afonin, have started discussing the potential for such a decision. However, according to Russian law, reintroducing this punishment is currently impossible. In 2009, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation made a decision to ban the death penalty, a ruling that has not been overturned since 1991. There is no established procedure for such an overturning. Nonetheless, some experts do not rule out this possibility, as the Russian authorities have a history of disregarding their own laws. The consequences of implementing the death penalty can be anticipated. The Kremlin would gain the ability to eliminate opposition figures by accusing them of “terrorism” and thereby obtaining a powerful tool for blackmail.
- Russian authorities start calling their invasion of Ukraine a ‘war’. For the first time, Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov has referred to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a war, rather than a “special operation.” This statement came during an interview with journalists. “We are in a state of war. Yes, it began as a special military operation, but… when the collective West joined in support of Ukraine, it became a war for us. I am convinced of this. And everyone should understand this for their internal mobilisation,” Peskov stated.
- It’s important to note that the Russian authorities have been extremely sensitive to the use of the term “war” within Russia since the beginning of the invasion. A law was swiftly enacted a week after the invasion commenced, making it illegal to label the actions of the Russian army as a “war.” While pro-government figures faced no repercussions for using the term, the situation was starkly different for activists and government critics. Official authorities rarely used the term “war” to describe Russia’s actions. However, since the start of 2024 and following the presidential elections, there has been a noticeable increase in Kremlin rhetoric. This includes the return of “nuclear” threats and discussions about establishing a “sanitary zone” along the Ukrainian-Russian border, a move that implies the annexation of territories like Kharkiv and Sumy in Ukraine.
- Peskov’s recent acknowledgement of the conflict as a “war” and the call for “internal mobilization” signal that the Kremlin is poised for further escalation. This raises the possibility that Russian actions, such as talks of “negotiations” and “ceasefires,” may give way to renewed territorial ambitions. Putin’s current confidence in his capabilities is evident, likely fueled by perceived issues with US financial aid to Ukraine and the impending second wave of mobilization, which could provide Russia with additional forces to pursue further territorial expansion.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Transfer of profits from Russian frozen assets to Ukraine – the Kremlin’s reaction. Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov has issued a veiled warning to Western countries, suggesting the possibility of “lawsuits” if a decision is made to use profits from Russia’s frozen assets to support Ukraine. This move clearly drew the ire of Russian authorities. However, the Kremlin’s response to this potential action does not seem as severe as one might expect. In the past, when reports surfaced about the potential transfer of frozen financial assets to Ukraine, the Kremlin threatened to “seize” all assets belonging to Western countries within Russia. Presently, we are not hearing such forceful rhetoric from Moscow. This shift in tone could suggest that the Kremlin is not yet prepared to react with such strong measures to the prospect of profit transfers.
- Putin admits negotiations on Navalny’s exchange. Putin has made a significant admission by acknowledging that negotiations for the exchange of the late Russian opposition leader Navalny took place. The dictator stated that he had given his approval for these discussions. This statement essentially confirms the Kremlin’s involvement in Navalny’s murder. Previously, Ukrainian Prism had examined the scenario where Navalny’s death could be seen as a Russian response to the United States’ rejection of negotiations with Russia regarding a ceasefire along the front line, a goal the Kremlin had been pursuing since the fall of 2023.
- New sanctions against Russia. Last week, Russia found itself confronted with new sanctions from the EU, compounding the impact of existing measures already in place. The Council of the European Union imposed sanctions on 33 individuals and 2 legal entities in response to the death of Russian opposition leader Navalny. Meanwhile, the European Commission is reportedly gearing up to introduce what’s been dubbed as “killer” measures for Russian and Belarusian grain. This entails an additional duty of $95 per ton, as reported by the Financial Times. The move is expected to result in a significant 50% hike in prices and effectively disrupt Russian and Belarusian grain exports to Europe. Additionally, there is the possibility of a 50% duty on oilseeds and their processed products. Up until now, major restrictions on Russian agricultural products have not been implemented. The push for these sanctions primarily came from Poland and the Baltic states within the EU. Furthermore, recent American sanctions against the entire tanker fleet of Russian company Sovcomflot—adding it to the SDN list, which entails a ban on activities and asset freezes—have led to Indian refineries halting the acceptance of oil transported by Sovcomflot tankers. This includes both private and state-owned Indian refineries.
