Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Russia resumes ‘Istanbul agreements’ talks, reports of new massive Wagner PMC recruitment, and attack on Russian governor
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Domestic policy takeaways:
- A Russian man attempted to assassinate a Russian governor. In Russia, the governor of the Murmansk region, Andrei Chibis, was attacked with a cold steel weapon, marking the first such incident in recent years. The attacker, an ordinary Russian citizen, explained his actions by stating his dislike for the Russian politician. Fortunately, the governor survived the attack. It remains unclear whether this event signals potential future acts of ‘disobedience’ and hostility toward authorities by Russians. The immediate response from other high-ranking Russian politicians was notable. For instance, following news of the attack, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council and former President, promptly cancelled his planned visit to the city of Apatity in the Murmansk region. This suggests that Russian politicians may, at least in the near term, hesitate to make public appearances. It’s important to note that there are currently no accusations against Ukraine regarding this attack. The sole representative of Russia’s political elite expressing such an opinion is Leonid Slutsky, a member of the State Duma and chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party.
- Putin made a few political statements at the meeting with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs board. Last week, Russian leader Vladimir Putin convened a meeting with top officials from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, including the Ministry’s head, Vladimir Kokoltsev. During this gathering, Putin made several political remarks. Without explicitly naming Ukraine, he once again insinuated their and Western countries’ involvement in the recent major terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall mall near Moscow, suggesting that the “beneficiaries” of the attack would be found. Despite evidence and statements from allies such as Iran and Belarus contradicting these claims, Russia continues to push the narrative that Ukraine, and to a lesser extent, Western countries, are responsible for the attack. Expanding on this, Putin highlighted that terrorism is a “two-sided weapon,” hinting at the potential for attacks on both Ukrainian and Western soil. Given these statements, coupled with Russian intelligence activities abroad, Putin’s words should be taken as a serious matter that warrants further scrutiny.
- Putin also addressed changes in Russia’s migration policy, advocating for a significant overhaul. This rhetoric suggests a genuine effort by Russian authorities to introduce new forms of monitoring within the migrant community. Putin highlighted the necessity of implementing additional biometric databases, aligning with reports of the government’s efforts to establish a new agency overseeing migration policy, directly answerable to the president. This signals forthcoming stringent controls over migrants, with the potential digitalisation offering the Kremlin an effective means to mobilise Central Asians on a broader scale than seen presently.
- Putin also delved into foreign policy matters, employing historical rhetoric to stress that “certain countries seek retribution against Russia for the campaigns of Napoleon and Hitler.” This statement serves as a veiled reference to the recent uptick in French President Macron’s rhetoric and proposals regarding the potential deployment of Western troops in Ukraine. Putin’s narrative appears to link the possible presence of French troops with Napoleon’s conflict with Russia. While this rhetoric may resonate with domestic audiences, its effectiveness in the realm of foreign policy remains questionable.
- A proposal to ban the opposition from running for election has been proposed in Russia. Last week, new initiatives surfaced in the Russian parliament aimed at further restricting the freedoms of individuals labelled as “foreign agents.” This designation is essentially a tool for the Russian authorities to curb the activities of opposition activists and politicians within the country. One such initiative came from the radical pro-government faction “A Just Russia,” which proposed a bill to disallow “foreign agents” from participating in elections at any level. This proposal sparked considerable controversy within Russia. The bill appears to be a response to potentially fabricated information circulating in the Russian media, claiming that a significant number of “foreign agents” were planning to run for seats in the Moscow State Duma during the upcoming local elections in the spring of 2024. The faction’s move backfired, casting them in a negative light, and the bill was subsequently sent back for revision. This episode highlights the limited autonomy of Russian political parties, even those aligned with the government, in initiating legislation or proposals without directives from the Kremlin.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Kremlin resumes attempts to start its “peace negotiations” through Shoigu. The French and Russian defence ministers, Sébastien Le Coronneu and Sergei Shoigu, recently engaged in their first conversation since the fall of 2022. The French emphasised the necessity of this dialogue, aiming to provide the Russian side with crucial information regarding the organisers behind the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack. Additionally, they made it clear that they possessed no evidence supporting Ukraine’s involvement in the incident. On the flip side, Shoigu, in line with the Kremlin’s public stance, asserted Russia’s possession of evidence to the contrary. However, the key outcome of this exchange came in the form of a statement from the Russian Ministry of Defence. The statement indicated Russia’s readiness for “dialogue” and potential negotiations, citing the “Istanbul peace initiative.” This initiative stemmed from a series of meetings between Ukraine and Russia in the early months of the full-scale invasion but was halted following revelations of the genocide in Bucha.
- Ukrainian Prism has thoroughly analysed Russia’s strategic push for these “negotiations,” a campaign initiated in the fall of 2023. Over subsequent months, the Kremlin has been subtly signalling its willingness for peace through purported “sources in the Russian government.” Reuters even reported Putin’s attempts, through intermediaries, to reach out to the United States with a proposal to freeze the conflict along the front line—an offer that the US ultimately declined. Shoigu’s recent public proposition marks the first notable high-level proposal since Russia’s presidential election. This indicates that, despite the escalating rhetoric, the Kremlin has not outright dismissed the idea of engaging in “negotiations.” Throughout the fall and winter of 2023, Russia continued to advocate for a “ceasefire” as an initial step towards such talks. This move, many speculate, could afford Putin the time needed to regroup and bolster his forces, potentially resuming hostilities from more advantageous positions in the future. It is important to note that despite the discourse on “negotiations,” the Russian authorities have remained steadfast in their demands. They continue to push the narrative of the “demilitarisation and denazification” of Ukraine, a perplexing notion that effectively translates to a desire to dismantle Ukrainian sovereignty.
- Wagner PMC resumes its operations in Africa. The Russian outlet Verstka recently published an investigation shedding light on the Wagner PMC’s latest recruitment efforts following the passing of its leader, Prigozhin. The group has embarked on a recruitment campaign to deploy mercenaries to Africa, marking an unprecedented move. The investigation revealed that around a dozen recruiters are currently involved in this operation. In the aftermath of Putin’s actions that led to the demise of most Wagner PMC officers in the summer of 2023, the organisation’s activities have fallen under the oversight of various Russian security entities. Notably, the “African” corps now operates under the control of the Russian GRU. Meanwhile, other units, including those previously engaged in conflicts in Ukraine, have been placed under the supervision of the Russian Rosgvardia—a force essentially serving as internal armed troops designed to safeguard the Putin regime—alongside the Ministry of Defense. Verstka’s report indicates that the ongoing recruitment drive is primarily focused on operations in Mali, where the Wagner PMC has previously been active. This suggests that the allocation of Prigozhin’s resources is nearing completion, with the “new” organisation gearing up for operations on the ground.
