Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Russia allocates extra funds to boost contract soldier numbers, an analysis of Moscow’s stance on peace negotiations, and implications of removing the Taliban from the terrorist list.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Russia plans to recruit an additional 255,000 soldiers for its war against Ukraine. The Russian draft budget for 2025, along with its financial and economic development plan through 2027, offers insight into Moscow’s long-term strategy for bolstering its military forces. Over the next three years, the government plans to allocate 90 billion roubles in one-off payments to incentivise citizens to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defence. This amounts to an annual expenditure of 30 billion roubles for recruitment purposes. Presently, the federal budget provides a one-off payment of 400,000 roubles per recruit, supplemented by additional funds from regional budgets. As a result, Russia has the financial capacity to enlist an additional 255,000 contractors for its army.
- Notably, this recruitment budget was significantly increased in the summer of 2024, when President Putin raised the one-off payment from 195,000 roubles to 400,000 by presidential decree. This move followed a general rise in recruitment payments across the regions, highlighting waning interest among Russians in joining the military amidst the ongoing war against Ukraine. These financial incentives seem to have had an impact, as no further major recruitment efforts were announced by the government between August and September, suggesting that their measures to strengthen the army have been relatively successful for the time being.
- Over the past two weeks, we have witnessed the return of a trend observed during the summer. Several regions have resumed increasing their recruitment payments. Notably, authorities in the Belgorod region have raised the payment to an astounding 3 million roubles for signing a contract with the Ministry of Defence. Similarly, in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, payments have been increased to 2.7 million roubles. Should other Russian regions follow suit, this would suggest that voluntary enlistment in the war against Ukraine has once again significantly declined. This casts doubt on the government’s target of recruiting 255,000 contract soldiers. If the trend continues, Russia may be forced to raise federal one-off payments further, which would likely result in a substantial reduction in the number of recruits the Kremlin plans to enlist over the next three years.
- In such circumstances, the Kremlin may have no choice but to announce a second wave of mobilisation, particularly given persistent reports in Russian media about manpower shortages at the front. Ukrainian Prism has already examined this issue, concluding that Russian bureaucracy is unlikely to be prepared for a new mobilisation before January 2025.
- The Kremlin is actively spreading propaganda among preschoolers. Last week, new developments emerged regarding Russia’s strategy to intensify propaganda efforts among its own population, this time targeting preschool children. During a meeting with finalists of the Teacher of the Year competition, President Putin emphasised the importance of instilling patriotism from an early age. Following this, he instructed that propaganda lessons, termed “conversations about important things,” be introduced in kindergartens. This format, already in use in schools since 2022, promotes key political narratives favoured by the Kremlin, including the justification of the war against Ukraine, opposition to the West, and the perceived stability of the government. Now, similar efforts will be directed at preschool children, extending the reach of these messages to an even younger audience.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russia’s ultimatum on negotiations remains unchanged, highlighting key points from Sergey Lavrov’s interview. Last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave an interview to Newsweek in which he reiterated the conditions for initiating negotiations to end the war—conditions first outlined by Putin in June 2024. These include Russia’s annexation of the entirety of the four Ukrainian regions—Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk—the abandonment of Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO membership, and the lifting of all sanctions against Russia. Only under these terms, Lavrov stressed, would Moscow be willing to discuss an end to the war. The interview made it clear that Russia’s political stance remains unchanged. Lavrov also referenced the so-called “Istanbul agreements,” which the Kremlin continues to tout as a “peace plan.” Under this proposal, Ukraine would see its sovereignty significantly curtailed, including a drastic reduction in its military forces.
- This statement followed last month’s BRICS security summit in St. Petersburg, where the issue of ending the war in Ukraine was raised, according to remarks by Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu. His comments hinted that Moscow’s hardline stance was not fully endorsed by all its BRICS partners. China, in particular—along with Brazil—has been actively promoting its own peace plan. Despite a series of recent high-level meetings between Russian officials and counterparts from China and India, including direct talks between Putin and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, there has been no shift in Russia’s position.
- Ukrainian Prism has previously noted that no shift in the Kremlin’s stance is likely before the upcoming BRICS summit, scheduled for 22-24 October in Kazan, Russia. During the summit, Putin is also expected to hold a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping—a meeting the Russian leader has publicly sought on two occasions in recent months.
- Russia is set to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations. Last week, Zamir Kabulov, the Russian President’s special representative for Afghanistan, announced that Moscow had made a high-level decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations. This move has long been anticipated. Since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, Russia has sought to establish effective ties with the new regime, with Taliban representatives regularly participating in forums held on Russian soil. Bilateral relations have also deepened in areas such as intelligence cooperation. For instance, FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov confirmed joint efforts with the Taliban to combat arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and the Taliban’s fight against the Afghan branch of the Islamic State (ISIS), known as Wilayat Khorasan.
- However, this engagement raises serious concerns about the long-term security implications, particularly regarding the potential rise of radical Islamism in the region, especially in Tajikistan. The strengthening of Wilayat Khorasan in Afghanistan over the past three years, alongside its growing activity and the possibility of its spread to neighbouring countries, presents a significant threat. The Taliban’s inability to effectively counter this threat is evident, and the long-standing issue of the Tajik Taliban’s influence, which has posed a danger to Tajikistan since the Taliban’s rise to power, remains unresolved. In this context, Moscow’s eagerness to deepen cooperation with the Taliban could have unintended consequences. Over the past year alone, ISIS has carried out a major terrorist attack in Russia at Crocus City and twice seized Russian prison colonies. Increased political and economic engagement with the Taliban, including the use of Afghan labour, could further heighten the terrorist threat within Russia itself.
