Brussels is adamant that official negotiations on Ukraine’s EU membership should kick off on June 25, as reported by Politico. Today, European and Ukrainian diplomats are actively engaged in efforts to secure the Hungarian government’s agreement to commence the negotiations. To shed light on the feasibility of starting the talks in June and the challenges currently confronting Ukraine, The Ukrainian Week held an informative discussion with Lyubov Akulenko, the Executive Director of the NGO Ukrainian Center for European Policy.
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– Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that Ukraine had done everything possible to initiate talks for EU membership, suggesting that only political manoeuvres remain. Do you believe negotiations could genuinely commence in June?
– Absolutely, they certainly can. From my perspective, the most challanging phase was in December, when there was a genuine threat of no decision being made to initiate negotiations. However, there was a collective effort, and they effectively navigated through the challenges posed by Orban. It became apparent at that time that they would strive to kick-start the negotiations before Hungary’s presidency and the new composition of the European Parliament.
– What are the primary challenges or obstacles that Ukraine is currently facing in this regard?
— Presently, we are facing challenges on two fronts. Firstly, the involvement of 27 member countries in the process means that any one of them can potentially block it at any given moment despite the limitations imposed by the negotiation framework. Secondly, the inclusion of the Association Agreement with the EU in the negotiation process adds another layer of complexity. Since 2014, we have been monitoring the agreement, with the latest assessment conducted in 2022. Our estimations suggest that Ukraine has fulfilled 55% of its obligations under the agreement. However, employing an extended methodology, which requires not only the development or adoption of acts but also their practical implementation, yields a figure of approximately 31%. On the contrary, the government presents a much higher number.
At present, we are undergoing an explanatory screening, followed by a bilateral screening where the EU will evaluate our progress. Challenges from the past persist, such as the failure to reinstate vehicle inspections, despite being crucial for complex reforms. Furthermore, legislative practices during the Agreement period often involved “gilding of directives” or Ukrainianising European legislation, deviating from European norms to secure parliamentary approval. Given the diverse interests within our large country, it is challenging to predict how we will address these issues moving forward.
So, considering how laws were passed before, I’m pretty sure the evaluation for how well we’ve followed the Agreement could be even lower than 31%. For instance, Europeans insist on a dedicated table for legislative acts, where each article is translated into English. Presently, based on my observations, even upon delegation requests, ministries fail to provide such tables. This suggests their possible absence, along with a lack of assigned personnel. However, there’s an explanation for this: the European Commission previously showed no interest in our Agreement activities, as they didn’t consider us part of the EU. Now, with this changed perspective, they’re highlighting the seriousness of the matter. Hence, it’s challenging to predict how swiftly we’ll navigate this bilateral screening process. In the Balkans, it occurred post-intergovernmental conference, slated for June in our case. We’re proceeding with an accelerated approach, with screening even commencing earlier.
— What other problems does Ukraine face?
— These are the crucial reforms (our government calls them ‘fundamental areas’): anti-corruption measures, judiciary reforms, restructuring public administration, media regulations, human rights enhancements, bolstering democratic institutions, and law enforcement reforms. All other sectors are connected to this central core, and if there are any issues here, the EU can halt the process. Take Albania, for instance, where negotiations were halted for a while because of a corrupt mayor who got thrown in jail, and the Greeks seized on that to stall the talks.
In my view, this is Ukraine’s final chance to really push through political reforms that will firmly establish us as a genuine democracy. What could go wrong here? In the Western Balkans, there’s hardly any matching European legislation for all these reforms. That gives the EU leeway to overlook certain processes, but at the same time, because of the broad terms, it’s easy to claim that we haven’t fulfilled something. That’s why it’s crucial for us that all requirements are crystal clear and that Ukraine undergoes as much political institution reform as possible during the negotiations.
There are also challenges concerning the government’s ability to negotiate and the ongoing public administration reform, which Ukraine is currently overlooking while structuring the negotiation process institutionally.
The problem is that it’s likely to rely solely on political roles, especially deputy ministers, which is shaky. When a minister is let go, all the deputies go with them. Moreover, we haven’t separated certain policy development functions based on direction. I looked over a survey by the National Agency of Civil Service, which evaluated the central executive bodies’ preparedness to implement the Agreement. Despite the irrelevant numbers (like saying that 200 people in the Ministry of Ecology handle European integration, which includes everyone except the accounting department), it shows that some negotiation areas are handled by multiple institutions, while others by none.
But I’m not convinced there’s the political determination to kickstart public administration reform. For me, the most sustainable setup would be one where civil servants, not politicians, lead the future 32 working groups.
— Are there any local challenges?
— We lack sufficient expertise across all negotiation-related areas. While we’re well-versed in the Agreement’s legislation, we’ve only made significant strides in certain sectors like energy. This begs the question of where to find such experts. There’s also the challenge of conducting macroeconomic analysis and modelling the repercussions of EU accession to justify why certain norms can’t be implemented now.
And, naturally, it’s hard to anticipate parliamentary decisions. In the past, everything could be delayed, norms could be altered. But such practices are no longer acceptable.
Moreover, our parliament is actively seeking involvement in the negotiation process, which is risky as it should be depoliticized. Civil servants should lead this effort, while parliamentarians ought to grasp what’s being approved, rather than using it for publicity. Their role also involves collaborating with the national parliaments of EU member states.
— How quickly can we complete the bilateral screening?
— It’s quite unpredictable. Currently, everything is moving swiftly, but Ukraine won’t be excused if we neglect to address, among other things, the cluster of fundamental reforms. The EU is less concerned about our legislation and more about its practical implementation. And we struggle with this, too, because while we’ve mastered the art of passing laws, we often stumble when it comes to putting regulations into practice due to understaffing. Moreover, the war has aggravated these problems significantly.
For instance, Latvia completed its negotiation process within two years. However, at that time, there was only half as much European legislation, and there were fewer urgent issues across various sectors of the economy to contend with. Can we achieve the same? I doubt it, given the challenges posed by the war and staffing shortages.
— More often than not, the primary challenges in Ukraine’s EU accession talks revolve around external factors, like Hungary’s stance. Could Hungary truly pose a hurdle?
— Absolutely, this will be an ongoing occurrence. Hungary could be placated by France or Germany, as we witnessed in the vote where Orbán abstained. However, given what lies ahead domestically, Hungary isn’t the major concern. We might worry about it if we had fulfilled all the prerequisites and then encountered delays (like being compelled to alter the country’s name, as occurred with North Macedonia). But presently, our primary challenges are establishing a skilled team and shielding it from political influences, along with implementing public administration reform.
