Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: potential Russian expansion in the Arctic, rumours about the appointment of Alexei Dyumin as commander of Russian forces in the Kursk region, and important reshuffles in Russia’s key ministries
Domestic policy takeaways:
- The current political and social situation around the ongoing hostilities in the Kursk region. Over the past week, the Kremlin has continued its strategic response to the Ukrainian military operation in the Kursk region, encompassing both political and social dimensions. The general Russian population appears to have fully adapted to the recent developments, no longer exhibiting the intense reactions that were evident during the initial days of the conflict. However, this level of adaptation is not mirrored among residents of the Kursk region and other border areas. In these regions, public dissatisfaction with the Russian authorities continues to escalate.
- Over the past week, the Kremlin has implemented measures to suppress public discourse on the issue of missing persons in the Kursk region. Several platforms that aided local residents in searching for their missing relatives have been blocked or banned.
- It is important to note that both the Russian public and government agencies perceive the hostilities in the Kursk region as akin to a natural or man-made disaster. Meanwhile, the propaganda apparatus has yet to leverage this situation to unify society or deepen public engagement in the war effort. This suggests that, despite its varied rhetoric, the Kremlin is not inclined toward escalation, including the use of nuclear threats.
- As previously analysed by Ukrainian Prism, the Kremlin has continued to exploit the Kursk NPP issue to discredit Ukraine, framing it as a threat to nuclear security. For instance, the head of Russia’s Rosatom invited IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi to visit the Kursk NPP. In this context, Russian propaganda once again sought to blame Ukraine for allegedly planning attacks on both the occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP and the Kursk NPP. It is likely that this narrative was used to justify Grossi’s visit to Russia. Given these developments, we can expect further attempts by the Kremlin to leverage the nuclear issue to discredit Ukraine in international forums.
- Analysing the rumours about Alexei Dyumin’s appointment as the head of the counterterrorist operation in the border area. The discussion surrounding the involvement of Russian presidential aide Alexei Dyumin in managing the situation in the Kursk region has emerged as a significant domestic political factor in Russia. Several Russian media outlets reported that he has been appointed as the coordinator of the counterterrorist operation in the border regions. However, the specifics of his role vary, with reports ranging from him having direct control over the command of Russian troops to overseeing the coordination of security and civilian authorities.
- The rumour arose from Dyumin’s participation in a meeting of various security agency heads convened by Putin last week. This should not be surprising, given that Dyumin is responsible for coordinating Russia’s military-industrial complex. However, these rumours lack public and legal substantiation. As a presidential aide, Dyumin does not possess the direct authority required to assume control over the hostilities in the region.
- Another crucial factor is the absence of any official recognition of Dyumin’s claimed leadership in the situation. At present, the only confirmations come from statements by various Russian public figures. It is important to understand that claims about Dyumin commanding the entire Russian military operation in the Kursk region are unfounded and based solely on rumours. His role as a coordinator between security and civilian authorities, rather than direct command, remains the most plausible scenario. This is supported by Dyumin’s status as a presidential aide, which aligns with his responsibilities. Additionally, his position as Secretary of the State Council, where he coordinates regional and federal authorities, reinforces this role. Overall, the appointment underscores Putin’s trust in Dyumin.
- Russia creates a new Maritime Collegium. Last week, Putin established a new body focused on Russian maritime policy: the Maritime Collegium. Officially, this collegium is tasked with enhancing the effectiveness of Russia’s national maritime policy and overseeing its implementation. Putin has appointed Nikolai Patrushev, a former Secretary of the Security Council and one of his closest allies, who now serves as a presidential aide overseeing shipbuilding, as the head of this new structure.
- Patrushev’s appointment is significant given that the Maritime Collegium will address issues concerning the development of Russia’s navy and the safeguarding of its interests in the Arctic. In his previous role, Patrushev was already involved in this area through his oversight of the interagency commission responsible for securing Russia’s “national interests” in the Arctic region.
