Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Presidential elections in Russia, potential shifts in the Russian government, Armenia’s U-turn to the West, attacks on oil refineries, and a new major raid by Russian volunteer groups.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Russia’s presidential elections – a plebiscite on continuing the current political line. Russia recently concluded another presidential election, with the outcome being widely anticipated. The main curiosity lay in the percentage of the vote the Russian government would claim. Ukrainian Prism has explored various facets of these elections on multiple occasions. What set this election apart from its predecessors was Putin’s imperative to publicly validate his political trajectory within Russia. The aim was to solidify this path with an absolute and unparalleled endorsement from the populace. Consequently, any member of the Russian elite would need to take this election and its ramifications seriously. Essentially, it wasn’t just a presidential election; it stood as a plebiscite on the support for the ongoing war and the broader anti-Western stance. Therefore, it came as little surprise when the Kremlin announced an unprecedented 87% backing for Putin, marking the highest figure across all five elections in which he has “participated.” As anticipated, the Russian authorities announced a significant “backing” for Putin in the temporarily occupied territories, citing a “result” of 90-95% of the vote for the leader. This action underscores the Kremlin’s lack of readiness for de-escalation, signalling its intention to persist in ongoing efforts to seize Ukraine. At this juncture, we should brace for the possibility that the Kremlin might pursue measures that are unpopular among Russians and were previously deemed unfeasible due to electoral considerations. This primarily points to a looming potential wave of mobilization, necessitated by the Russian army’s substantial losses and the imperative for rotation. Another intriguing observation is the Russian opposition’s lack of effort to impede high voter turnout; in fact, they adopted a contrasting strategy. They proposed a “noon protest” campaign, urging Russians to visit the polls simultaneously on a designated day and time, aiming to convey a specific level of dissent. Consequently, Russian propaganda seized upon this development as evidence of overwhelming support for the government.
- Boris Kovalchuk was appointed to a position in a presidential administration. Boris Kovalchuk, the son of Yuri Kovalchuk, a close friend and associate of Russian President Putin, recently assumed the role of deputy head of the Presidential Control Department in the presidential administration. Just last week, reports surfaced of his departure from the position of head at Inter Rao, a company he dedicated 15 years to. Government-controlled Russian media speculated on potential roles he might undertake after this “promotion.” These included the top spots at Gazprom, Rosneft, the Deputy Prime Minister post overseeing energy issues, or even the governorship of St. Petersburg. Ukrainian Prism delved into these possibilities, highlighting the slim chances of his appointment to Gazprom or Rosneft, considering that such a move would necessitate Putin displacing their current heads, Miller and Sechin, both of whom wield considerable political influence.
- The elevation of Boris Kovalchuk within the presidential administration signals Putin’s reluctance to engage in potential conflicts. The same sentiment extends to the possibility of him assuming the role of deputy prime minister instead of Alexander Novak, whose name has recently emerged in discussions regarding potential reshuffles in the Russian government following the presidential election. In this context, Kovalchuk’s “promotion” doesn’t stir up conflicts within the Russian elite. However, it does prompt questions about the rationale behind this appointment. It’s worth noting that such a move could be seen as grooming future influential political figures—the emerging generation of Russian authorities. Yet, it’s premature to view Kovalchuk’s appointment as part of a strategy to promote a “new successor.” Present circumstances do not permit Putin to openly discuss stepping away from the presidency, as it remains the linchpin of his personal security and authority, particularly given the ongoing war.
- Putin’s interview with Russian propagandist Kiselev. Putin gave an interview to Russian propagandist Kiselev, in which he repeated anti-Western messages and once again hinted at nuclear weapons. In fact, this can be seen as a response to French President Macron’s recent idea of sending Western troops to Ukraine. The Russian authorities have reacted quite actively to this, and this interview is intended to make Russia’s position more public. Putin again threatened Western countries, speaking of Russia’s “military and technical readiness for nuclear war” and the use of these weapons in case of a threat to “sovereignty and independence,” where the presence of Western troops in Ukraine can be interpreted in this way. At the same time, this does not imply that the Kremlin would actually take such a step in response to a real decision to deploy NATO troops in Ukraine; rather, it is an element of the overall threat. As we’ve seen previously, Putin has previously threatened to destroy “convoys of Western equipment and weapons,” a move we’ve yet to witness. Concurrently, the Russian leader reiterated his readiness for “negotiations,” aligning with the consistent Kremlin narrative that began in the fall of 2023 and persists today. Putin once again emphasized the necessity of “taking into account the situation on the ground,” referring to Russia’s recent efforts to negotiate with the United States to halt the war on the front lines. In essence, this interview illustrated that the Kremlin’s strategy remains steadfast.
