In January 2023, Randall Reed was detained by the police and mistakenly accused of stealing designer handbags. He spent a night in jail before proving that he had never been in the state where the crime occurred, leading to his release. The arrest stemmed from a faulty facial recognition system.
Cases similar to Randall Reed’s are becoming more common with each passing month. Despite the inherent flaws in facial recognition systems, they are being increasingly used not only for observation but also as tools for law enforcement to target potential suspects. These scenarios could soon become a reality in Ukraine, potentially due to the impending adoption of Law No. 11031 on the Unified Video Monitoring System for Public Safety. This current legislation, still in the form of a draft bill, is currently under review by the relevant committee. A detailed examination reveals Ukraine’s ambition to create a comprehensive surveillance network for its citizens, rivalling the capabilities of the infamous Russian “Sphere” – a technology used to identify participants in protest demonstrations. This proposed system might soon be equated with the Chinese global recognition systems that have become part of everyday life in that nation.
The Ukrainian Week looks into this bill, examining the global use and regulation of surveillance and recognition technologies.
Ukraine’s Bill 11031: legalisation of mass surveillance
The new bill is titled “On the Unified Video Monitoring System for Public Safety,” and it is aimed at creating a comprehensive global video surveillance system in Ukraine to monitor street activities. The stated noble purpose is the safeguarding of public safety, as highlighted in the bill’s summary: it is intended for preventive and proactive measures to curb criminal activities. However, a close reading of the bill reveals the extensive scope of the future surveillance system for Ukrainians, even to readers less familiar with modern technologies.
The authors of the document propose not just observation but also the identification of individuals through video footage. This means cameras will be equipped with facial recognition capabilities, using citizen data for identification purposes. As a result, the surveillance outcomes will include not only video files capturing street scenes but also the potential identification of all the individuals depicted in those files. For example, Person A walked with Person B near Parliament, entering at 16:03 and leaving at 18:31, then driving north in a BMW. At 7:23, in the park near the Parlaiment, Person C strolled with a dog, pausing to exchange messages on the phone for 10 minutes while attentively observing the windows of the Parlaiment building’s second floor.
It’s important to note that the creators of the bill suggest using not only the data available in records for “identifying” individuals—like names, birthplaces, registration details, or tax information. The document introduces the concept of biometric data, which refers to “personal data obtained through special technical processing related to physical, physiological, or behavioural characteristics of a person, such as facial images or fingerprint data, voice, enabling the unequivocal identification or confirming the unequivocal identification of a person.” In simpler terms, the video surveillance system will rely on our images (how they ended up in the state’s possession remains a question) and other traits to precisely identify us.
Interestingly, the article discussing the rights of individuals whose data is included in the video monitoring system does not mention the right to delete one’s information from there. We can find out what data about us has ended up in the video monitoring system, request a certificate about it, demand corrections, and somewhat ghostly we have the right “to ensure the protection of our rights if a request or demand to correct our personal data is not satisfied”.
Ukraine’s move towards surveillance
At the onset of the war, the Ukrainian authorities announced cooperation with Clearview AI, supposedly for the identification of Russian occupation forces. However, doubts about the very fact of such cooperation were raised more than once later on. From the initial idea to apply this technology to photos of occupiers to its potential use on Ukrainian citizens is merely one step. It appears that the Ukrainian authorities are now gearing up to take that step.
The software component, such as Clearview AI’s technology, is just one part of the preparations for mass surveillance technologies. By May 2023, the introduced “Safe Kyiv Region” video surveillance system boasted nearly two thousand cameras with recognition capabilities.
While proponents argue for the necessity of these technologies, citing their role in solving war crimes, they conveniently overlook the fact that civilians are also under surveillance. The faces of citizens are transformed into digital copies, ready for identification—a concerning shift towards potential mass monitoring.
Facial recognition technology in a global context
Facial recognition technology serves as a vivid example of innovation that has been met with the principle of technological restraint. This approach involves intentionally slowing down its development and even shelving certain advancements until all risks are thoroughly studied and necessary laws are enacted.
In 2021, the European Parliament made a call to ban such systems, highlighting a cautious approach. Meanwhile, major American tech giants announced the suspension of facial recognition system developments or, at the very least, refrained from selling them to law enforcement. IBM, for instance, justified its decision by pointing to the use of these systems against Black Lives Matter protesters.
However, the temporary halt in the development of facial recognition technology was short-lived. By early 2024, the UK government announced the establishment of its own database using passport photos for facial recognition during mass surveillance.
Overall, global practices in the use of facial recognition and surveillance technologies demonstrate two main approaches. The first involves the caution and, in some cases, bans seen in the democratic world. For instance, certain US states have prohibited private businesses from employing recognition cameras. On the other hand, we see contrasting examples in China and Russia, where mass surveillance is on the rise and often targets dissenters and, at times, even unsuspecting individuals.
Potential security threats
The use of such systems presents not just risks linked to rights violations and privacy erosion. While the bill’s authors try to restrict access to recognition data to specialised service representatives, there’s no assurance that data—like the daily routes of regular individuals—won’t fall into the hands of stalkers or burglars.
Moreover, we should remember a journalist investigation into the extensive use of Chinese surveillance cameras and the unregulated streams of data stemming from such monitoring. The report prepared by journalists of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty revealed that thousands of surveillance systems with Russian software Trassir, installed throughout Ukraine on city streets and public or private properties, could have been sending data to servers in Moscow for years. Beyond the risky Russian tech, Ukraine was extensively using cameras from China, with Hikvision leading the pack, followed by Dahua, both Chinese companies. Importing their products was banned in the US due to “threats to national security.” Despite being listed as “international war sponsors,” Chinese surveillance systems remained legal and continued operating nationwide in Ukraine, preferred for domestic use due to their affordability. They were even used in state security systems, including the “Safe City” program.
Despite the undeniable achievements of Ukrainian IT professionals, crucial technological systems vital to Ukraine have been repeatedly breached by Russian hackers and cybercriminals supported by the GRU, Russian military intelligence. The lingering question remains: if criminals were to gain access to the video surveillance system, where is the guarantee that they won’t simply observe, discreetly monitoring crucial locations and objects to aid in selecting targets for future Russian missile strikes?
