Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Russia revives its “June ultimatum” rhetoric, unveils a new nuclear doctrine, and cuts off gas supplies to Austria.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Putin officially signs Russia’s revised nuclear doctrine. Russian President Putin has officially signed the revised nuclear doctrine of Russia. While the details had been previously disclosed, Ukrainian Prism has already analysed the changes. The key updates in this document, distinguishing it from the previous version, include clarifications regarding certain weapons whose use against Russia would trigger a nuclear response. Notably, drones are now included in this list. Additionally, the revised doctrine for the first time includes Belarus, meaning an attack on Belarus could also provoke Russia’s use of nuclear weapons.
- Overall, the document appears more politically charged than military in nature. It openly demonstrates a threatening stance, seemingly aimed at limiting Western military support to Ukraine. The doctrine also features vague language that lacks clear interpretation. For instance, it introduces a new political element alongside the previously defined weapons criteria: the notion of a “critical threat to the sovereignty” and “territorial integrity” of Russia as grounds for deploying nuclear weapons. However, the document fails to define what constitutes a “critical threat to sovereignty,” a highly ambiguous term that allows Moscow to interpret it freely. Given Putin’s political rhetoric, it’s evident that the Kremlin could consider a defeat in the war against Ukraine or any event that personally threatens Putin—regardless of whether it involves an attack on Russia itself—as a “threat to sovereignty.”
- In the Kremlin’s view, the signing of the revised doctrine is intended to serve as a deterrent, primarily targeting the United States. It aims to influence matters such as the U.S. administration’s decision to allow Ukrainian forces to use long-range missiles against Russian territory and military infrastructure. This is reflected in the frequent references to the updated doctrine by Russian officials in recent days, particularly in connection with the U.S. approval for Ukraine to deploy ATACMS missiles against Russia. However, as evidenced by the high likelihood of Ukraine using long-range U.S. weapons against the Bryansk region just the day before, these deterrent hopes have not materialised. Consequently, Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine should now be seen more as a tool of political pressure than a genuine threat.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Scholz and Putin’s conversation: Russia is back to its June ultimatum. Last week, several events suggested that Russia’s stance on the potential end of the war may have shifted dramatically, moving towards rejecting negotiations. The basis for this shift lies in the conversation between Putin and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the first in two years. Following the meeting, the Russian authorities published a transcript in which the Kremlin, while claiming openness to negotiations, once again referred to Putin’s June ultimatum. This speech, delivered by the Russian president to Russian Foreign Ministry diplomats inthe early summer of 2024, was the first time since the war began that Putin explicitly outlined Russia’s conditions for peace talks: the annexation of all four Ukrainian regions (even those the Russian military had never occupied), the lifting of sanctions, and Ukraine renouncing its NATO ambitions.
- Until October 2024, this position had remained unchanged, clearly signalling the Kremlin’s unwillingness to engage in any meaningful dialogue to end the war. However, after the recent BRICS summit in Kazan, neither Putin nor any other Russian officials mentioned this ultimatum. Ukrainian Prism closely followed the Kremlin’s position and noted the possibility that Xi Jinping and other BRICS members could exert pressure on Moscow in future negotiations. The absence of the June ultimatum in Russian rhetoric—especially during Putin’s last two major public speeches—has raised hopes that such pressure may indeed lead to a shift.
- We are now seeing the return of the June ultimatum at the highest level. Last week, the Russian army also resumed attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which had not been seen in recent times. This suggests two possible developments. The Kremlin may be using the return of the “June” rhetoric to ramp up diplomatic pressure ahead of potential talks with newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump. At the same time, the current situation on the front does not rule out the possibility that Putin may decide against considering an end to the war or declaring a truce. In this case, Ukraine could still consider pressuring the Kremlin with the involvement of Beijing, whose plan outlines an option for ending the war along the front line. The best course for Kyiv would be to formally agree to organise a summit with Western countries, China, and nations of the Global South. This would create enough pressure on Moscow to force it to retract its “ultimatum” position or, at the very least, publicly reveal Moscow’s unwillingness to negotiate.
- Russia cuts off gas supplies to Austria. Last week, Russia abruptly cut off gas supplies to the Austrian company OMV Gas Marketing & Trading. This move came after OMV won a lawsuit against Russian Gazprom the day before. The case concerned the autumn of 2022 when Russia halted gas supplies to Austria without explanation. As a result of the trial, OMV sought to recover 230 million euros in fines from Gazprom, potentially in the form of gas. This appears to have been the reason behind the suspension of formal Russian gas supplies to Austria.
- However, this doesn’t mean Russia is losing its European market. For instance, the Slovak company SPP, which operates Slovakia’s national gas system, confirmed that gas deliveries from Russia have continued without interruption. Reuters also reported that OMV is still receiving gas, albeit in slightly smaller volumes. SPP further suggested that other European gas market players may be purchasing the gas that Russia stopped supplying directly to Austria. It’s likely that this gas is being resold by a trader to OMV, making Gazprom’s decision appear largely symbolic. Reuters also noted that Russia is supplying gas to Europe in even larger quantities than before Gazprom’s decision. Therefore, it is inaccurate to suggest that Russia’s presence in the EU energy market is further declining.
