Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Tensions between Russia and Iran, the withdrawal of Russian mercenaries from Africa and another arrest of Shoigu’s former deputy
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Another former deputy of Sergei Shoigu arrested in Russia. The crackdown on high-ranking military officials linked to former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu continues in Russia. Last week, Pavel Popov, who served as Deputy Defense Minister under Shoigu, was arrested, marking him as the third top official from Shoigu’s team to face such charges. Previously, Timur Ivanov and Dmitry Bulgakov, both former deputy defence ministers, were also detained. Law enforcement appears to be intensifying its purge, effectively dismantling Shoigu’s entire team. The sweep isn’t limited to high-ranking officials alone; last week, Major General Valery Mumindzhanov, deputy commander of the Leningrad military district, was arrested. Like most of those detained, Mumindzhanov faces charges of corruption.
- Pavel Popov faces allegations of fraud related to his management of Patriot Park, an ideological hub established by Sergei Shoigu in 2014. Popov, a veteran of Shoigu’s team since 2004, when Shoigu was head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, now finds himself caught in a widening crackdown. This shift suggests that Shoigu’s influence is waning, as evidenced by his failure to transfer any of his key associates from the Ministry of Defense to positions within the Russian Security Council. Although Shoigu serves as the Security Council Secretary, he operates with his predecessor, Nikolai Patrushev’s team.
- Notably, several former deputy defence ministers have yet to be arrested. Among them are Ruslan Tsalikov, the most senior member of Shoigu’s team and former first deputy defence minister. According to British intelligence, the FSB has questioned Tsalikov but has not yet detained him. His arrest could severely undermine the political prospects of the current Security Council Secretary.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russia is redeploying some of its mercenaries from Burkina Faso to the Kursk region. According to French newspaper Le Monde, Russia is repositioning some of its operatives from Africa, specifically mercenaries from the “Bears” unit, which operates under the Russian Redoubt PMC. This unit, consisting of up to 300 mercenaries, was stationed in Burkina Faso from January 2024, where they were primarily tasked with protecting the local junta leader, Ibrahim Traore. However, with the escalation of the Ukrainian operation in Russian border regions in August, Moscow has begun repatriating these mercenaries to Russia, particularly to the Kursk region. Currently, around 100 of these operatives have been withdrawn from Burkina Faso, though it remains unclear how many remain in the country. This redeployment is corroborated by posts on the unit’s social media channels, including a recent Telegram update stating that the “Bears” have “completed their tasks and are returning home in full force.”
- Moscow’s decision to redeploy its “Bears” unit from Africa highlights a reluctance to commit its main forces to the Kursk region and signals potential setbacks for Russian influence in West Africa. In February 2024, several juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formed the Alliance of Sahel States, seeking Russian military support to bolster their positions. This alliance promised Moscow significant leverage in the region.
- However, recent developments have posed challenges for Russia. In late July 2024, the Wagner Group suffered a substantial defeat at the hands of local Tuareg rebels, resulting in significant casualties. The withdrawal of hundreds of mercenaries from Burkina Faso may suggest that Russia is currently struggling to deploy sufficient forces to support its allies. This situation could undermine Moscow’s credibility and influence not only in Burkina Faso but also in other regions where Russian mercenaries are active.
- Tensions are escalating between Russia and Iran over the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Last week, tensions between Russia and Iran over the Armenian-Azerbaijani political settlement came to the forefront. The Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Russian ambassador to express Tehran’s firm stance that any alterations to the internationally recognized borders or the geopolitical status quo in the region are unacceptable.
- The dispute centres around the Zangezur Corridor, a critical infrastructure project involving a railway and highway intended to link Azerbaijan’s mainland with its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, which is separated by Armenian territory. This corridor, which is planned to traverse Armenia along its southern border with Iran, has been a contentious issue among several regional players for years. Following the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan signed an agreement stipulating that the transport corridor through Armenian territory would be under Moscow’s control. This corridor has become a central element of Moscow’s influence over Yerevan’s policies and the broader regional dynamics. Consequently, all recent Russian statements and official visits concerning the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement are closely tied to the fate of the Zangezur Corridor.
- For many states in the region, the specifics of the Zangezur corridor are of lesser concern. Recently, Baku and Tehran explored an alternative proposal in which a transport route linking Azerbaijan with its exclave could pass through Iranian-controlled territory. However, following President Vladimir Putin’s official visit to Baku, the focus shifted back to the Zangezur corridor through Armenia, now a central element in the evolving peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In response, Russian officials have criticised the Armenian government for allegedly obstructing this proposed settlement.
- On September 2, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov underscored the necessity of Russian control over the Armenian segment of the Zangezur corridor in a speech at a Russian university. This statement likely triggered a strong reaction from Iran, which summoned the Russian ambassador. This issue is politically significant for Tehran, as it challenges Turkey, Azerbaijan’s principal ally, and is critical to maintaining Armenia’s independence and territorial integrity. Consequently, tensions between Tehran and Moscow are intensifying.
- Putin’s visit to Mongolia. President Vladimir Putin’s recent official visit to Mongolia unfolded against the backdrop of two key issues: Mongolia’s participation in the International Criminal Court and its decision to exclude the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline from its strategic development plans until 2028. The visit underscored that despite Mongolia’s reliance on Russian energy—importing nearly 95% of its oil products and 20% of its electricity from Russia—there was no immediate threat of arrest for Putin. This reflects Moscow’s influence over Ulaanbaatar, which remains heavily dependent on Russian resources.
- The primary focus of Putin’s visit appears to be the gas sector. This aligns with previous Russian statements regarding the agenda of the discussions and the ongoing situation surrounding the Power of Siberia 2 project. The absence of significant announcements following the visit suggests limited progress on this front. Public statements from the visit indicate that Russia is keen on enhancing its energy supply to Mongolia and modernising the country’s energy infrastructure. Notably, an agreement was reached for the reconstruction of the Mongolian CHP-3 plant in Ulaanbaatar, and discussions were held about potential Russian gas supplies for Mongolia. However, Russia’s strategic interest likely remains centred on advancing the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline project.
