Recently, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy expressed confidence that after the end of the war, there will be a “boom in birth rates” in our country. “I understand that when the war ends, there will be a boom. I am sure of it. People will return. They will be confident in tomorrow, confident in the future and in Ukraine,” he said.
Yet, Ukraine’s population is dwindling at an alarming rate, prompting the state to explore ways to avert disaster. What are the fundamental causes of this demographic challenge, and what insights does global experience offer us?
Unjustified optimism
Despite the president’s optimism, Ukraine now faces a demographic catastrophe. According to Worldometers data, as of January 1, 2024, the country’s population stood at 37.9 million, including the occupied territories. This marks a decline of 6 million or 13.7% since 2020 and a staggering 13 million (25%) drop compared to 1990. In less than 34 years, we have lost a quarter of our population, dealing a significant blow to the country’s economic (and defence) potential. The current birth rate is at a critically low level of 1.29 children per woman, far below the minimum of 2.1 needed for normal reproduction. As of 2023, the average age of Ukrainians surpassed 44, the highest it has been since the start of such record-keeping.
By the late 2000s, the government was engaged in discussions about a national program to tackle the demographic challenge, yet such a strategy remains elusive. In 2009, the Verkhovna Rada more than doubled (by 105%) payments for the birth of the first child, increasing them from 13.9 thousand to 28.4 thousand hryvnias. However, this did not lead to a substantial rise in the birth rate; between 2005 and 2015, it fluctuated within the range of 1.22 to 1.52.
It wasn’t until March 28, 2024, that the Ministry of Social Policy announced the launch of public consultations on Ukraine’s Demographic Strategy until 2040. These discussions are slated to conclude by June 1. However, the ministry’s proposed project doesn’t significantly deviate from the government’s demographic policy principles since 1991: the authors suggest new state support programs, traditionally challenging to grasp and implement, and also aim to repatriate Ukrainians who have migrated abroad.
Given the context of a full-scale war, which has claimed numerous military and civilian lives and forced thousands of Ukrainians to seek refuge abroad, Ukraine’s national existence is practically threatened with extinction within a few decades. Clearly, the government should already be taking steps to avoid this dire scenario. To start, we need to assess the effectiveness of demographic policies employed by countries facing similar challenges.
Financial aid falls short of expected outcomes
Between 1980 and 2019, developed nations roughly tripled their per capita support for young parents. This encompassed various forms of expenditure, such as direct monetary aid upon childbirth, childcare subsidies, compensations for work-related maternity leaves, and more. Despite these efforts, the average birth rate declined from 1.85 to 1.53 per woman.
In Finland, known for its robust support for new parents, the birth rate plummeted by a third post-2010. Conversely, Hungary, lauded for its family policies by Prime Minister Orban, recorded the lowest number of newborns last year since the beginning of such records. Even with generous budgetary programs, South Korea saw its birth rate drop to a record low of 0.89, the lowest on the globe.
Certainly, government assistance helps decrease the number of children living in poverty and allows parents more time for childcare, among other benefits. However, data suggests that the extent and diversity of budgetary payments do not notably affect the birth rate. For instance, in New Zealand, where families allocate over 37% of their income to childcare, the birth rate is higher compared to the Czech Republic, where similar expenses constitute less than 3% (1.75 versus 1.70, respectively).
The data unequivocally point to societal norms, traditions, and the broader cultural landscape as having a far more significant impact on the birth rate than financial factors.
The Financial Times highlighted several factors that contribute to the declining birth rate in developed countries:
- The percentage of people seeing childbirth as a crucial part of a fulfilling life is on the decline. According to Pew Research, this figure in the U.S. dropped from 61% in 1993 to 26% today.
- Parents are feeling the need to devote more and more time to each child. Back in 1965, mothers in developed nations spent just one hour on average per day with their kids. Today, that number has increased to three hours, reaching nearly four hours in the case of South Korea. Interestingly, the scenario in France is quite the opposite: mothers there spend about two hours daily with their children, and the birth rate is one of the highest in Europe (1.8).
- The share of young women giving birth is swiftly declining. In the 1960s in the U.S., the majority of 34-year-old women had three children. Nowadays, the largest group of women in this age bracket has zero (!) children.
- Possibly the most pivotal factor is the rising proportion of the population refraining from marriage or long-term partnerships. This trend is strongly influenced by the increasing number of women who can financially support themselves, thereby eliminating a traditional motivation for marriage.
Financial assistance programs are unable to impact any of the aforementioned factors. Their origins lie in the fundamental cultural shifts that have occurred in the lives of developed countries over the course of decades. As a result, a sudden turnaround is unlikely; the trend towards higher birth rates can only emerge in the long-term perspective.
Repressive Methods and Secularisation
An infamous attempt to boost birth rates not through incentives but through repressive measures is exemplified by Decree 770 in communist Romania. In 1967, Nicolae Ceaușescu signed a decree that outlawed abortions and contraception, imposed taxes on adults without children, and mandated monthly medical check-ups for women up to 45 years old to detect early pregnancies. Each pregnancy was meticulously recorded and monitored until childbirth.
For several years, the birth rate in Romania indeed soared to an astonishing 3.5. However, this came at a cost: the number of orphans and abandoned children rose significantly, and an underground abortion industry flourished. Following the regime change and the repeal of the law in the 1990s, the birth rate in Romania plummeted to historically low levels of 1.3.
In the context of cultural shifts, France’s experience stands out. Following the revolution at the close of the 18th century, a profound secularisation took place – marking the separation of church from public life. In various regions, the revolutionary forces either expelled clergy members or compelled them to pledge allegiance to the new authority, relinquishing their ties to the church.
According to a study by Guillaume Blanc from the University of Manchester, the more secularised regions of France witnessed considerably steeper declines in birth rates over the ensuing century compared to areas where the clergy retained their influence. By 1850, the average French woman had 3-4 children, contrasting sharply with England, where such stark cultural changes hadn’t occurred, and the average was 5-6 children.
There’s little point in waiting for improvement
An obvious lesson for Ukraine should be the recognition of the limited impact of government policy on the birth rate. Certainly, the state should pursue an active family policy, but it needs to have clear objectives: reducing child poverty, aiding low-income families, and so forth. The solution to the problem of Ukraine’s declining population should be sought in fundamental cultural realms rather than purely financial avenues. It’s also crucial to steer clear of the practices of developed nations that attempt to tackle demographic crises by importing migrants, effectively eroding their own national identity.
It’s highly unlikely that the birth rate in developed countries will soon rebound to the needed 2.1 level. If such a miracle were to occur, it would result from shifts in social structures, not governmental policies. There’s nothing inherently wrong with striving to assist families, but to avert a demographic catastrophe, alternative methods must be explored.
