Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Kadyrov is once again demonstrating his control over the Chechen Republic and his political independence; Russian neighbours are concerned about Russia’s informational resources; and there is a shift in Russian rhetoric towards citizens who have left the country.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Over the past week, the ‘head’ of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, has made several controversial statements, indicating his continued pursuit of establishing himself as an entity beyond the confines of Russia’s domestic political system. These statements also highlight the apparent lack of significant control over the Chechen Republic by federal authorities. For instance, during a meeting with commanders and heads of units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Rosgvardia, Kadyrov called for the punishment of family members of those who committed crimes and evaded law enforcement agencies. The translation of his speech from Chechen makes it evident that he is referring to matters of murder and blood revenge.
- “Even if we don’t locate the criminal, we won’t persist in the search for him; however, we will certainly identify and locate his relatives. Following a tradition that dates back to time immemorial, if one of the relatives is found guilty and the actual criminal remains elusive, his brother or father would face repercussions, often leading to their demise. Hence, we are committed to swiftly seeking retribution through blood revenge. No disavowal of relatives proves effective until we take action against someone from their family, thus reclaiming our right to blood revenge. This statement was shared on the Telegram channel “1ADAT” of the People’s Movement “Adat”.
- This was also posted on his Telegram channel, illustrating his readiness to publicly showcase his power. These moves by the Chechen “leader” are aimed at signalling that there will be no response from federal authorities to his statements. During the same meeting, Kadyrov declared his intention to eliminate his critics, asserting that he would go so far as to kill each one of them. Additionally, he underscored his determination to combat Chechen political refugees in other countries, stating, “…we will eliminate such individuals to the best of our ability”.
- Furthermore, last week, Kadyrov made another rather controversial statement. During a meeting of law enforcement officials in Grozny, attended by prominent pro-Russian public figure Scott Ritter, he declared his readiness to release Ukrainian prisoners in exchange for lifting sanctions on his family members. “We have prisoners that we have detained… I am providing our guest with the list of prisoners of war. If they lift the sanctions against my mother, my daughters, innocent people, and horses—except for me—we will give them back”, his words were quoted by the Russian state federal news agency TASS.
- Some Russian information sources expressed their indignation after Kadyrov’s statement, particularly the Russian “military experts”. As a response, Kadyrov released a statement claiming that his previous remarks were meant to be “thick trolling”. This shows that the Chechen ‘leader’ is trying to gauge public opinion and determine the limits of what he can say or do without facing consequences.
- We have noticed that the Russian authorities are taking steps to bring back citizens who left the country after the start of the war. This issue is quite sensitive. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Russian authorities have been shifting gradually from an aggressive and antagonistic position towards Russians who left Russia to a negative and dismissive position. A few months ago, there were several examples of radical antagonism. For example, in November 2023, the head of the Russian Central Election Commission, Pamfilova, called those who criticise Russia from abroad “scum” and “lurking waiters.” In December 2023, she changed her public position, saying that citizens who left Russia were crying “crocodile tears” because they would not be able to vote in the presidential election abroad. Last week, the public political discourse on this issue has radically changed. The Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Kirill (Vladimir Gundyaev), said that Russia should not reject people who left the country after the war started if they return “acknowledging their wrongdoings”. The portrayal of Russian citizens who left Russia has also evolved. Previously, propaganda depicted them as ‘liberal’ oppositionists antagonistic to Russia, suggesting that Russia lost nothing with their departure. But now Patriarch Kirill has said that among these people, some are “quite worthy ones, but those who made a mistake or got scared, or really wanted to find something more convenient in life, comfortable, but were shamed on this path”. This change in narratives is likely to have two main goals. Firstly, it is necessary to demonstrate positive rhetoric on the eve of the presidential elections without changing the militaristic rhetoric. Secondly, it is likely based on the understanding that the Russian economy is beginning to face staffing problems. Most of the Russian citizens who have left Russia were quite highly paid professionals who have been involved in high-paying sections of the Russian economy, such as IT or other high-paying jobs. In this case, the Russian authorities seek to offset this negative trend.
- As Ukrainian Prism has previously reported, the Kremlin continues to promote radical, militaristic, and ‘sovereign’ narratives as the foundation of Putin’s election campaign. For instance, on January 7, the Russian president met with the families of Russian military personnel and made several statements. Primarily, Putin stressed to Russian officials that his meeting should serve as a signal for them to adopt a similar rhetoric. It’s worth noting that he did not conduct a comparable meeting in 2023. “A clear signal that my colleagues, I repeat, anyone at any level of government, administration, should always be with you so that you always feel close to people who can support you, help you, come to your aid if you need it”. The Kremlin is trying to promote Putin’s rhetoric through the actions of regional authorities to increase the support for his political line among the electorate.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- The European Union has expanded its sanctions against Russia, targeting a critical segment of the Russian economy. Specifically, it has been revealed that the Russian diamond mining giant “Alrosa” and its CEO Pavel Marinichev have been included in the sanctions list. This company oversees approximately 90% of all Russian diamond production and is state-owned. “The company is an integral part of an economic sector that generates significant revenues for the government of the Russian Federation,” stated the EU Council in a press release. This reflects the ongoing efforts by the EU and the US to restrict the income of the Russian state, a strategy they have actively pursued in this area recently.
- We continue to observe a gradual decrease in the presence of Russian information resources in Russia’s neighbouring states. In particular, it has been reported that restrictions have been imposed in Kazakhstan, leading to the removal from the air of 11 Russian TV channels owned by PKVS Kazakhstan, a subsidiary of “Channel One. World Network,” which, in turn, is owned by “Channel One”—one of the primary sources of the Russian information machine. These restrictions were implemented by the satellite and Internet broadcasting operator TVCOM, which announced its decision to reduce the number of channels with an information agenda. Russian channels were replaced by popular entertainment, movie, and educational channels, including Discovery, Animal Planet, and Eurosport. Such decisions are not unique to Kazakhstan. Ukrainian Prism has previously highlighted campaigns against Russian propaganda resources, as seen in Armenia. For instance, at the end of December 2023, the Armenian Television and Radio Commission banned the broadcast of “Sputnik Armenia” radio for a period of one month. In this way, Russia is gradually losing avenues to influence its neighbours’ populations through its propaganda.
- The Wall Street Journal, citing several U.S. officials, reported that Russia plans to buy short-range ballistic missiles from Iran, expanding Moscow’s capability to inflict damage on Ukrainian infrastructure. Ukrainian Prism has repeatedly examined the relations between these authoritarian regimes and highlighted the issue of Russia’s potential purchase of Iranian weapons, including short-range missiles. This suggests that discussions between Putin and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi on December 7, during which no significant statements were made or documents signed, likely explored the possibility of Iran supplying ballistic missiles to Russia. If confirmed, we can anticipate a potential exchange of these weapons for Russia’s modern Su-35 fighters. Additionally, besides Iranian missiles, it has been revealed that Russian military forces may already be using North Korean ballistic missiles, as noted by John Kirby, the White House National Security Council’s Strategic Communications Coordinator. Russia is expanding such connections, and we should anticipate an uptick in the use of foreign weapons.