- Patrushev has announced his intention to focus on the regulatory aspects of Russian maritime policy. His leadership may signal a shift towards a more assertive strategy, potentially indicating an increased push for expansion in the Arctic. This aligns with recent statements about bolstering the Russian Navy. Another crucial consideration is the future of the Northern Sea Route, which the Kremlin has actively promoted in recent years as an alternative route for transporting Chinese goods to Europe, although this initiative has yet to produce significant results. Patrushev’s future activities, particularly regarding the construction of additional Russian nuclear-powered icebreakers essential for maintaining the Northern Sea Route, should be closely monitored. These developments suggest that the Kremlin is gearing up for a more robust political and economic expansion in the Arctic region.
- Recent appointments in the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last week, two significant personnel changes occurred within Russian ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. Anna Tsivilieva, a relative of Putin who was appointed Deputy Defense Minister during the last major government reshuffle, has been promoted to State Secretary and Deputy Defense Minister. Prior to her recent appointment, Tsivilieva had not held prominent government roles and was involved in military rehabilitation efforts. Ukrainian Prism has suggested that her previous role as Deputy Defense Minister was part of Putin’s strategy to exert tighter control over military officials within the Ministry of Defense. Her promotion to State Secretary further supports this theory, as she will now be responsible for articulating the positions of the Russian president and government on various legislative matters. In essence, Tsivilieva will serve as the key intermediary between the Ministry of Defense and other federal structures.
- Other notable changes have occurred within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Russian diplomat Sergei Butin has been appointed First Deputy Foreign Minister, a role he assumed only a year after being named an ordinary deputy minister. A career diplomat since 1996, Butin has spent most of his tenure within the ministry, also serving as vice-consul and consul general in Japan, focusing on Eastern affairs. His rapid advancement over the past year may suggest he is being groomed as a potential successor to Sergei Lavrov as Foreign Minister. Russian media have intermittently speculated about Lavrov’s possible resignation since the onset of the war.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russia’s position on potential peace negotiations has been shifting. Regarding the Ukrainian military operation in the Kursk region, there is no unified stance within Russia on the issue of peace negotiations. In his initial public response, Putin declared that negotiations were impossible. Simultaneously, Russian media reported that Russia had suspended all humanitarian and political negotiations due to the situation in Kursk.
- However, two weeks later, evidence suggests that Russia’s position may not be as rigid as initially portrayed. Notably, the Kremlin has initiated its first-ever negotiations on prisoner exchanges since the war began, driven by the high number of detainees in the Kursk region. Similarly, on August 19, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Putin’s stance that negotiations were unfeasible following the Ukrainian military action in Kursk. Yet, Russian presidential aide for foreign policy Yuri Ushakov indicated that Russian peace proposals had not been cancelled but merely postponed, as they were “not appropriate at this time.”
- These developments suggest that the Russian leadership’s assertions about the impossibility of negotiations due to the conflict in Kursk may be largely rhetorical. It appears that the Ukrainian military operation in the border region has already had notable political repercussions, influencing the dynamics of potential peace talks.
- Putin’s visit to Azerbaijan. Putin’s recent official visit to Azerbaijan was his first since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Officially, the discussions between Putin and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev focused on strengthening allied relations between the two countries. However, most experts believe the primary purpose of Putin’s visit was to address gas supplies to the European market. With Russia looking to sustain its exports after its transit agreement with Ukraine expires at the end of 2024, there is a strong likelihood that Azerbaijani gas will be routed to Europe through both Russian and Ukrainian pipeline systems, ensuring continued gas transit.
- Another key topic of discussion was the peaceful settlement and the potential signing of an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Kremlin aims to position itself as a mediator in this process to preserve its regional influence. However, the current state of Russian-Armenian relations suggests that Moscow’s role as mediator is unlikely to be effective. In this context, Russia largely maintains a symbolic presence. It is also noteworthy that, at present, relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are notably positive.
