Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Russia continues to accuse Ukraine of the terrorist attack, despite denials voiced by Kremlin allies, alongside increased harassment of migrants and the cessation of rhetoric regarding the reinstatement of the death penalty.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- The Kremlin continues to blame Ukraine for the terrorist attack. Russia continues to spread disinformation among its own people and political establishment about Ukraine’s alleged involvement in the terrorist attack on the Crocus City Hall mall, where about 140 people lost their lives. Despite clear evidence that the attack was carried out by the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), who claimed responsibility, the Kremlin continues to push the narrative of Ukraine’s “involvement.” Last week, FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov stated that while radical Islamists were behind the attack, Ukrainian and Western intelligence services were directly involved, according to him. Meanwhile, no concrete evidence has been presented, only vague assertions of “their guilt.” This has been coupled with public declarations of intent to label the Ukrainian Security Service as a “terrorist organisation” in Russia, along with threats directed at the head of the Ukrainian Defence Intelligence Service, Kyrylo Budanov. Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council and a key figure among Putin’s inner circle has also pointed fingers at Ukraine for the attack. His statements carry weight, given his typically discreet nature in public statements. Other Russian agencies have persisted in their quest to find a Ukrainian link. For instance, the Russian Investigative Committee claimed that the terrorists received funding from Ukraine for the attack’s preparation, yet no evidence was presented. Despite even Kremlin-friendly states issuing statements effectively refuting Russia’s claims of Ukrainian involvement, further open accusations from Russia are likely on the horizon.
- Terrorist attack, mobilisation and attack on Kharkiv. We can see that Russian security forces are actively pursuing this case. There’s a possibility they are gearing up for a significant public event where the Kremlin will formally accuse Ukraine and Western nations—particularly the United States and the United Kingdom—of being involved in the terrorist attack. This could serve as a pretext for escalating their actions, possibly leading to increased missile strikes on Kyiv to paint a narrative of Russia’s response to the “organised” attack. Additionally, there might be a ramp-up of hostilities in the Kharkiv region, with the aim of capturing it. Putin has already hinted at this course of action, citing the need to “establish a buffer zone” along the Ukrainian-Russian border. This notion finds support in articles from Russian newspapers like Verstka and Medusa, which cite Russian officials affirming the Kremlin’s interest in seizing Kharkiv. Indeed, this appears to be Russia’s preferred next military move. It’s conceivable that Putin could leverage the “findings” of the investigation into the terrorist attack to justify a new wave of mobilization, something the Russian authorities seem to be pushing for. This scenario is becoming increasingly likely, given the current developments.
- Russian authorities may create a special structure for controlling migrants. The pro-government Vedomosti newspaper has reported that Russia is gearing up to establish a new entity tasked with overseeing migration and interethnic policies. While there are no definite details yet on how this entity will operate, the publication suggests the possibility of either a new ministry, a separate department or an agency directly answerable to the president. This move seems to be a response to the growing political and social demand for tighter migrant control measures within Russia. The current state of affairs in this sphere is described as chaotic, making the creation of such a structure quite probable in the near future. If it does come to fruition, it would be under direct Kremlin oversight—specifically under the Department of Internal Policy in the presidential administration—and would grant authorities an effective means of managing the migrant population. A major concern arises from the potential for Russian authorities to use this new structure to streamline bureaucratic processes, possibly easing the way for mobilizing migrants. Another possible scenario involves integrating this entity, along with a substantial number of migrants, into the administrative framework of the Kremlin, which currently has a strong presence in budgetary spheres of work.
- Russian authorities are moving away from the topic of the return of the death penalty. Currently, it’s evident that Russian authorities have opted against pushing for the reinstatement of the death penalty as a punitive measure. Following the terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall mall, the Russian media and the “expert community” launched into a widespread discussion on this matter. Several high-ranking officials, including the controversial former president Dmitry Medvedev and the head of the pro-government United Russia faction in the State Duma, Vladimir Vasiliev, voiced support for this move. The Russian Constitutional Court had already prohibited the death penalty back in 2009, and legally, it cannot reverse its own decision without a prescribed procedure in place. In the past week, there have been no observable actions from the Kremlin in this direction. Additionally, Russian propaganda, led by one of its most prominent figures, Dmitry Kiselev, has begun circulating the narrative that President Putin himself opposes the death penalty. As a result, the Kremlin has opted against reintroducing this form of punishment.
- Tajik citizens are massively leaving Russia. Against the backdrop of rising anti-immigrant sentiments in Russia, it has come to light that Tajik citizens are leaving the country in large numbers. The Deputy Minister of Labor of Tajikistan, Shakhnoza Nodiri, reported instances of harassment against their citizens, with many expressing fear for their safety in Russia. According to the deputy minister, there are now more people returning to Tajikistan than leaving it. Simultaneously, Russian authorities are carrying out aggressive raids and inspections in areas densely populated by citizens from Central Asian countries, particularly in Moscow and St. Petersburg. It is apparent that such actions by Russian security forces were anticipated, allowing authorities to gather information on specific individuals and potentially consider them for future mobilization efforts. Overall, these raids seem to serve a more political and psychological purpose. Within the framework of the Russian system, security forces are under pressure to demonstrate results to their superiors. Therefore, the inspections of migrants following the recent terrorist attack serve as a prime example of such “effective” activity.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Iran warned Russia of a possible terrorist attack. Reuters, citing its own sources, reported that Iran had alerted Russia several days prior to the shooting in the Moscow region about the potential for a major terrorist attack on Russian soil. This intel came to light during the interrogation of individuals arrested on suspicion of involvement in the January 3 bombings in Iran. However, Russian officials, represented by the Special Representative for Afghanistan, stated that the Russian Foreign Ministry had not received such information. Similar to reports from the United States, the Iranian warning consisted of general statements without specific details. Adding to this, self-proclaimed Belarusian President Lukashenko acknowledged the possibility that the terrorists might have been attempting to cross the Russian-Belarusian border, indicating that their target was not necessarily Ukraine. Thus, even Russia’s allies are providing information that contradicts the notion of Ukraine’s involvement in the March 22 terrorist attack.
- Armenia bans Russian propaganda on TV. Armenia is furthering its departure from the Russian sphere of influence, as evidenced by recent government decisions aimed at curbing the presence of Russian propaganda within its borders. Last week, reports emerged that Armenia had banned the airing of propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s programs on television, particularly on the RTR-Planet channel, citing “offensive content regarding peoples and national values.” This move is part of a series of steps taken by the Armenian government to combat Russian propaganda, highlighting the country’s continued shift in direction and rhetoric within the broader context of political changes and a growing trend of distancing from Russia.
- Russia vetoes the work of the commission to monitor the DPRK nuclear program. Russia has vetoed the extension of the UN commission tasked with monitoring the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs, as well as ensuring compliance with sanctions. Last week, Security Council members were set to vote on the continuation of the commission’s mandate. While 13 members voted in favour and China abstained, Russia cast its vote against it, stipulating that they would support the commission’s work only if a timeline for lifting sanctions against the DPRK was established. Consequently, the commission will halt its operations by the end of April. This move by the Kremlin clearly indicates the recent political alignment between the two dictatorships. If the commission’s work comes to an end, it opens the door for the DPRK to resume its missile program unhindered. It’s plausible that this decision was mutually agreed upon, potentially allowing Russia to continue receiving weapons from North Korea.
