Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: The effectiveness of US financial sanctions, the potential rejection of Nadezhdin’s registration as a presidential candidate, and the arrest of the ‘ex-governor’ of Sevastopol in London.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Boris Nadezhdin, a so-called “liberal opposition” candidate, has officially submitted 105,000 signatures to enter the presidential “election.” Ukrainian Prism has been analyzing this candidate and the reasons why the Kremlin has permitted an anti-war and openly opposing candidate to participate in the signature collection process. Currently, it is known that the Russian Central Election Commission “identified” 15,3% of defective signatures among 60,000 signatures, surpassing the permissible value of 10%, with the total acceptable number of defective signatures among 105,000 signatures being 5%. The CEC also announced that it would review Nadezhdin’s registration on February 7. As previously noted by Ukrainian Prism, Nadezhdin will likely be blocked from participating in the election through bureaucratic schemes designed to prevent his candidacy. The Kremlin perceives the presence of a candidate who would openly make anti-war statements as crossing a “red line.” It’s probable that after being denied registration, Nadezhdin will formally endorse Vladislav Davankov, a candidate from the United New People and Growth Party, who is considered a “pocket liberal” candidate. Furthermore, another clear indication that the authorities have initiated a campaign against Nadezhdin is the emergence of open criticism of his personality in Russian propaganda, despite Nadezhdin’s previous appearances as a regular guest on Russian political TV shows. Russian propagandist Solovyov has begun disseminating information about the “Ukrainian footprint” and the involvement of “Navalny’s and Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s people” in the signature collection process. Russian TV channels themselves have openly portrayed negativity in their reports on Nadezhdin’s signature collection, emphasizing the “mistakes” made during the process.
- Over the past week, several “candidates” for the presidency expectedly withdrew from the election and endorsed Putin. Andrei Bogdanov, the leader of the Russian Freedom and Justice Party, submitted his own signatures for registration and promptly announced his withdrawal from the presidential campaign, citing the discovery of an unclosed foreign bank account that disqualifies him from candidacy. Similarly, Sergei Baburin, the head of the Russian Public Union party, also submitted his “signatures” to the CEC before immediately withdrawing and urging voters to support Putin. These actions orchestrated by the Kremlin aim to portray the presidential election process and the participation of various “candidates” as visible. However, the reality is abundantly clear that the presidential election process in Russia is effectively nonexistent.
- The “head” of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, continues to consolidate his personal power in the republic. His daughter, Khadzhikhat Kadyrova, has been appointed as the First Deputy Head of the Chechen Presidential and Governmental Administration, tasked with overseeing the “social bloc.” Ukrainian Prism has noted several times in recent months that Kadyrov has been consistently advancing his family members into key government roles. Their increased presence in the media also serves to highlight Kadyrov’s assertion that he operates outside the established “system” and can wield power according to his own vision and capabilities.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- A session of the Supreme State Council of the Union State was held in Russia last week, during which Putin and Lukashenko met. The event itself was routine, and the key issues regarding the activity of the Union State remained unchanged. As in the past, Lukashenko focused on the economic aspects of their cooperation. He insisted on the need for a unified economic space as part of the Union State, the removal of existing supply barriers for various goods, equal conditions for the activity of companies in both countries and the lifting of transit restrictions. Additionally, Lukashenko reiterated Russia’s foreign policy stance on the necessity of establishing a “multipolar world” aimed at diminishing the influence of Western states and thwarting their failed attempts to “subjugate Moscow and Minsk.” Naturally, the objective is to appease the Kremlin in addressing the economic challenges facing Lukashenko’s regime. Meanwhile, Putin reiterated his statement regarding the alignment of the two states’ positions on global and regional issues, signifying Lukashenko’s continued support for Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moreover, following this meeting, an agreement was signed to create a unified media holding encompassing Russia and Belarus, which is set to incorporate the existing five media outlets focusing on the Union State. It is worth noting that their effectiveness is rather low. In summary, Lukashenko’s visit aimed to demonstrate his ongoing commitment to the Kremlin’s policies.
- It was reported that Dmitriy Ovsyannikov, the former “governor” of Sevastopol, was detained in London on charges of sanctions violation and money laundering. Ovsyannikov gained prominence for successfully lifting EU sanctions in 2022. He assumed the role of “governor” of Sevastopol in 2016 amidst tensions between “then-governor” Serhiy Minyaylo and “speaker of the legislative assembly” Aleksey Chaly, positioned as a compromise figure and technocrat lacking significant political experience. Prior to this appointment, Ovsyannikov served as the Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade, where he rose through the ranks. Throughout his career, he focused on this particular issue. For instance, he has held prominent positions at enterprises within the well-known state corporation Rostec, including serving as deputy director and director for economics and finance at UEC-Perm Engines. Additionally, he held the position of deputy head of the financial and economic department at the United Engine Corporation. Furthermore, he is associated with Sergei Kiriyenko, with whom Ovsyannikov had contact while serving as a federal inspector for the Kirov region and Udmurtia. At that time, Kiriyenko held the position of presidential representative (Russian: полпред). These factors demonstrate the significance of his role in understanding the functioning of the Russian military-industrial complex. Furthermore, the EU court’s decision to lift sanctions against him in 2022, citing his departure from the sanctioned positions and his ability to open a British bank account, highlights the capacity of Russian officials to circumvent repercussions for their actions against Ukraine.
- Last week, it was announced that EU member states have endorsed the European Commission’s proposal to utilize frozen Russian assets for the future recovery of Ukraine. A dedicated fund will be established to receive proceeds generated from these assets. This represents a significant initial step during the conflict aimed at utilizing frozen resources to support Ukraine. Russian authorities have issued public warnings of potential “consequences” if these funds are transferred to Ukraine. Additionally, one of the specific measures the Kremlin is prepared to take is the confiscation of “Western assets” in Russia.
- Ukrainian Prism has previously observed that the US and EU’s sanctions strategy, aimed at bolstering and enforcing existing restrictions, has started to yield results. In recent weeks, Russian authorities have encountered several financial challenges from countries that had previously aided them in evading Western sanctions. Last week, the Russian pro-government newspaper Vedomosti reported that Turkish banks began closing the accounts of Russian companies. According to the report, not only sanctioned legal entities but also other Russian companies are encountering difficulties. This situation arose following the recent tightening of restrictions by the United States. Russian authorities have also responded to this situation. For instance, Kremlin spokesman Peskov stated that these restrictions “are a result of the unprecedented, overt, and aggressive pressure primarily exerted by US representatives on Turkey and Turkish companies.”
