Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Death of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Putin’s presidential address and the new sanctions
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Vyacheslav Lebedev, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, dies. It has been reported that Vyacheslav Lebedev, the long-time chief justice of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, has died. Since 1991, he has been ensuring the demonstration of a formal independent judicial system in Russia. In fact, for 34 years, Lebedev completely immersed himself in the Russian judicial and law enforcement systems, always providing the necessary political solutions for the authorities. Lebedev’s death is significant because he was one of the top officials who balanced the judicial system and prevented internal confrontations. In some ways, it is possible to compare him with Putin, who similarly structured the entire political system to disallow any serious public confrontations. Through the example of the struggle for Lebedev’s seat, we can observe a miniature of Russia’s future after the death of the Russian dictator.
- Moreover, Lebedev’s death marks the beginning of the gradual “extinction” of the old political elite, which poses a challenge for the “young” generation of Russian officials seeking to ascend to power. This event sets the stage for a clash between the established and emerging elites. Currently, it remains uncertain who will succeed Lebedev, although some politicians have already begun vying for the role in the public sphere. One notable example is the speculation surrounding Medvedev’s potential appointment, although this move could potentially diminish the current influence of the siloviki on the judiciary, making it a less likely scenario.
- There is also a high probability that Putin will not nominate anyone to the position of the head of the Supreme Court. This scenario is well exemplified by the head of the Accounts Chamber, which the Russian dictator has not appointed since the end of 2022. In this case, it will be a good demonstration of his inability to change the current balance in the Russian political system.
- Russian authorities’ new restrictions against the opposition movement. The Russian State Duma has approved a new bill in its first reading, targeting activists, politicians, and journalists opposed to the Kremlin. Many of them fall under the classification of “foreign agents.” According to the bill, Russian citizens and companies will be banned from advertising on information platforms owned by individuals on this “foreign agents” list. This law appears to be primarily aimed at a specific information outlet (“Redaktsiya”) owned by journalist Alexei Pivovarov, known for its wide reach and independent operation within Russia without government control. These measures by the Russian state continue the trend towards tighter control of the country’s information landscape.
- Putin’s presidential address. The Kremlin has confirmed that Putin will deliver a message to the Federal Assembly on February 29. It’s no secret that he plans to use this opportunity as part of his election campaign. Putin is expected to address three main issues during his speech. The first, integral to his election strategy, will likely revolve around the war and showcasing “Russian victories.” It’s almost certain that the Russian leader will highlight the “failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive” and promote the Russian army’s progress in the Avdiivka area as a testament to its success while conveniently omitting mention of significant losses such as the A-50U aircraft and the ships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This segment doesn’t carry much surprise or weight. Moving on, the next aspect will focus on social issues. Following the pattern of previous years, it’s likely to take the form of distributing money to the population ahead of the elections. Perhaps this time, the gesture will be even more substantial. The third and arguably most crucial part remains unconfirmed. In the months following the summer Ukrainian war campaign, the Kremlin has been publicly touting its readiness for “negotiations,” notably highlighted by Putin’s interview with Tucker Carlson. Behind the scenes, utilising intermediaries such as the Persian Gulf states, Putin has been attempting to engage the United States in discussions regarding a potential “freeze” on the conflict along the frontline. He went as far as offering assurances of his willingness to “move away” from opposing Ukraine’s accession to NATO and its neutrality, a significant departure from Russia’s longstanding policy. According to Reuters, the United States rejected the Kremlin’s proposal for negotiations. Putin will likely once again mention his “willingness to negotiate.” There’s a chance that this time, the Kremlin might publicly specify the boundaries of its “concessions,” aiming to exert additional pressure on Western leaders and Ukraine.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- New powerful sanctions against Russia. On the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion and in the wake of the death of Russian opposition leader Navalny, Western countries have imposed new sanctions against Russia. The United States has rolled out its most extensive package yet, targeting 500 legal entities and individuals. Building on a strategy initiated at the end of 2023, the U.S. aims to reinforce compliance with the existing restrictions it has imposed. Noteworthy examples of these sanctions include:
- 14 Russian tankers owned by the Sovcomflot company;
- The PIK development group, Russia’s largest real estate developer;
- A number of financial, banking and investment structures, including the National Payment Card System, which is the operator of the Russian payment card Mir. This decision presents significant hurdles for Mir’s international market entry and essentially confines it to a domestic Russian system.
- A number of third-country companies and individuals who assisted Russia in circumventing sanctions. The list includes companies from China, the UAE, and Serbia.
- One drawback of this package is the absence of strong U.S. sanctions against the crucial sectors of the Russian economy that generate revenue for the Kremlin. This notably includes more stringent measures targeting the energy and metallurgical sectors, along with secondary sanctions on Russian banks.
- The EU has introduced its 13th package of sanctions, targeting 88 legal entities and 106 individuals. These restrictions are primarily aimed at the Russian military-industrial complex. Following a pattern similar to the U.S. sanctions, the European package has imposed more stringent export restrictions on dual-use goods involving companies from third countries such as India, Sri Lanka, China, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Thailand, and Turkey. Similarly, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom introduced new sanctions.
- Armenia’s further distancing from Russia. On February 22, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated in an interview with France 24 that Armenia had effectively “suspended” its participation in the CSTO due to Russia’s ongoing dominance. In swift response to Pashinyan’s pointed remarks, the Russian Foreign Ministry demanded clarification, asserting that Russia purportedly “abides by all agreements within the Organisation” and its allied obligations to Armenia. Currently, Armenia is not officially leaving the CSTO, only minimising its interaction within the organisation. Pashinyan also clarified that the “suspension” of Armenia’s CSTO activities does not pertain to the presence of Russian troops at the Gyumri military base, indicating that there are currently no ongoing discussions regarding their withdrawal. However, he emphasised that this option should not be ruled out at this juncture. Through these actions, the Armenian government seeks to navigate Moscow’s “red lines” and maintain a delicate balance to prevent further harm. On the Russian side, even a small military presence in the Caucasus holds significant sway over Armenia, serving as a crucial tool of influence. Moscow is expected to strive to uphold its military base in the region.
- Despite escalating tensions, Russia maintains significant influence over Armenia. Economically, Yerevan remains heavily reliant on Russia. Despite the emerging trade challenges, Russia remains Armenia’s largest trading partner, representing over half of Armenian exports.
- Potential transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia. In recent months, amidst contacts between representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia, there have been reports of negotiations between the two sides regarding the potential transfer of Iranian missiles to Russia in exchange for Russian Su-35 fighter jets. Last week, Reuters reported that Iran had transferred 400 surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. However, Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine, denied this information. The issue of missile transfer posed a challenge for the Russians. It is understood that Iranian authorities sought not only the jets but also the technology for their production and operation, a request to which the Kremlin was unprepared to accede. The outcome of these negotiations remains unknown, as well as the evidence behind the Reuters report.
