Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Lavrov’s visit to China, lack of clarity on Russia’s approach to “negotiations”, and a new Russian “ministry of patriotism”.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- In Russia, discussions are underway to create a new ministry for patriotism and youth. We’re seeing the Russian government shaping a new youth policy. Reports indicate plans to establish a new ministry tasked with developing a “youth policy” and a so-called “patriotic education”. This information was revealed by the sources of the Russian pro-government media outlet Vedomosti. Various options are currently on the table for how this ministry will operate. One possibility is to base it on the Federal Agency for Youth and Patriotic Affairs, a structure used by the presidential administration to promote and coordinate public activities. These initiatives fund efforts to enhance patriotism and build an effective framework for nurturing a new generation of ‘loyal Russians’. These moves align with the objectives outlined by Putin during his federal address in early 2024, where he emphasised support for young people. However, the new ministry’s potential seems somewhat limited at the moment. Russian authorities appear to be working with standard approaches, such as financing patriotic initiatives and creating new centres and facilities for youth, without a deep understanding of the motivations and needs of the younger generation. Even with an increase in bureaucratic capacity, these steps may not yield significant results in the long term.
- Russia threatens sanctions against its partners for refusing to give up the “Mir” payment system. The head of the Russian central bank, technocrat and influential financier Elvira Nabiullina, known for rarely making political statements and avoiding the media spotlight, recently surprised many with a threat of sanctions against countries that ceased support for the Russian “Mir” payment system, akin to Western VISA and MASTERCARD. This statement comes as a significant departure from Russia’s usual approach towards countries loyal to it, marking a rare instance of an aggressive stance. Primarily, this concerns several Central Asian nations – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and, separately, Armenia. Their decision to withdraw support for the Russian payment system stems from the US sanctions imposed back in February on the National Payment Card System, which operates the Mir payment card. Nabiullina’s strong rhetoric suggests a highly negative reaction to these actions by Russia’s partner countries, as it could potentially create challenges for its grey exports, which primarily flow through these nations.
- Catastrophic floods in the Orenburg region were caused by a dam break and government inaction. A dam on the Ural River collapsed on April 5 in the city of Orsk, situated in the Orenburg region of the Russian Federation, causing swift flooding in numerous areas of the city and its surrounding settlements. Subsequently, several other dams, which were supposed to safeguard the city from such floods, also gave way in the following days. This breach resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of people, with critical infrastructure in Orsk and Orenburg cities suffering severe damage. For instance, operations at the Orsk oil refinery were halted. Despite the scale of the disaster, local authorities have been notably passive in their response, offering limited assistance in evacuation and compensation for affected residents. Frustrated by the authorities’ inaction and the absence of compensation, residents of Orsk staged a demonstration on April 8. The local prosecutor’s office quickly labelled the rally as unauthorised, and during a meeting with the demonstrators, the governor of the Orenburg region discouraged video recordings and avoided making concrete promises.
- The flood damage continues to escalate each passing day, with numerous settlements, including the regional centre of Orenburg, still under imminent threat. It’s crucial to note that neighbouring regions to Orenburg are also at risk. This marks the second major crisis for Putin since his “re-election”. Interestingly, the Russian leader himself has no plans to visit the Orenburg region to witness the aftermath of the flood, as confirmed by his press secretary, Dmitry Peskov. Instead, Putin purportedly maintains constant communication with local authorities. The unfolding disaster in the Orenburg region lays bare the inconsistency and lack of decisive action on the part of Russian authorities.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russia still cannot define its current position on the “negotiations”. In the past week, there has been a noticeable disagreement within the Russian authorities regarding their stance on reintroducing the key points of the Istanbul Agreements into the ongoing discussion of “peace negotiations”. These agreements covered various topics discussed during the meetings between Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Istanbul in the initial months of the full-scale invasion. We have recently observed Russia re-introducing this concept in their discussions, particularly evident in Shoigu’s conversation with the French defence minister. However, about a week after this exchange, Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, made a stark declaration that the “geopolitical situation” had shifted, effectively ruling out a return to the ‘Istanbul format’.
- Yet, following Peskov’s statements, during a meeting with the self-proclaimed Belarusian President Lukashenko, Putin expressed an entirely contrary opinion, once again emphasising the necessity to “return to the Istanbul Agreements”. The very next day, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov also weighed in on the matter, presenting yet another viewpoint. He emphasised the need to return to the “Istanbul Agreements” while “considering the situation on the ground”. This inconsistency highlights the lack of clarity within the Russian government regarding the nature of these potential “negotiations”. It seems that Lavrov’s statements may reflect the current Kremlin position. Their assertive tone suggests that Russia aims to initiate any potential dialogue from a position of strength, maintaining its firm stance on ultimatums related to limiting Ukraine’s sovereignty, a core aspect of the Russian “Istanbul Agreements”, along with the international recognition of all occupied territories.
- Lavrov’s visit to China. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently travelled to China, where he held talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. This meeting is seen as a preliminary step for Putin’s upcoming visit, a visit that has been confirmed by the Kremlin. In their remarks about the meeting, the Chinese side mentioned that the two countries have bolstered their “strategic cooperation” and emphasised their shared commitment to “honesty and justice”. However, it’s notable that Lavrov made a distinct statement during the discussions. Apart from criticising NATO for its inability to engage in negotiations based on a “balance of interests”, Lavrov also highlighted Putin’s intention to strengthen “Eurasian security” in collaboration with China. He also emphasised the necessity to “initiate a dialogue involving our other like-minded partners on this matter”. The question arises whether these statements from the Russian foreign minister are general assertions or if Russia aims to kickstart the process of creating a new security framework in the region. The clarity on this matter might come from Putin’s upcoming visit to China, which will likely shed light on Russia’s intentions.
- Russia’s statements on the upcoming “peace summit” in Switzerland. Russian officials have been vocal about the upcoming peace summit scheduled for June in Switzerland. The news is that Russia has not received an invitation, and any potential participation is contingent upon the establishment of a certain foundation that allows for engagement with the Kremlin. In response, the Russian Embassy in Switzerland swiftly issued a statement asserting that “even if Russia were to receive an invitation to such an event, it would decline.” Russian President Putin also weighed in on the summit, offering a somewhat defensive yet hopeful remark: “We haven’t been invited, but they say we’ve declined. However, I want to reiterate that we are in favour of it, but not in a format that imposes schemes unrelated to reality upon us.”
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Ukrainian Prism closely monitors the key developments in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. These developments serve as the cornerstone of the political agenda, influencing discussions within the aggressor country and shaping its stance in the international arena.
