Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Latest on the second wave of mobilisation in Russia, tensions between Moscow and Tehran, and the political landscape surrounding the prospects for a “peaceful settlement” of the war.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- The current status of Russia’s second wave of mobilisation. Last week, Russia launched a trial version of the Unified Military Register website, marking a step towards fully digitising the interaction between military commissariats and conscripts. The system introduces electronic conscription notices, signalling the gradual shift towards a modernised draft process. For now, the resource is only available in three regions: Sakhalin, Ryazan, and the Republic of Mari El. This development plays a critical role in assessing the likelihood of a potential second wave of mobilisation in Russia. Additionally, a close examination of the platform’s technical framework offers insight into the Kremlin’s timeline for such a decision, reflecting the country’s bureaucratic and technical readiness.
- The most significant challenge Moscow encountered following the 2022 mobilisation was the mass exodus of Russians, regardless of whether they had received conscription notices. Compounding this issue, Russia lacked the bureaucratic infrastructure to prevent young citizens from fleeing the country, and the possibility of imposing martial law was conspicuously absent from the rhetoric of its leadership.
- In 2023, the Kremlin initiated efforts to establish an electronic registry, aimed not primarily at issuing digital conscription notices, but at creating a bureaucratic link between the Ministry of Defense, responsible for mobilisation, and the FSB, which oversees Russia’s borders and controls citizens’ movement. To this end, a series of laws were passed that institutionalised the creation of the registry and imposed new restrictions on future conscripts summoned through the system. Among these, the most significant is a rule barring citizens from leaving Russia seven days after an electronic summons is posted in the registry. President Putin has publicly announced that the autumn 2024 conscription will operate under the new system of digital notices. The technical development of the registry began in early 2024, and, according to a government tender, the service was slated to officially launch on November 1 of this year. This timeline would allow Russian authorities to address any issues with the system during the autumn conscription, which runs from October to December 2024.
- This would have positioned the Kremlin with the full technical capability to initiate a new wave of mobilisation in early 2025. However, the first few days of the registry’s trial phase exposed serious technical flaws, the most concerning being inadequate data protection. A vulnerability was discovered that allowed access to the personal information of any Russian citizen. Consequently, authorities announced that the upcoming conscription would proceed under the old system, pushing the launch of the electronic registry to January 1, 2025. Further testing will be required, with the next trial set for the spring conscription period, running from April 1 to July 15, 2025.
- In this way, the Kremlin faces a dilemma. Either risk additional technical problems with the registry and hold a new wave of mobilization in the first months of 2025, or wait for the spring draft and hold mobilization closer to mid-2025. Amid these developments, The Wall Street Journal reported, citing its own sources, that Russia’s military leadership had urged President Putin to announce a new wave of mobilisation after the presidential election. Similar reports surfaced within Russian media in early 2024. The ongoing situation on the front lines has further intensified the Russian army’s growing manpower shortage.
- Further measures by Russian authorities to recruit contract soldiers for the war against Ukraine. Amid ongoing issues with the electronic military registry, the Kremlin remains focused on expanding its army for the war against Ukraine by engaging contractors through public and political channels. During the first half of 2024, there was a marked decline in the number of Russians signing contracts with the Ministry of Defence, prompting the government to repeatedly raise one-time enlistment bonuses. While this growth has now stabilised, it may signal the effectiveness of this recruitment strategy.
- Last week, Russian authorities took further steps to sustain recruitment levels. Notably, the State Duma passed a law allowing criminal cases against individuals under investigation to be dismissed if they sign a contract with the Ministry of Defence—an option previously reserved for those already convicted. The government’s continued emphasis on contract-based recruitment was underscored by the establishment of an interdepartmental security council commission on contractor recruitment, created by President Putin and chaired by Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy head of the Russian Security Council. This commission will coordinate efforts among federal and regional authorities to recruit Russians for military service under contract. The formation of this commission not only signals Medvedev’s growing political influence but also reflects Putin’s ongoing strategy to bolster the army in Ukraine through volunteers, rather than by launching a new wave of mobilisation.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russia’s current rhetoric regarding the “peace negotiations”. Amid the growing international discourse on a “peaceful settlement” to Russia’s war against Ukraine—from Western powers to countries of the “Global South”—the Kremlin’s stance remains unchanged. In recent weeks, several of Russia’s allies and partners have made public statements expressing their interest in ending the war. Chief among these are the Chinese-Brazilian “peace initiative” and potential peace moves by India. During the BRICS security meeting in St. Petersburg from September 10-12, the issue of ending the war was a primary topic raised by Russia’s partners, according to Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu.
