Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: the continuation of the informational and political “purges” in Russia, Naryshkin’s attempts to demonstrate his effectiveness to Putin, and Russia’s problems on the foreign policy front.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Last week, it was announced that Russian authorities are willing to initiate public control of the status of individuals who wish to participate in Russian elections, particularly the presidential elections. According to the Russian Central Election Commission, after the 2024 presidential election, it will propose changes to the legislation that will prohibit the use of the “presidential candidate” status for citizens who have not reached the final stage of election participation—specifically, those who have not garnered enough votes for self-nomination. This kind of activity on the part of the “head of the Central Election Commission,” Pamfilova, demonstrates her commitment to actively shaping and controlling this process, including its informational aspects. Such initiatives are also intended to enhance Pamfilova’s standing in the eyes of the Kremlin.
- As Russia’s presidential election in March 2024 approaches, high-ranking Russian officials consistently issue public statements on provocative and populist issues. For instance, Sergei Naryshkin, the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and one of the most influential figures in the Russian political elite, has made a statement regarding the readiness of the United States to interfere in the upcoming elections. According to Naryshkin, this interference is purportedly facilitated by Russians participating in U.S. education exchange programs.
- “As the elections approach, the US government is inventing more and more sophisticated ways to illegally interfere with democratic procedures. For example, Washington intends to intensify its work with Russian graduates of American university exchange programs…A program of such work is already being prepared. It is planned to conduct training in neighbouring countries. The main emphasis will be on teaching participants how to spread ethnic and social hatred, how to interfere in elections, and how to discredit the Russian leadership on social media”, said Naryshkin.
- These statements should be interpreted as a desire to showcase their own “effectiveness” to Putin. Clearly, the Russian dictator is emotionally invested in such “work reports” from the siloviki. It is not surprising, at this point, that Naryshkin decided to leverage this element to demonstrate his work and bolster his position in the eyes of the Russian president. We can assert with certainty that in the near future, some actions from the Russian “siloviki’ (special forces) can be anticipated in this direction, even if they have nothing to do with the real influence of the United States in Russia.
- Putin has begun engaging in activities that can be interpreted as a “pre-election tour.” Over the past week, he visited Chukotka, where he publicly demonstrated his “vitality” and readiness to “work with the people” to solve their problems. This last aspect, unsurprisingly, is related to the fact that Russian military personnel have been unable to pass medical examinations. This reaffirmed the previous conclusion made by Ukrainian Prism, which asserts that the Kremlin is injecting a “militaristic” agenda into its “election campaign,” even in relation to various social issues. Putin similarly reiterated his previous remarks about large families and the trend of having many children among Russians, which has also been a frequent theme in his recent rhetoric.
- Russian authorities continue to systematically work towards full control of the information space in Russia. Last week, it was reported that a criminal case was opened against Russian journalist Yekaterina Fomina for “publishing fakes” about the Russian army. Fomina is known for her coverage of the Russian military’s involvement in marauding, killing, and robbing the Ukrainian civilian population. It remains peculiar that Russian authorities did not take action earlier, but the delay may have been bureaucratic or related to other Russian journalists and activists. Such activities by the Kremlin are likely to persist and gain momentum as the presidential election date approaches. This concern extends beyond journalists.
- Similarly, it was reported last week that a criminal case was opened against Russian “politician” Sergei Udaltsov, the leader of the so-called “Left Front,” a pro-socialist movement that has frequently interacted with the Communist Party of Russia in the past. This figure has supported the annexation of Crimea and endorsed the war in the East of Ukraine in the past. Simultaneously, he has portrayed himself as an “opposition” figure to the Russian authorities, participating in “protest actions” and supporting the candidacy of Girkin-Strelkov as a presidential candidate from the “left and patriotic forces.” This is yet another indication that the political and information space in Russia is undergoing further “purge” which is likely to continue in the future.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- We continue to observe Armenia’s steady strategy of politically distancing itself from Russia. Last week, it became known that Armenian authorities have been willing to continue working on a peace treaty with Azerbaijan “through Western platforms”. This was announced by the Chairman of the Armenian Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Relations, Sargis Khandanyan.
- “It is very important for us to continue within the negotiating formats that have already been established. You know that Washington has set up a format for meetings of foreign ministers, as well as a format for negotiations between leaders of the countries with the assistance of the European Union. This gives a legitimacy to the negotiations,” said Khandanyan.
- Recently, positive dynamics have been observed in the settlement of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. An important aspect of this process is the fact that Moscow is not a party to these negotiations, not even within the framework of mediation, while the role of Western powers in this process is growing.
- Moreover, the Secretary of the Armenian Security Council, Armen Grigoryan, took part in a meeting of political advisors on the Ukrainian “Peace Formula” in Davos. This once again shows us that Armenian authorities have now chosen a course of “soft” distancing from Russia.
- The United States continues to work towards creating more financial and political pressure against Russia. Last week, it became known that the Biden administration supported a bill that would allow the seizure of part of the $300 billion of frozen Russian money to be transferred to Ukraine. According to Bloomberg, “The bill would provide the authority needed for the executive branch to seize Russian sovereign assets for the benefit of Ukraine”.
- It is important to understand that Russian authorities have been quite aggressive in their public statements about initiatives related to the potential transfer of these frozen funds to Ukraine. Bloomberg also writes that this proposal will be discussed during the meeting of G7 leaders on the anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion next month, where we should expect potential approval of this step. A significant public reaction from the Russian authorities on this topic, including blackmail regarding “negotiations,” is likely to be anticipated.
