Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Iranian ballistic missile supplies to Russia, U.S. sanctions against Russian propaganda abroad, and the complete formation of a system of full control over elections in Russia
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Regional elections in Russia: The Kremlin has solidified its control over elections at all levels. Russia held regional elections from September 6th to 8th, including votes for 23 governorships nationwide. Unsurprisingly, all incumbent governors or acting governors secured their “victories.” This marks the culmination of the Kremlin’s efforts to fully control elections, creating the facade of democratic legitimacy while eliminating any genuine competition. Central to this strategy is the widespread use of e-voting, which has rendered the verification of voting results virtually impossible. With this system in place, the Kremlin can now easily neutralise any challenges from non-systemic opposition at the local level. The absence of independent observers during these elections also ensured minimal reports of voting irregularities, giving the illusion of a flawless process.
- The elections to the Moscow City Duma highlighted this systemic control. In previous terms, the Yabloko party had a handful of opposition deputies in the Duma, offering a symbolic check on the Kremlin. However, not a single opposition candidate was registered in these elections, underscoring the near-total elimination of dissent within the Russian political system.
- In addition, the current regional elections have demonstrated that the statements of Russian officials, including Putin, that the military in Russia is the new elite are only public rhetoric. For example, the number of Russian veterans of the war with Ukraine who were able to run for election does not even reach 0.5%, which is 495 Russians. In addition, an important factor was the lack of attention paid by Russian propaganda to these candidates. This suggests that the government is not interested in having former military personnel among the deputies.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Further issues have arisen for the Russian liquefied natural gas project “Arctic LNG 2. The United States has expanded its sanctions on Novatek’s Arctic LNG 2 project, a key Russian liquefied natural gas initiative. These latest measures target two additional tankers involved with the project, compounding the restrictions imposed in August on three tankers that had been loading LNG from Arctic LNG 2. As a result, Russia has struggled to find any buyers for the gas produced at the facility. The sanctions have effectively isolated the project, with global market players unwilling to engage with either the sanctioned tankers or Novatek itself. According to experts interviewed by the Financial Times, this situation has left the project, still incomplete, unable to sell any volumes of its liquefied gas. Despite the project’s significance, it faces mounting difficulties in securing commercial viability under the weight of these international restrictions.
- Iran delivered ballistic missiles to Russia. Last week, The Wall Street Journal and CNN, citing their own sources, reported that Iran had transferred over 200 Fatah-300 ballistic missiles to Russia. This development has been anticipated for the past year, as rumours circulated in Russian media about a potential arms-for-fighters exchange, with Iran seeking Su-35 fighter jets from Moscow in return for its missiles and the capacity to produce these aircraft domestically. Officially, Tehran denies supplying weapons to Russia, yet the Fatah-300 missiles are similar to the systems already employed by Moscow in its war against Ukraine.
- The Russian military has been using S-300 surface-to-surface missiles, which have limited accuracy. With its missile stocks dwindling due to the protracted conflict, Russia appears to be seeking Iranian replacements to shore up its arsenal. The potential transfer of Su-35 jets to Iran now seems increasingly probable, though it remains uncertain whether Tehran will also secure the technological know-how to produce these advanced aircraft independently.
- Russia continues to fuel nuclear hysteria surrounding the Kursk nuclear power plant. Moscow is steadily escalating public anxiety over the situation at the Kursk nuclear power plant. As noted previously by the Ukrainian Prism, Russia appears intent on leveraging the international dimension, particularly the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to its advantage. On September 6, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi held closed-door talks in Kaliningrad with Rosatom chief Alexei Likhachev, alongside representatives from Russian government agencies, including the Ministry of Defence.
- Russia’s approach follows a familiar pattern: last month, Moscow stoked nuclear fears to elicit a statement from Grossi about the “danger of a nuclear incident” at the Kursk facility, although Kyiv has not been directly blamed. The latest talks have seen Russian officials ramp up the narrative, warning of a potential catastrophe even greater than Chornobyl should the plant be attacked. Likhachev ominously suggested the fallout could affect both the EU and Turkey, a clear attempt to exert geopolitical pressure on Ukraine via these states.
- Crucially, while Russia fans the flames of nuclear alarmism, it has yet to take meaningful steps to mitigate the alleged risks, such as shutting down the plant. Given the Kremlin’s inflammatory rhetoric, Ukraine can expect Russia to continue exploiting the IAEA to further heighten nuclear fears and sway international opinion.
- Major sanctions against Russia’s propaganda machine abroad. The United States last week imposed fresh sanctions on the Russian media organisation RT (formerly Russia Today). These measures extended to the entire Rossiya Segodnya media group, which encompasses both RT and Sputnik, key platforms for disseminating Russian propaganda abroad, as well as domestic outlets. The sanctions also targeted ten individuals linked to RT, including its editor-in-chief, Margarita Simonyan. The move comes in response to Moscow’s use of this media network to attempt to influence the US presidential election. The fallout has already seen some foreign propagandists, previously aligned with RT, sever ties with the organisation.
- Additionally, it has emerged that the US Department of Justice has indicted two RT employees for financing Tenet-Media, a prominent American media platform. They reportedly funnelled at least $10 million into the platform, which features popular American right-wing conservative voices. By targeting this funding stream, the United States has disrupted a significant channel Moscow used to inject its narratives into American political discourse and influence domestic politics.