- New attacks on Russian oil refineries. Last week saw a continuation of the massive attacks on Russian refineries, which commenced in early 2024 and have already significantly impacted the country’s oil refining capacity. This aspect of the struggle against the Kremlin should be viewed as one of the most effective, as it directly impacts Russia’s financial capacity to sustain its military-industrial complex. Additionally, it puts strain on the Russian air defence system, which is unable to effectively safeguard such a large number of facilities. Furthermore, some of these attacks showcased an expansion in Ukraine’s operational range.
- Recently, nine different facilities have come under attack: the Lukoil-Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery, Russia’s largest refinery, the Ryazan Oil Refinery, refineries in the cities of Oryol and Kstovo, the Novoshakhtyn Oil Refinery, the Kaluga Oil Refinery, two refineries in the Samara region, and the Slaviansk-on-Kuban Oil Refinery. As of now, there is no concrete data on the impact of these attacks. However, these actions have already influenced gasoline prices, which have surged to their highest level since September 2023. It’s also important to note that Russia is presently undergoing standard maintenance at various refineries. These factors, combined with the likelihood of continued strikes, will undoubtedly affect both gasoline prices and refining volumes. Additionally, Russia faces the challenge of managing its crude oil reserves, as halting production presents difficulties, and the prospect of selling large quantities raises uncertainties.
- Russian volunteer groups raid Russian territory. The recent raid by several Russian volunteer groups, namely the Freedom of Russia Legion, the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC), and the Siberian Battalion, which commenced on March 12, came as a significant blow to the Putin regime. These volunteers managed to seize control of several settlements in the border area of the Kursk and Belgorod regions of Russia, launching successful attacks on military targets in these regions. This is not the first instance of Russian volunteers conducting raids on Russian soil. It underscores the readiness of Putin’s adversaries to engage in armed conflict to liberate Russia from the dictatorial regime. However, it is apparent that the current resources and capabilities of these Russian volunteer groups are insufficient for conducting large-scale operations deep into Russian territory.
- The official number of volunteer units remains unknown, but estimates suggest it ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 soldiers, a relatively limited force. Nevertheless, this size is sufficient for conducting regular raids along the Russian border. These raids serve an important purpose by drawing a portion of Russian troops to defend border regions, where active combat operations are typically less frequent compared to the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. This situation complicates the activities of the Russian army, requiring it to allocate resources to the defence of border areas. This diversion of resources may potentially have a positive impact on military operations along the active frontline areas, favouring Ukraine. These actions serve to show Russians that Putin cannot assure their security in border areas, potentially leading the local population to gradually recognize the lack of prospects and consequences of Russian aggressive actions. Conversely, for some Russians, these raids might act as a factor for rallying around the current regime, prompting demands for the safeguarding of territories and retaliatory strikes.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Armenia openly starts to follow the Western political course. For several weeks now, Armenia has maintained an openly critical stance against Russia and any close ties with Moscow. This week, Armenia’s potential withdrawal from the CSTO was directly confirmed. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that the organization is hesitant to address the question of the extent to which it is willing to defend the country or if it is prepared to do so at all.
- “If the CSTO addresses these questions and meets our expectations, it will signify that the issues between Armenia and the CSTO have been resolved. If not, Armenia will withdraw from the CSTO,” Pashinyan declared.
- Additionally, for the first time, Armenia has initiated discussions about the potential pathway towards EU membership as one of the options for the country’s future. This announcement came from Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan. Similarly, Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan straightforwardly expressed that the country’s decision in 1991 to commence closer cooperation with Russia was a mistake. In the near future, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is also scheduled to visit Armenia, with some suggestions of the country’s potential membership in the organization possibly being hinted at, further intensifying Russian rhetoric. It appears that the Kremlin, which initially aimed to resolve such a public demarche discreetly, has now come to terms with the limited prospects of this approach. It seems clear that the Armenian authorities have opted for a new political trajectory. As a result, we’ve begun hearing rather aggressive statements recently about the potential consequences of Armenia pursuing the “Ukrainian path.” In the coming days, we should anticipate a rise in Russian rhetoric and the onset of potential threats against Armenia and its sovereignty.
- Announcement of Putin’s visit to Turkey. Turkish President Erdogan has announced Putin’s upcoming visit to his country, indicating that this event will follow the Russian presidential election. Erdogan has been working towards organizing this meeting for quite some time, with reports of its preparation circulating for several months. It seems likely that Erdogan aims to assume the role of chief peacemaker by arranging negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. The timing of the announcement of the Russian leader’s visit, which came shortly after Erdogan’s meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is not surprising, as the Turkish president had persuaded Zelenskyy to pursue such negotiations. It is known that the Ukrainian leader rejected the idea. Erdogan likely seeks to secure more public concessions from Putin that he can leverage in organizing “peace talks.” Another aspect is Turkey’s interest in reviving the previously established “Black Sea Grain Initiative,” from which Russia withdrew. This initiative has continued to operate successfully under the protection of Ukraine. Such a prospect could be counterproductive for us, as the current mechanism has proven effective in circumventing Russia, which has been unable to impede its operations.
