Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights:
Putin’s “ceasefire” agenda continues alongside the presentation of the main presidential candidates and intrigue within the Russian government.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- The names of all the candidates for the 2024 presidential election from Russia’s parliamentary parties have been officially announced. Nikolai Kharitonov, a member of the State Duma and chairman of the Committee on the Development of the Far East and the Arctic, was nominated by the Communist Party of Russia. As previously noted by Ukrainian Prism, this confirms the Kremlin’s determination to minimise the possibility of creating any chances for a candidate to publicly oppose Putin, as happened during the 2018 elections with Pavel Grudinin. Kharitonov’s candidacy is rather weak. Despite having already run in the 2004 presidential election and coming in second place, he has been completely inactive in the public sphere. A potential nomination of Gennady Zyuganov by the Communist Party could result in him receiving more votes than Kharitonov. This would decrease the authorities’ ability to significantly lower the results for the communist candidate. This situation will not arise for Kharitonov due to his low recognition. The Kremlin can manually ‘inflate’ the maximum number of votes for Putin. When journalists asked Kharitonov about his criticism of the current Russian president, he responded in a rather uncanny way that demonstrated the tone of the upcoming presidential election: “What should I criticise him for? He is responsible for his own work routine. Why would I criticise him? First of all, I am not the kind of person to criticise my colleagues… I understand perfectly well how hard it is to be the president of the Russian Federation”.
- It is now official that Leonid Slutskiy has been chosen as the candidate for the Liberal Democratic Party. Currently, his party is going through a serious crisis and lacks a clear vision for its future development. It remains unclear what strategy Slutskiy will adopt for his campaign.
- It was surprising news when the decision was made to nominate Vladislav Davankov, the Deputy Speaker of the State Duma, as a candidate for the New People party. Davankov previously ran for the position of mayor of Moscow in 2023. Alexei Nechayev, the party’s leader, was expected to run as their candidate, but he has since decided not to run. Davankov, a fairly young 39-year-old candidate, was approved by the Kremlin despite his age being similar to other candidates, especially Putin. It has been reported that the New People Party and the Party of Growth have merged together to form a single candidate. There are predictions that Davankov, the candidate, will be juggling too much socially radical rhetoric. He is expected to “oppose” certain initiatives, such as a ban on abortion.
- When it comes to independent candidates, several were reportedly denied access to the required signature collection process. The Russian CEC refused to register an initiative group to nominate journalist Yekaterina Duntsova, who was running with openly anti-war rhetoric, for president. It also became known that the initiative group to nominate the terrorist Igor Girkin-Strelkov as a presidential candidate was not able to gather officially, as four notaries who were supposed to certify the process refused to participate at the last moment. It is evident that the Kremlin will not permit non-systemic candidates to participate in the upcoming elections. This is because they want to have maximum control over the process, which would be difficult to achieve in the presence of independent candidates.
- Last week, Russian media reported that Sergey Kiriyenko, the curator of domestic policy in the presidential administration, may resign. According to a senior official quoted by the Meduza media outlet, the president is attempting to prevent his staff from becoming entrenched and acquiring too much power and influence by rotating them regularly. The official stated that “he has sat in his chair too long”. This hardly affects state corporations. But it does concern officials”. It is important to note that there are no apparent reasons for his resignation. In Russia, it is common for high-ranking officials to hold their positions for many years. It is also unlikely that such a decision would be made on the eve of the 2024 elections, which Kiriyenko is responsible for. There have not been any signs of broader political ambitions or failures, similar to the baseless news of Prime Minister Mishustin’s resignation. It is possible that there are ‘aparatchik’ power struggles within the Russian government and preparations for a potential redistribution of power after the elections.