- However, last week, two traditionally loyal states voiced rhetoric critical of Moscow. India, alongside the United States, Japan, and Australia, issued a joint statement calling for peace, emphasising the importance of respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations. The Kremlin’s displeasure with such sentiments was also evident in its response to a statement by one of its key allies, Iran. On September 23, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told the UN General Assembly that Iran had never endorsed Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, reaffirmed its respect for national borders, and expressed readiness to support negotiations for a peaceful resolution. In response, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Russia would continue to “explain its position to its Iranian friends.”
- Amid these developments, Moscow continues to signal that its uncompromising rhetoric remains unchanged. On September 22, the Russian Foreign Ministry reiterated that Russia would not participate in a second peace summit, though it expressed openness to a “political and diplomatic” resolution based on the “situation on the ground”—a reference to Putin’s demand for control over all territories in four Ukrainian regions. Despite this, increasing pressure from Russia’s partners on its hardline stance seems likely in the near future. For instance, last week, Brazilian media quoted Carlos Marcio Cozendey, Secretary for Multilateral Political Affairs at Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as saying that China and Brazil would present a joint peace proposal on September 27. While Moscow has previously spoken favourably about the Chinese-Brazilian initiative, it has consistently maintained its territorial demands. The release of this plan could create significant political pressure on Russia, as it is unlikely to call for Ukraine to relinquish the four contested regions to the Kremlin.
- Sergei Shoigu’s unannounced to Iran and Syria. On September 15-16, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu made two unannounced trips to Syria and Iran. In Damascus, he met with Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, discussing “a range of issues related to international and regional security.” The true purpose of this visit remains unclear, though it is possible Russia is continuing efforts to mediate a political settlement between Syria and Turkey, a topic broached during the summer of 2024. Moscow has orchestrated similar diplomatic initiatives, which could boost its standing in the region.
- The more significant visit was Shoigu’s meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Tehran. While it was officially stated that Shoigu delivered a personal message from Putin, no further details were provided. This visit occurred amid heightened tensions between Russia and Iran over the Zangezour corridor, particularly regarding its route and who will control the transport link. This issue, previously analysed in depth by the Ukrainian Prism, underscores growing friction between Moscow and Tehran.
- Tehran is staunchly opposed to any arrangement that would limit Armenia’s sovereignty along the route of the Zangezour corridor, particularly if control were to fall into the hands of Azerbaijan. Conversely, Russia aims to assert independent control over this corridor through the FSB, insisting that it should traverse Armenia. This would grant the Kremlin significant leverage over the Armenian government and regional infrastructure. Tensions escalated to the point where Iran summoned the Russian ambassador to convey its stance against any territorial or geopolitical shifts in the area.
- Iranian media reported that Shoigu raised the issue of trade routes and corridors with Azerbaijan, suggesting Moscow’s intent to maintain amicable relations with Tehran. It remains unclear whether the Kremlin’s position on the Zangezour corridor has shifted. Additionally, the two sides officially discussed preparations for a new foundational interstate agreement between Russia and Iran. Russia has referred to this topic twice in the past month—first during a meeting of BRICS representatives in St. Petersburg and then in Shoigu’s discussions with the Iranian president. However, since June 2024, Iranian authorities have made little progress on this agenda. Reports have also surfaced indicating that Tehran has delayed the delivery of missile launchers previously promised to Russia. These developments may signal Iran’s interest in improving relations with the West, raising concerns for Moscow, as evidenced by Shoigu’s unannounced visit.
