Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Russia, deaths of people associated with Shoigu’s ex-deputy and preparations for the second wave of mobilisation
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Russia is preparing for a possible new wave of mobilisation. Russia is preparing for a potential new wave of mobilisation. The government is enhancing its technical capabilities to prevent conscripts from leaving the country if a new wave of mobilisation is declared. The Russian Ministry of Digital Development has issued a tender for creating special software to facilitate information exchange between the Ministry of Defense and the FSB concerning Russians who have received conscription notices from military recruitment offices. This system will handle the transmission of a “list of all persons temporarily prohibited from leaving the Russian Federation and subject to military conscription.” As a result, conscripts will automatically be barred from leaving Russia, even if they have not received a conscription notice in person. The system is expected to be officially launched by November 29 and will affect Russians conscripted in the fall of 2024, from October 1 to the end of the year.
- The official introduction of this system aims to address the challenges faced during the first mobilisation announcement in the fall of 2022, when hundreds of thousands of Russians attempted to flee the country, creating an unacceptable impression of the population’s unwillingness to go to war. The new system will mitigate this possibility.
- The timetable for the system’s introduction aligns with information from Russian media. Sources close to the Russian military command have indicated that by the end of 2024 or early 2025, the Russian army will be unable to conduct large-scale military operations without a second wave of mobilisation. Therefore, the conscription in the fall of 2024 will enable the Kremlin to optimise the new registry’s functioning technically.
- Russia puts Navalny’s wife on the wanted list and adds her to the terrorist list. Russian authorities have barred Yulia Navalnaya, wife of the late opposition leader Alexei Navalny, from returning to Russia. Last week, a Moscow court arrested her in absentia on charges of participating in an “extremist community.” If she returns home, she will be immediately arrested. Shortly thereafter, Russian authorities added Yulia Navalnaya to the list of terrorists and extremists. The pro-government media outlet Interfax reported that the formal reason for this decision was her creation and distribution of videos on the Internet aimed at discrediting the authorities. These actions officially close off Navalnaya’s path to Russian politics if she wishes to follow in her husband’s footsteps.
- Two close associates of detained Shoigu’s deputy, Timur Ivanov, have died within a week. Ivanov, the former deputy to ex-Defence Minister Shoigu, whose arrest triggered the largest purge in the Russian Defence Ministry and army, lost two key connections. On July 9, it was reported that Magomed Khandaev, head of the Russian Defence Ministry’s State Expertise Department, had died. Throughout his career, Khandaev dealt with building issues within the Ministry of Defence, an area linked to significant corruption. His testimony could have led to charges against Timur Ivanov and Shoigu. His death eliminates the possibility of such a scenario.
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- The second death was of businessman Igor Kotelnichikov, who was involved in a corruption case within the Defence Ministry. His death was announced on July 13. Russian human rights activists reported that Kotelnichikov had died in solitary confinement. Some Russian sources, known for leaking information about Russian security structures, wrote that FSB officers visited Kotelnichikov and demanded he testify against Timur Ivanov.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Indian PM’s official visit to Russia. Last week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made an official visit to Russia, where he met with Russia’s Vladimir Putin. This meeting is significant as it demonstrates India’s current strategy in its relations with Russia, focusing on economic aspects rather than potential “confrontation” with the West. Russian media tried to present this visit in such a format. It is worth noting that shortly before arriving in Moscow, Prime Minister Modi refused to attend the SCO summit, which the leaders of Russia, China, and Iran also attended. Today, the members of this organisation directly position themselves as an “alternative to the Western world,” and their leaders’ statements at the summit clearly indicated their antagonism towards the United States and its allies. In this way, India demonstrates its unwillingness to oppose the West politically. This factor is key to analysing Modi’s visit to Russia.
- According to a joint statement by the two leaders, the main topic of the talks was the economic component. They discussed various aspects of financial interaction and the export of Russian energy resources in detail. One of Modi’s main tasks was likely to create a mechanism for rapid money transfers between the two countries. On paper, both sides announced many different areas of economic cooperation. In reality, the only substantial economic component remains the sale of Russian oil and gas at significant discounts.
- Modi’s visit to Moscow did not attempt to promote any “peace plans” or initiatives. In this context, Delhi remains a neutral actor. Attention should be paid to the mention of “good services” in the joint statement. This likely refers to India’s role in mediating certain diplomatic signals. In March 2024, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar acknowledged his country’s usefulness in conveying direct and frank messages to the Russian government.
- Two important points should be noted here. Firstly, the Indian media reported that Modi had discussed the issue of releasing Indian citizens from the Russian army, whom Russian recruiters had forced to fight against Ukraine with the promise of high salaries. This involves several dozen people. The Indian television channel NDTV, citing sources, reported that Putin agreed to release them and send them home, although Russian law prohibits the release of those who signed a contract with the Russian Defence Ministry during mobilisation. In this way, India is demonstrating that it does not want to be involved in any way with the Russian invasion. The second important point was Modi’s statement that “war is not a solution” and his assurances of “optimism” and “hope for the future” after his talks with Putin. For now, this tells us that the Russian leader continues to promote the idea among foreign leaders that Russia is willing to negotiate for peace.
- Modi’s visit to Russia should not be seen through the prism of India’s possible shift toward an alliance with Moscow. Indian public rhetoric is more focused on obtaining economic preferences than on creating antagonism toward the West.
- Pentagon Chief Austin and Russian Defence Minister Belousov have another phone call. Pentagon Chief Lloyd Austin and Russia’s new Defence Minister Belousov had another telephone call, marking their second in recent weeks. Such frequent official dialogues between U.S. and Russian representatives have been unprecedented during the war. The previous dialogue was initiated by the American side, emphasizing the importance of maintaining open channels of communication. This time, however, it was Russia that took the initiative.
- The heightened frequency of these talks likely stems from recent intensified Ukrainian attacks on Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, using American ATACMS missiles. These strikes have effectively targeted Russian air defence systems on the peninsula, enabling Ukrainian forces to conduct operations across Crimea. Moscow previously attributed these attacks to the U.S., prompting the initial call. The current conversation, initiated by Russia, likely reiterates Moscow’s assertions and contains veiled threats towards the U.S.
- This situation emphasises the effectiveness of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian targets. It also highlights Russia’s current inability to effectively counter them, thereby leaving Moscow with few options beyond diplomatic discussions of this nature.