- The board of the Russian Defense Ministry met last week to discuss the results of the Russian army and defence sector in 2023. President Putin was present and heard a report from Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. A key element of their speeches was to present the situation in a positive context. They mentioned some difficulties related to communication and radar communications, but other problems and failures of the Russian army were not actually discussed. During the meeting, Shoigu mentioned that the country’s military-industrial complex has significantly increased production of all types of military equipment. Despite claiming no significant losses, Shoigu and Putin aim to mobilise a large number of soldiers, with plans to increase the number of armed forces personnel by over a million people. However, no reference was made at the meeting regarding the fate and future status of the so-called PMCs and the Prigozhin Rebellion. It is expected that the issue of PMC activities will be discussed privately. On several occasions, Putin spoke negatively of Western powers and the United States on several during his speech, maintaining his anti-Western rhetoric. He is also very concerned about further NATO expansion and Finland’s accession to the Alliance, stressing the “inadmissibility” of such actions and the alleged “threat” to Russia’s security interests. In particular, in order to improve its deterrence, he instructed the Defence Ministry to continue forming and manning the Moscow and Leningrad military districts and to deploy more forces there. Interestingly enough, during the meeting, Putin and Shoigu announced that they would maintain their existing military missions abroad, particularly in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh. They insisted that “the military contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh continues to contribute to peace”. In other words, Russia is not abandoning its presence in the South Caucasus and plans to maintain at least some of its military forces in order to retain its control in the region. Putin and his government continue investing more resources in the development of Russia’s military potential, aiming to prolong the Russian-Ukrainian war. That’s evidenced by a major increase in military production, plans for further population mobilisation, and more aggressive rhetoric from Putin against the West and Ukraine generally.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- We have been closely monitoring the ongoing development of the Russian narrative that suggests their willingness to “negotiate” and agree on a “ceasefire”. The Ukrainian Prism has long emphasised the gradual development of this scenario. Over the past month, Russian political figures, including Putin and other officials, have continued to hint about the possibility of such a future scenario. Recently, the discourse on this issue reached a new level. The New York Times published an article claiming that Putin is ready for a “ceasefire”. Here are some of the article’s key takeaways:
- Putin has been signalling through intermediaries since at least September that he is open to a cease-fire that freezes the fighting along the current lines, far short of his earlier ambitions to dominate Ukraine, two former high-ranking Russian officials close to the Kremlin, as well as American and foreign officials who received messages from Putin’s envoys say.
- This previously unreported initiative was allegedly voiced last year after Ukraine defeated the Russian army in the northeast. According to the sources, back then Putin made it clear that he was satisfied with the territory captured by Russia and indicated his readiness for a ceasefire.
- “We are ready to negotiate a ceasefire”, says one senior international official who met with senior Russian officials this autumn. “They want to stay where they are on the battlefield.”
- According to one of the interlocutors, the perfect timing would be before the Russian presidential elections in March 2024.
- We are currently witnessing a rise in discussions about a ceasefire. The Russians are taking advantage of the Western leaders’ partial exhaustion from the war and the financial difficulties faced by Ukraine. It is crucial to highlight that the Ukrainian government should make substantial efforts to explain to our partners that this scenario is unacceptable. The Russian authorities intend to use the ceasefire to reinforce their armed forces and gather resources for further military aggression.
- The European Union has recently approved the 12th set of sanctions against Russia. As part of these sanctions, certain products such as chemicals, lithium batteries, thermostats, DC motors, and servo motors for drones, machine tools and parts of machinery and equipment will be prohibited from being exported to Russia. Additionally, the sanctions package also includes a clause that prohibits EU exporters from re-exporting classified goods and technologies to Russia or using them in Russia when they enter into agreements with third countries. Furthermore, the set of sanctions entails prohibiting the import, transfer, and acquisition of diamonds from Russia. Additionally, last week, the United States declared an escalation of sanctions against banks that were engaged in delivering prohibited military equipment to Russia. Thus, we observe an increase in financial strain on the Russian economy.
- Armenia has taken a step to combat the Russian propaganda machine in the country. The Commission on Television and Radio of Armenia has recently banned Sputnik Armenia radio for a month. This radio has repeatedly broadcasted statements that humiliate the state and its people. The decision is consistent with the Armenian authorities’ approach to gradually distancing themselves from Moscow.
- In the past week, we have noticed a gradual increase in various political activities within Russia as the election campaign with Russian specifics has begun. However, it is unlikely that any political decisions or changes in the government will be made before the 2024 elections. Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s foreign policy remains aggressive for the domestic audience and open to the international audience. It is improbable that the ceasefire or negotiation process will yield any results before March of next year.
