Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: “elections” in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, the strengthening of Russia’s National Guard, and Putin’s election strategy.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- It appears that Putin has officially launched his election campaign. Over the past week, he has held several public events where he confirmed the Ukrainian Prism’s earlier prediction that his strategy would be based on a fully militaristic and anti-Western rhetoric. During the “direct line with the president” event, Putin mainly talked about the war against Ukraine, the importance of defending sovereignty, and the stability of the Russian economy. In his speech, he emphasised the Russian army’s success on the battlefield and reiterated the need to “fulfil all the goals of the special military operation”. It is evident that this aggressive rhetoric will be maintained until the presidential elections, and any mention of the peace talks will be kept to a minimum. At the same time, Putin announced that there are no plans for a second mobilisation wave. The issue of mobilisation is unlikely to be raised before the elections, and any large-scale mobilisation events will be delayed until the period after March 2024. In the socio-economic sphere, the Russian authorities have decided to pursue a strategy of imitating ‘stability’. It is unlikely that there will be any major public announcements or decisions that could potentially affect or lower voter turnout before the elections.
- During the United Russia party congress, Putin continued to use the same rhetoric in his speech. He dwelt on a familiar narrative of “needing to preserve the sovereignty”, which Russia allegedly cannot exist without, and called for unity and firmness in the government. Putin paid special attention to the already standard statements about the West, which, over the years, “have been hoping not only to bring down Russia’s economy and society but also our political state system”. Such statements suggest that Putin’s election rhetoric has been fully formed and put into action.
- Last week, Putin met with the leaders of all State Duma [lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia – ed.] factions, including Vladimir Vasilyev of the United Russia faction, Gennady Zyuganov of the Communist Party, Sergey Mironov of A Just Russia for Truth, Leonid Slutskiy of the Liberal Democratic Party, and Alexey Nechayev of the New People faction. Additionally, State Duma Speaker, Vyacheslav Volodin was also present, as well as the domestic policy curator Sergey Kiriyenko. Kiriyenko’s presence indicates that the need to agree on the campaign strategy was the main reason for this event. We also believe that Putin could have selected the key “candidates” in the upcoming elections as all of those present, except for Mironov, are likely to be the main “candidates” next year.
- Last week, several events revealed the strengthening of Russia’s National Guard (Rosgvardia) and the growing political influence of its director, Viktor Zolotov. The Grom special unit, which the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs previously controlled, is reportedly being transferred to Russia’s National Guard. The potential transfer was already discussed in the summer of 2023. For example, Russian MP Hishtein announced that the Grom unit would be transferred to the Rosvgardia along with its entire infrastructure. In July, it consisted of approximately 7,000 soldiers. Moreover, last week, the Russian State Duma passed a law allowing the Rosgvardia to include volunteer units in its ranks. This indicates an active consolidation of Zolotov’s political power.
- It has also come to light that the Russian Central Bank has significantly increased its powers. The Russian State Duma has passed a law allowing the Central Bank to disconnect any actor in the financial market from currency trading. This would allow the bank to tighten its grip over the financial system and, if necessary, cut off any market participants from trading for a period of six months. Moreover, the basis for such a decision may even be a “threat to market stability”. The definition of “threat” will be assessed at the Central Bank’s discretion. Probable reasons for such a significant expansion of the Central Bank’s executive powers include the need for a more thorough control of Russia’s financial system and maintaining the ruble’s exchange rate ahead of the presidential election. Also, this way, the Russian authorities will increase the number of their “punitive” tools.
- Russian media outlets are circulating information about Navalny’s “disappearance” from the colony where he was serving his sentence – his press secretary, Kira Yarmysh, reported this. It is very likely that this coincides with the start of the election campaign and is a well-planned Kremlin strategy. One of the possible options is the Russian authorities’ attempt to draw attention to Navalny in order to potentially use his political figure in negotiations, including a POW exchange.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- As part of their preparations for the 2024 presidential elections, the Russian authorities appear to have radicalised their rhetoric and resorted to organising the so-called “voting” in Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories, including the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. At the same time, the Central Election Commission of Russia took unprecedented measures while organising an evident farce, which was presented as “voting”. First of all, the Russians will not publish lists of polling stations with the location of the polling station commissions. Nor will they publish information about members of election commissions. Only the “voting results” will be published. There have also been reports about a potential initiative allowing the use of Ukrainian passports to “vote”. All of these decisions are likely aimed at making it easier to demonstrate “absolute support” for Putin by the “majority of people”. It is not unlikely that Russian authorities may publish “the largest” numbers from the occupied territories compared to all the regions where elections will be held. If the Kremlin decides to hold presidential elections in the occupied territories, it’s a clear sign that Moscow is not even theoretically ready to discuss the return of this part of Ukraine through diplomatic channels.
- Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, gave an interview to the US TV channel NBC News. During the interview, he reiterated most of the Russian propaganda narratives about Russia’s war against Ukraine, as well as the “responsibility” of the United States. The main purpose of this interview was to remind Americans about Russia’s readiness to negotiate, but only on its own terms, effectively eliminating such possibility altogether. Peskov also hinted at Putin’s willingness to negotiate with Trump.
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- “Putin is ready to work with anyone who will understand that from now on, you have to be more careful with Russia and you have to take into account our concerns. At the same time, the Russian leader would prefer a U.S. president who has a “more constructive” approach to Russia and understands “the importance of dialogue”, he said.
- Russia has continued creating tensions with Finland. Last week, Finns reopened the Vaalimaa and Niirala border crossings, but on the same day, Russia once again allowed illegal immigrants to cross the border with Finland, which was the primary reason for the earlier closure. The Finnish border force reported that once the crossings were closed, the illegal immigrants disappeared, and the Russian authorities stopped bringing them to the border. Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo has officially stated that Russia is attacking the sovereignty of his country and the EU. In addition to this, Putin announced the creation of the Leningrad military district, stating that: “There had been no problems before. Now, there will be. Because we will now create the Leningrad Military District and station certain military units there”.
- Last week, Russian authorities intensified their efforts to create conflict and contradictions between Ukraine and its partners. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that representatives of Western countries seek to establish contacts with Moscow bypassing Ukraine, despite numerous public promises not to discuss these issues without Kyiv’s presence. Similar announcements are undoubtedly part of the Kremlin’s psychological operations. “A number of high-level, very well-known leaders of certain Western countries, including one leader of a very well-known Western country, have sent us signals several times, through different channels, at least three different channels, saying, why don’t we meet and talk about what to do about Ukraine and European security”, claimed Lavrov.
