Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: revisions to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, a sharp escalation in military funding for 2025, and the ongoing high-level diplomatic engagements between Moscow and Tehran
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Russia revises its nuclear doctrine. Last week, President Putin convened a public meeting of the Security Council to discuss Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy. Following this, the Russian president announced several adjustments to the country’s nuclear doctrine, a move that Russian officials have threatened since the onset of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For now, these revisions appear to be confined to a localised context.
Key elements of the updated doctrine include Russia’s asserted right to deploy nuclear weapons in response to aggression against Belarus, in the event of intelligence suggesting a large-scale missile or UAV attack on Russia, and a clause that treats aggression by a non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear power as a collective assault. These changes seem designed primarily as political manoeuvres aimed at intimidating Ukraine and the West as the war drags on.
Despite the announcement, the final document outlining the detailed modifications to the doctrine has yet to be published. Early indications suggest that no significant strategic alterations have been introduced. The existing doctrine already permits the use of nuclear weapons in response to ballistic missile attacks; now, UAVs have been added to the criteria. This addition grants Moscow another lever to exert political pressure, particularly on Western powers. Notably, the inclusion of UAVs in the nuclear doctrine could technically encompass the ongoing drone strikes launched by the Ukrainian military on Russian infrastructure. Nevertheless, Russian officials have dismissed the likelihood of invoking this doctrine in response. For instance, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has stated that mass Ukrainian drone attacks should not be linked to nuclear deterrence policy—a stance that appears somewhat contradictory.
The West’s reaction to these updates has been muted, underscoring the limited impact of the revisions. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, for example, noted that the Alliance has observed no substantive changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine that would warrant adjustments to NATO’s own posture.
The recent Security Council meeting convened by President Putin underscored a significant domestic political dimension. Notably absent were Sergei Shoigu, the current Secretary of the Russian Security Council, and Nikolai Patrushev, the former Secretary and now a key presidential advisor. However, there may be a rationale behind Patrushev’s absence. Attending in his place was Rashid Nurgaliyev, First Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, who had worked under Patrushev for a decade. The fact that Nurgaliyev retained his post after Shoigu’s appointment signals that Patrushev still wields considerable influence within the Russian security apparatus.
Shoigu’s absence from such a critical meeting, coupled with the recent arrests of several members of his former team and other military officials, suggests a growing strain on his political standing. The situation indicates that the arrests are beginning to reverberate, casting uncertainty over Shoigu’s future as Secretary of the Security Council and his overall role within Russia’s security hierarchy.
- Russian government increases spending on war. Bloomberg, citing the draft Russian budget for 2025, has reported that the Russian government is planning a dramatic increase in war-related expenditures next year. Although officials have refrained from providing precise figures, they confirmed an imminent rise in defence funding. Moscow is expected to raise military spending by 22%, reaching $142 billion (10.8 trillion rubles), a figure that represents nearly 30% of the total budget—an extraordinary allocation not seen since the Soviet era. An additional 3.5 trillion rubles will be directed towards “national security,” bringing defence-related expenditures to an estimated 40% of the entire budget.
- These figures reveal two critical dynamics. Firstly, Russia is bracing for a prolonged escalation in its military activities, evidenced by expected cuts in social spending, a trend already observed. Secondly, the strain on the Russian economy is becoming increasingly apparent due to the ongoing war and sanctions. Moreover, current oil prices, alongside news of Saudi Arabia’s plans to increase oil production—despite OPEC’s consensus—pose further questions about the sustainability of Russia’s budget. This could force the Kremlin into deeper cuts in other sectors, exacerbating the economic challenges it faces.
- The current economic outlook brings into sharp focus the Russian government’s reliance on its sovereign wealth reserve, the “Russian National Wealth Fund.” Last week, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation issued a stark warning, indicating that the fund could be depleted by as early as 2025, owing to the widening budget deficit and declining revenues from the oil and gas sector. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov echoed these concerns, acknowledging that funds would need to be drawn from the reserve to compensate for the shortfall in energy revenues.
- This looming scenario highlights the mounting pressure on Russia’s fiscal stability, with the war deepening the strain. If these reserves are depleted, Russia could face significant economic challenges as soon as next year, further undermining its already precarious financial position.
- Russia is freezing its LNG projects amid problems in the industry due to sanctions. The Russian pro-government newspaper Kommersant recently reported that Novatek has halted work on two of its most promising liquefied natural gas (LNG) production and export projects due to Western sanctions. The Murmansk LNG project, once considered a flagship initiative, and the Obsky LNG facility have been shelved. In their place, Novatek is refocusing its efforts on the Arctic LNG-2 project, another development that has stalled under sanctions.
- Even if Russia manages to complete Arctic LNG-2, it faces significant hurdles in finding buyers for its liquefied natural gas. On September 28, India’s Petroleum Minister Pankaj Jain formally announced that India would not purchase LNG from the Arctic project, citing sanctions as the key reason. The difficulties Russia has encountered in this sector over the past year highlight its dependence on Western technology and infrastructure for effective LNG production. Without these, Moscow’s ambitions in the global LNG market are severely curtailed.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russian Prime Minister Mishustin’s visit to Iran. The deepening of official ties between Russia and Iran continues to accelerate, as highlighted by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s recent visit to Tehran, where he met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. This marks the second high-level visit in the span of a month; on September 16, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu travelled to Iran, delivering a “personal message” from Vladimir Putin to the Iranian leadership and likely discussing the Zangezour corridor. This latest visit officially focused on economic cooperation and bilateral relations, underscoring the intensifying diplomatic engagement between the two nations.
- The backdrop to this flurry of diplomacy lies in a number of contentious issues that have strained the Russia-Iran relationship in recent years, most notably surrounding the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and Russia’s ambitions to control part of the Zangezour corridor through Armenia. Tehran, meanwhile, is staunchly opposed to any geopolitical changes in the region, which adds complexity to their negotiations.
- A key element of these discussions is the expansion of trade and economic cooperation, as both countries seek to diversify mutual trade channels. Against the backdrop of mounting difficulties in processing grey imports of sanctioned goods from so-called “friendly” nations, Russia appears to be exploring ways to resolve these challenges with Iran’s help, potentially by establishing a hub for sanctioned goods in Iran. This theory is further supported by Russia’s attempts to integrate Iran into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Following Mishustin’s visit, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk stated that the two countries discussed ratifying a free trade agreement between the EAEU and Iran by 2025, as well as Iran’s potential role as an observer within the organisation.
