The Anniversary NATO Summit in Washington, scheduled for July 9-11, 2024, will celebrate the Alliance’s achievements with its new leader, Mark Rutte, the former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, and two new member countries – Finland and Sweden, which joined in 2023 and 2024 respectively.
Meanwhile, Ukraine will support its partners from the sidelines, knowing it won’t be invited to join as a full member for many years. In the same waiting room, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia also hold out hope for better prospects.
Despite the fact that the Russian attack on Ukraine highlighted issues such as the inadequate defence capabilities of many member countries and the fact that eight members of the Alliance still do not allocate 2% of their GDP to collective security, the example of European states historically within Russia’s geopolitical interests has demonstrated the value of full membership in the face of Russian revanchism.
To ensure that the celebration is not overshadowed by the unresolved ‘Ukrainian question’, which directly points to the existence of red lines that the Alliance is not yet ready to cross to avoid the threat of direct confrontation with Russia, the United States has been taking steps for the second year in a row to “send a powerful signal to Putin.”
Last year, the NATO Summit in Vilnius decided that Ukraine would eventually become a member of the Alliance without a Membership Action Plan, but it did not offer an invitation for membership. This decision made President Zelensky threaten to cancel his participation in the event. Additionally, the summit marked the first meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Council, which replaced the Ukraine-NATO Commission, which had been developing cooperation since 1997.
This time, the absence of an invitation to NATO is masked by a bilateral security agreement with the United States. The document is referred to as a “bridge” to Ukraine’s future membership in the Alliance. Furthermore, the Alliance will announce the establishment of a mission in Germany under NATO’s aegis, which will coordinate the provision of all types of assistance to Ukraine in the long term.
From January to July 2024, Ukraine has already signed 20 agreements with partners, including the European Union and all G7 countries. An agreement with Poland is planned to be signed before the NATO summit.
What is the origin of this format, and what do the agreements entail?
Back in 2022, while seeking security guarantees for Ukraine, an international advisory group led by Andriy Yermak, head of the Ukrainian President’s Office, and former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, proposed the idea of the “Kyiv Security Treaty.”
The treaty envisioned two key dimensions: a multilateral strategic partnership treaty and bilateral agreements between Ukraine and its security guarantors at the governmental and parliamentary levels. These guarantors would undertake long-term legal and political commitments based on each partner’s capabilities. The proposal included a provision for consultations within 24 hours and a decision to implement extended guarantees within a coalition of willing countries to defend the state affected by aggression within 72 hours—a concept partially reflected in the already signed bilateral agreements.
This work laid the foundation for the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, agreed upon by the G7 leaders on July 12, 2023. The document marks the beginning of negotiations with Ukraine, aiming to formalise bilateral security commitments and agreements. These commitments, consistent with the multilateral framework agreement and in accordance with each country’s legal and constitutional requirements, demonstrate unwavering support for Ukraine as it defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity, rebuilds its economy, protects its citizens, and seeks integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.
Each agreement is unique, considering the history of previous security cooperation with Ukraine and the specific commitments based on the financial and technical capabilities of the partner country. In this way, the agreements complement each other.
For example, the United States commits to supporting the modernisation of Ukraine’s Air Force by procuring modern fighters, providing armaments, and offering training to support fourth-generation fighters like the F-16. Denmark, through the Air Force Coalition, will also support the F-16’s full potential by providing fighters, ammunition, simulators, training, long-term maintenance, and creating necessary conditions in Ukraine. Sweden will continue its support by providing technical assistance for military equipment systems transferred to Ukraine, such as the CV90 combat vehicle and the Archer artillery system, and commits to working on transferring ASC 890 aircraft to Ukraine. Naturally, the public parts of the agreements do not contain all the details of the arrangements made.
Financial commitments are defined in various ways. The agreement with Lithuania states the government’s intention to provide Ukraine with security and defence support amounting to 0.25% of its annual GDP each year. France will provide up to 3 billion euros in additional aid in 2024. Italy, which has already provided Ukraine with eight packages of military assistance since the start of the full-scale invasion, intends to “maintain the same level of additional military support in 2024.” Details will be determined through consultations.
Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that the security agreements signed by Ukraine will enable the country to receive $60 billion in military assistance annually for the next four years.
Most agreements outline several key points that are crucial for Ukraine’s defence and integration efforts. They recognise Ukraine’s inalienable right to self-defence, as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, and emphasise the importance of restoring the country’s territorial integrity. Support is extended for Ukraine’s path to European integration and closer ties with NATO, along with the provision of defence-related goods and services.
These agreements also identify the partner country’s priority capability coalitions, of which there are eight following the 20th Ramstein meeting: Air Force Coalition, Integrated Air and Missile Defense Coalition, Artillery Coalition, Armored Vehicles and Maneuverability Coalition, Naval Capabilities Coalition, IT Coalition, Demining coalition, and Drones coalition. Support will be provided to build modern, NATO-interoperable Defense Forces capable of reliably deterring and defending against future aggression through training and military education programs, joint military manoeuvres, and exercises.
Additionally, the development of Ukraine’s defence-industrial complex is a priority, with efforts to attract investments, create defence enterprises in Ukraine, establish joint research and development, and pursue joint production. The exchange of intelligence information and deepening cooperation between intelligence services is emphasised, along with cooperation in combating serious and organised crime and collaboration in cybersecurity. Implementing the coalition’s demining tasks, strengthening macroeconomic stability, and cooperation in Ukraine’s reconstruction and economic recovery are also key components.
