Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: The arrest of Shoigu’s ally, Russia’s veto of the UN resolution banning nuclear weapons in space and new mobilisation methods
Domestic policy takeaways:
- The arrest of Timur Ivanov, a close ally of Russian defence minister Shoigu. On the evening of April 23, what seemed to be the onset of a significant internal power struggle emerged, marking the first such instance since Russia’s full-scale invasion. The Russian Investigative Committee disclosed the arrest of Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, citing allegations of accepting a substantial bribe exceeding 1 million rubles. Interestingly, despite these allegations, Ivanov was seen later that same day at the Defense Ministry Collegium, as televised by federal channels, contradicting earlier reports suggesting his arrest had been sanctioned in advance by Shoigu. Ivanov held critical responsibilities, overseeing housing, medical care, and the construction of Defense Ministry infrastructure and properties, effectively making him one of Shoigu’s key confidants. Renowned in the Russian expert community, Ivanov’s close ties to the defence minister had seemingly granted him immunity from scrutiny. According to Forbes, Ivanov ranked among the wealthiest figures within the Russian military. Serving as one of Shoigu’s most loyal associates since 2010, Ivanov had consistently remained by his side through various roles, spanning their tenure at the Emergency Situations Ministry to their current positions at the Defense Ministry. Despite previous instances where high-ranking officials avoided repercussions for corruption allegations, the economic aspect of Ivanov’s case appears irrelevant, suggesting a more targeted attack on Shoigu personally. Such a high-profile development could not have transpired without Putin’s endorsement.
- From Shoigu’s perspective, there are several angles to consider when interpreting the situation. It seems likely that Ivanov’s arrest serves as a signal from Putin, suggesting potential uncertainty surrounding Shoigu’s tenure as defence minister. The exact motives behind Putin’s decision remain unclear at this point. One possibility is that Putin aims to recalibrate the balance of power among internal elite factions, perhaps leveraging the threat of power loss to prompt Shoigu’s compliance with future changes. If this is the case, the appointment of a replacement for Ivanov, who is not aligned with Shoigu’s inner circle, would reinforce this narrative, potentially sparking conflict within the Defense Ministry’s upper echelons. A similar scenario unfolded in 2015 when Alexei Dyumin, despite his proximity to Putin, assumed the role of deputy defence minister for only a month before being replaced by Timur Ivanov, likely due to his lack of alignment with Shoigu’s team. Replicating such a situation now would only exacerbate internal strife within the ministry, ultimately hampering its effectiveness.
- If Ivanov’s arrest is indeed a precursor to Putin replacing Shoigu ahead of anticipated government changes, it would mark a significant departure from Putin’s typical approach to handling his political allies. Putin rarely resorts to scandal-driven removals of his close associates from prominent political roles. Therefore, this scenario seems improbable.
- Valentina Matviyenko, the head of the Federation Council, describes the upcoming changes in the government and its future strategy. According to a recent interview with Valentina Matviyenko, head of Russia’s Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, conducted by the pro-government media outlet RIA Novosti, the prospect of this scenario seems unlikely. Matviyenko stated that the core team of the upcoming government is expected to remain intact, suggesting that targeted replacements are more probable. She also outlined the primary objective of the “new” government, which will be to execute a “sovereign six-year development strategy.” This is likely a political spin on the Russian authorities’ agenda, aligning with Putin’s priorities outlined in his recent federal address, particularly focusing on social initiatives. However, it’s worth noting that the concept of “sovereignisation” in Russia may have populist undertones. The ambitious plans for infrastructure development, especially in the military-industrial complex, and the potential relocation of major production facilities to China, akin to Nornickel’s example, could face challenges without Western investment and technological cooperation. The recent setback with the Arctic LNG 2 project, halted due to the withdrawal of Western investors and sanctions, underscores the potential limitations of such endeavours.
- New methods of mobilisation in Russia.The issue of mobilisation and preparations for it was raised again in Russia last week. It was reported that the Russian authorities have fully implemented a new method of recruiting its citizens into the army. The pro-government newspaper Kommersant writes that in the process of considering criminal charges against Russians, investigative authorities have begun to offer special “explanatory” papers to those suspected of criminal cases. The papers offer an exemption from criminal proceedings in case of signing a contract with the Ministry of Defence, which means actually participating in the war. Previously, this method of recruitment was used only for convicted citizens, whose death rate as a result of hostilities is the highest. If the accused agrees, he is handed over to the Ministry of Defence. Then, at the request of the relevant unit commander, the criminal case is suspended, and after the defendant is dismissed from the armed forces, it is completely stopped. Kommersant also noted that this strategy is already being used by the Russian authorities in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and in the border regions. It will be extended to other regions of Russia.
- Simultaneously, the Russian authorities have officially implemented electronic conscription, set to commence on November 1, 2024. This decision follows the enactment of the law on a unified register of individuals liable for military service in April 2023, as directed by Putin, calling for “conscription” in the autumn of 2024. Consequently, all mobilisation functions will be fully transitioned online, eliminating the direct involvement of Russian military commissariats. The digital summons will be deemed delivered seven days after publication in a designated register, and upon dispatch, the recruit will automatically be restricted from leaving Russia. Furthermore, additional restrictions have been introduced. Failure to report to the military commissariat within 20 days of receiving an online summons will result in a ban on applying for a foreign passport and operating an individual business. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence now has access to information regarding the property, transportation, and foreign travel of Russians. These measures are indicative of the government’s long-term strategy for future mobilisation processes.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russia blocked the draft UN resolution against nuclear weapons in space. Russia has exercised its veto power against a UN resolution proposing the prohibition of nuclear weapons deployment in space. The resolution, jointly proposed by the United States and Japan, garnered support from 13 out of 15 Security Council members, with Russia and China abstaining from voting. This situation serves as direct evidence of Russia’s pursuit of a new type of weaponry. It is confirmed by the United States, as articulated by US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, that Russia is actively developing technology to launch nuclear weapons into space using satellites. The blocked resolution likely aimed to address this emerging threat, and Russia’s obstruction indirectly validates concerns about their intentions. Russian representatives defended their veto by citing their rejected amendments, which sought to broaden the resolution’s scope to encompass all space weapons without specific definitions. According to Russia, technologies such as the Ukrainian army’s Starlink satellites and their British counterpart OneWeb, along with other military assets like cyber defence systems, could be classified as “weapons.” Unable to secure their desired amendments, Russia leveraged this discrepancy as justification for their veto.
- Russia faces new issues in transactions with Chinese banks. We’re closely monitoring the challenges Russian companies are encountering when dealing with Chinese banks. According to Reuters, major Chinese banks now take months, compared to just a few days previously, to process payments from Russia. This delay is causing significant problems, particularly in industries like metal processing, where businesses struggle to receive payment for their goods. Bank representatives attribute this to US sanctions, which restrict their ability to transact with Russia. Compounding the issue is that Russian residents attempting to work through third-party countries, such as the UAE, are also experiencing difficulties. Interestingly, this problem emerged shortly after Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s visit to China. Almost half of Russia’s transactions with China pass through intermediary countries like Kazakhstan, Hong Kong, Kyrgyzstan, and the UAE, prompting calls for a strategic shift from the Kremlin. Recognising these challenges, Russia and China have turned to unofficial payment methods, such as currency brokers and cryptocurrencies, with some Chinese firms already adopting these alternatives.
