Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Putin’s «inauguration», Shoigu’s resignation, Russia’s new defence minister, and further developments regarding Armenia’s distancing from Moscow.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Putin was officially “inaugurated” and re-elected to a new presidential term. According to the usual tradition, Putin’s “inauguration” was, in fact, a kind of “mini-federal address” that gathered almost all Russian officials. Even Ramzan Kadyrov, who has recently been rumoured to be suffering from serious health problems, personally attended the ceremony. Many Western countries refused to send representatives to the ceremony. At the same time, representatives of six EU states – Hungary, Slovakia, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, and France – attended the events. While the presence of Hungary and Slovakia was expected due to the special relationship between the governments of these countries and Russia, it was surprising that France sent a representative to the “inauguration” in the media. This step is likely to be a part of Paris’s strategy to keep a communication channel with the Kremlin open.
- Putin’s speech was part of the “inauguration”, and he essentially reiterated familiar narratives. The Russian dictator referenced individuals involved in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, stressing the imperative to “defend the Motherland” at all costs. The theme of “confronting challenges” took centre stage in his address. Putin once again echoed Russia’s stance of being “open to negotiations,” a key component of the Kremlin’s current foreign policy approach. He reiterated that dialogue can only occur when Western nations “properly assess the reality.” As customary, Putin alluded to the concept of a “new world order,” which serves as the cornerstone of the Kremlin’s strategy for engaging with African and Latin American nations.
- Based on this speech and the actions of Russian authorities, we can gather insight into some of Putin’s probable priorities in the near future. These priorities persist and focus on three key objectives: advancing and, where feasible, implementing the strategy of “negotiations,” retaining political dominance over Russian territorial gains, and bolstering Russia’s portrayal as a counterbalance to Western “hegemony.”
- Shoigu’s resignation and Russia’s new Minister of Defence. Following the presidential election in Russia, as anticipated, there will be an overhaul of the entire power structure. The government, too, has seen notable transformations. Sergei Shoigu, a longstanding figure in the Russian political landscape and a trusted confidant of Putin, is set to step down from his role as Minister of Defence.
- Andrei Belousov is set to assume the role of the new Minister of Defense. Having previously served as the First Deputy to Prime Minister Mishustin, Belousov held a pivotal position as the government’s second-in-command. He’s widely credited with playing a crucial role in sustaining the Russian economy during the initial months following the imposition of extensive Western sanctions. Renowned as a macroeconomics expert, Belousov is recognised for his steadfast loyalty to Putin, operating as the President’s trusted confidant rather than aligning with any particular political faction. His focus on economic sovereignty underscores the imperative of reducing reliance on foreign markets and fortifying domestic resilience. Belousov’s nomination to lead the Ministry of Defense signifies a concerted effort to conduct a thorough assessment of its substantial budget and streamline the operations of the military-industrial complex, a critical component of Russia’s defence strategy. Leveraging his background as an economist, Belousov is poised to not only revamp the defence sector but also steer the Russian economy towards a more militarised orientation. This transformation entails expanding the scope and output of the Russian military-industrial complex, augmenting the production of military assets, and optimising resource allocation for wartime endeavours.
- Patrushev’s dismissal. What’s the reason behind Shoigu’s dismissal, and what should we anticipate? The possibility, initially slim, didn’t surprise many after Timur Ivanov’s arrest. However, Nikolai Patrushev’s departure from his role as secretary of the Russian Security Council is raising eyebrows. Currently, there’s no solid information to justify such a move. Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, swiftly mentioned upon Patrushev’s dismissal that it’s tied to a new role, yet to be disclosed in the coming days. This explanation holds weight, given Patrushev’s close ties to Putin. Speculation suggests he might have been involved in planning a potential full-scale invasion of Ukraine within a closed political circle. As the de facto leader of all Russian siloviki, Patrushev’s influence is immense, making his termination seem unlikely.
- In this scenario, it appears more probable that his removal from the position of Security Council Secretary was primarily to pave the way for Shoigu to step in. This assumption stems from Putin’s longstanding staff policy, which has revolved around reshuffling rather than outright dismissing underperforming officials. He frequently reallocates individuals to different roles, maintaining their presence within the system. Another indication that Patrushev hasn’t fallen out of favour with the Russian leader is the elevation of his son, Dmitry Patrushev, who is set to become deputy prime minister in the upcoming government, transitioning from his current role as Minister of Agriculture. Presently, it seems likely that Patrushev will transition to the presidential administration, following a similar pattern of changes.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russia removed Volodymyr Zelenskyy from its wanted list. What was it about? The information about the put on the wanted list of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been removed from the Russian website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs database. He was included in this list last week. At the time, this news raised a number of important issues, especially regarding Russia’s strategy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president. Ukrainian Prism analysed this factor as well and noted that such a step could also be just a propaganda public campaign aimed at a domestic audience and would not have foreign policy consequences. At the same time, we should not rule out the opposite scenario, in which the Kremlin clearly used this decision as a signal of its readiness to move away from the «readiness to negotiate» strategy.
- Now, Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s rapid disappearance from the List once again raises the questions of the causes of this decision. The Russian media have conveyed that including Ukrainian politicians on the wanted list was a technical matter, attributing the action to the Main Department of Internal Affairs of the so-called “DPR,” which purportedly listed Volodymyr Zelenskyy. However, the situation remains in flux. The Kremlin still has the option to fully commit to a strategy of not recognising Zelenskyy’s legitimacy as president in the near future.
- Armenia stops financing the CSTO; Russia withdraws its troops from several regions. Yerevan continues to gradually move away from Moscow. Armenian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Ani Badalyan stated that her country would halt funding for the CSTO, specifically addressing the budget for 2024 approved by the organisation in November 2023. Although Armenian authorities emphasise that this decision does not imply their withdrawal from the CSTO, it is increasingly perceived as inevitable. In February 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced suspending his country’s participation in the organisation.
- It’s important to recognise that Armenia is facing considerable pressure in this matter. Primarily, this relates to economic ties with Russia and the presence of Russian military personnel on Armenian soil. There has been a significant shift in this regard. Following the recent meeting between Putin and Pashinyan, it was agreed that Russian border guards would cease their activities in certain Armenian regions and be withdrawn from the country. Yerevan had previously raised this issue, and the fact that it was discussed personally between the two leaders suggests Putin’s attempt to influence this decision. Dmitry Peskov, the Russian president’s press secretary, alluded to Putin’s involvement by mentioning his discussion of regional security during the meeting.