Assistance is provided for continuing institutional reforms in Ukraine, with sanctions against the Russian Federation aimed at restricting its access to finances, goods, technologies, and services used in its aggression, deterring revenue flows to Russia, and preventing future attacks. This includes the continuation of the moratorium on transferring frozen assets to Russia. Achieving a just peace, creating a compensation mechanism for damages, and ensuring accountability for international crimes committed in Ukraine are also prioritised, including exploring options for creating a tribunal to ensure Russia’s accountability for its crimes in Ukraine.
Developing Ukraine’s capabilities to counter Russian and other propaganda and disinformation, expanding cooperation to enhance resilience against nuclear, biological, and chemical threats, and promoting humanitarian cooperation and social recovery are further integral aspects of these agreements.
Do bilateral agreements ensure Ukraine’s security?
Most agreements explicitly state that they do not offer security guarantees but instead focus on security cooperation and providing long-term support to Ukraine. These agreements are seen as a temporary alternative to NATO membership.
Formalising partners’ commitments aims to mitigate the risks of ‘political storms’ in partner nations, a concern heightened by the prolonged war, the rise of right-wing movements in Europe, and delays in receiving aid packages from the United States. Additionally, these agreements reinforce shared priorities for Ukraine, such as the restoration of territorial integrity and progress towards EU and NATO accession.
However, these agreements do not involve the direct participation of troops from third countries in the Russian-Ukrainian war, as consensus on this matter has not been achieved in the West. Furthermore, former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin has pointed out that these agreements lack a concept akin to qualitative military advantage, which exists in agreements between the United States and Israel.
The sections outlining cooperation in the event of a future armed attack primarily involve commitments to hold consultations within 24 hours and subsequently provide rapid and sustained security and economic assistance, alongside imposing sanctions on the aggressor country. The bilateral agreements formalise a cooperation framework that has been established since 2022.
Unlike the painfully succinct Budapest Memorandum, which merely obligated guarantor countries to refrain from attacking and, in case of third-party aggression, seek immediate UN Security Council assistance for Ukraine, these agreements represent a more comprehensive approach. However, they do not constitute full-fledged collective security arrangements either.
The parliaments of signatory states have not yet ratified these agreements, even though they are being reviewed in some countries like France, for instance. As history shows, predicting the long-term fulfilment of political agreements is challenging. Therefore, whether these agreements will suffice to support Ukraine until it becomes a NATO member remains a rhetorical question.
Despite political rhetoric regarding Ukraine’s future within NATO, the main impediment remains the cautious stance of Western partners rather than Ukraine’s compliance with NATO standards or uncertainties over borders due to territorial integrity violations. Following the Vilnius summit, former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg clarified that Ukraine would receive an invitation when “appropriate political conditions” permit, avoiding full-scale war between NATO and Russia.
Considering that Ukraine will remain within Russia’s insatiable interests in the near future, only two scenarios could create the desired conditions. Either Russia undergoes democratisation and renews cooperation with the West, possibly under pressure from China, or the ongoing war with Ukraine and sanctions weaken Russia to the extent that it focuses solely on internal issues rather than geopolitical ambitions. In such a scenario, Ukraine could capitalise on an opportunity similar to that of Finland.
While it is tempting to envision these scenarios, realistically, expecting such outcomes is impractical. Therefore, the bilateral agreements are primarily aimed at securing long-term support for Ukraine. The effectiveness of their implementation will determine Ukraine’s standing on the global political stage. Consequently, the foremost objective is to bolster Ukraine’s own capabilities, as these agreements alone cannot halt current aggression or prevent future wars.
Security, NATO, Ukraine
Ahead of the upcoming NATO Summit next week, the Alliance has significant milestones to celebrate. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were discussions about dissolving NATO due to its perceived irrelevance in a post-bipolar world. As recently as 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron remarked, “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of NATO.”
Just five years later, spurred by Russian aggression and bolstered by Ukrainian resilience, NATO has undergone a revitalisation, though it still faces challenges in fully realising its potential as a formidable force. According to the Financial Times, last year’s NATO defence plan underscored that in a scenario of full-scale war, the Allies would possess less than 5% of the necessary air defence systems required to adequately safeguard countries on its eastern flank.
Furthermore, NATO lacks extensive experience in activating Article 5 in response to a large-scale conflict. Article 5 has only been invoked once, following the terrorist attacks of September 11 against the United States. NATO has implemented practical collective defence measures on three other occasions at the request of Turkey: in 1991 during the Gulf War, in 2003 amid the Iraq crisis, and in 2012 due to the situation in Syria. However, the scope and duration of these measures pale compared to what would be required to engage in full-scale warfare in response to aggression.
Interestingly, under Article 5, member countries of the Alliance have the authority to offer any assistance they deem necessary based on the specific circumstances. Each country independently determines the nature of support it provides in each particular instance, similar to the bilateral agreements Ukraine entered into. Back in the 1940s, there were debates over how to implement the principle of mutual aid, as consensus couldn’t be reached on automatic U.S. intervention in case of an attack on European member states.
Therefore, for Ukraine, signing bilateral agreements broadly means political, financial, and moral support with an uncertain future trajectory.
