Paul Cruz is a researcher at the Émile Durkheim Center. He has been focusing on the evolution of the Ukrainian political system since 2014. Paul has been a frequent speaker at the Sciences Po Bordeaux and a regular commentator for various media outlets. He is particularly interested in the process of what we’d call a de-oligarchisation in Ukraine. In his interview with The Ukrainian Week / Tyzhden, Paul shared his observations on the achievements and prospects of the fight against corruption in Ukraine.
— You are one of the few researchers studying the fight against corruption in Ukraine. What is your perception of its recent evolution?
Since 2014, significant progress has been made from a regulatory perspective to better control corrupt practices in politics and the business world. Volodymyr Zelensky, as well as his predecessor Petro Poroshenko and their respective governments, have implemented a number of impressive reforms that are interesting and noteworthy.
One of these reforms, which I discuss a lot in France, is the reform of public procurement and the creation of the Prozorro platform in 2016. Another important reform is an online income declaration for state officials, which was created the same year. It was an incredible step forward, not just for Ukraine. I’m not aware of many European countries where citizens can easily access the salaries of judges they will face in court. In this regard, it’s worth noting that Ukraine established a register of ultimate beneficiaries for companies well before many other Western European nations did so. Ukrainians have long had the ability to consult the Ukrainian business register by entering a company’s registration number to see who its ultimate beneficiaries are. However, in France, for example, public access to this data was only granted in 2021.
— What do you think is the reason behind this positive trend?
I have already mentioned the political will demonstrated by the Ukrainian president and his predecessor, but there is another very important factor in the fight against corruption: the highly active and developed Ukrainian investigative press. It makes effective use of the information that is publicly available and obtained through reforms. This creates a de facto alliance between the political class, engaged in anti-corruption reforms, and civil society, which consistently pushes politicians in that direction. Investigative journalism plays an important role in this regard. If we add the European Union and international donors to this equation, actively encouraging these reforms, we create a strong and positive dynamic.
— Did the year 2022 signify a turning point in this process?
The large-scale Russian invasion that happened in 2022 has played a significant role in making a clearer distinction between the business and political spheres. Previously, these two spheres were intertwined, leading to clientelistic practices and corruption. This oligarchic system is very adaptable and knows how to adjust to new conditions. Naturally, it is too early to say that oligarchic and clientelistic practices have ended, but the Russian invasion has certainly accelerated the decline of oligarch influence in Ukraine.
On one hand, under President Volodymyr Zelensky, the state has gained strength and the state institutions have become stronger. At the beginning of the war in 2014, the Ukrainian state was left in a weakened state, and as a result, some of the oligarchs, responding to what was often a demand from Ukrainian society, took on its responsibilities. They financed combat battalions and were appointed to key positions at the regional level, tasked with protecting certain parts of the country from destabilisation and occupation, while others acted as negotiators and mediators. In other words, they substituted for the state, which was not able to fulfil all its duties fully. The difference with the invasion of 2022 is simply striking.
On the other hand, one of the reasons for the oligarchs’ decline in influence is their supposed lack of patriotism. There is a suspicion that these powerful individuals prioritise their own economic interests over the interests of the nation, which has led to growing calls for them to be excluded from playing a role in decision-making. Take, for example, the “Monaco Battalion” scandal. When it was discovered that oligarchs and politicians were vacationing on the French Riviera instead of aiding Ukraine’s war efforts, immediate demands were made to revoke their parliamentary mandates.
— What about other factors contributing to corruption? Russia, for example?
For decades, the Kremlin has used large-scale corruption to advance its diplomatic and political interests and has succeeded in gaining the loyalty of many European politicians. Before corruption, there was clientelism: offering compensation, a symbolic position, a title to a person in exchange for their loyalty and the fact that they will advance our interests. It is a practice that has been widespread both in Europe and in Ukraine. Its pattern is the same as the neo-patrimonial system that Vladimir Putin has built in Russia, where his “power is vertical”: at the top of the pyramid is a person who has access to all the political, economic, and administrative resources and that person distributes those resources in exchange for loyalty.
In Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk – closely linked to the Russian president and the godfather of his daughter – is a notable example of such a system. Medvedchuk was extremely proud of this quasi-kinship and exploited it to play a significant political role, even if it was only on the pro-Russian fringe of the Ukrainian political scene, to artificially polarise it. We know that Viktor Medvedchuk has also received significant economic benefits due to his proximity to the Kremlin, but it is primarily a symbolic reward rather than an economic one. And he was far from the only politician – both in Europe and in Ukraine – to receive these symbolic rewards from the Kremlin and try to use them to his advantage.
Today, we must address the issue of individuals who have profited and advanced their political careers through the support of the Kremlin, both in Ukraine and Europe.
— Yet, for years, Ukraine has been associated with corruption more than Russia. Why is that?
There are many biases and cultural assumptions about business practices in Ukraine, although, to some extent, this also applies to other countries in Eastern Europe. A very strong imagination about the extent of corruption in this region is based on real practices, but there is also an effect of imposition. When, for example, foreign business actors come to any of these Eastern European countries with a belief that they will only succeed through corruption. This way, they inadvertently fuel this phenomenon.
When it comes to Ukraine, many prejudices stem from a simple lack of knowledge about the country. For a long time, Ukraine was not well-known in France and Europe, and only a few researchers were studying Ukraine in France. Until 2022, interest in Ukraine was niche, but now there’s a real willingness in French society to understand the country, which is also evident through media coverage. So, I think that improving the image is only a matter of time, and, of course, it also depends on the effective continuation of reforms. Ukraine still has work to do, and there is no time to waste.
— What makes these efforts so urgent in times of war?
Firstly, this is because, for the Kremlin, the narrative about widespread corruption in Ukraine is a real political weapon. Ukraine has managed to resist the invasion due to three factors. The first is the higher morale of Ukrainians who firmly know what they are fighting for. The second factor is the total unpreparedness of the Russian army, which believed in its own narrative that Kyiv would give in and fall in three days. But the final factor, no less important than the previous two, is the financial and military support of the West. Therefore, the Kremlin has only one objective: to destroy these three factors that aid Ukraine in resisting. And how do we stop Western support and undermine morale? Of course, through the narrative that money and equipment given in good faith are corrupted and diverted for personal economic interests, feeding corruption instead of serving the great cause of defending the homeland. Unfortunately, this narrative has the potential to work out, and that’s why the Kremlin uses it. That’s why Ukraine has a very significant role to play here, and it will be absolutely necessary to continue on this path of anti-corruption reforms.
— And secondly?
A large amount of aid is conditioned on the implementation of reforms. The same goes for accession to the European Union, which, along with the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, has requested Ukraine to implement a number of reforms related to the transparency of a judicial system and business environment. These issues are extremely important, and this is precisely the situation where Ukraine cannot afford to make mistakes.
The Venice Commission gave a positive opinion on the reform of the Supreme Court and the recruitment of its judges but was rather critical of the anti-oligarch law. The implementation of the country’s de-oligarchisation is a firm demand from the European Union. Volodymyr Zelensky’s bill was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada [the Ukrainian Parliament – ed.] and signed by the president in November 2021, just a few months before the large-scale invasion. The Venice Commission has said, rightly, in my opinion, that the Ukrainian authorities should go further in this area. The Commission believes that this law is too punitive and not systematic enough. It is evident that Ukrainian authorities also had their own interests in mind when adopting such a law, which would reduce the political influence of their competitors. This is a mistake that the Venice Commission is asking to correct by adopting a more systematic law.
There are conclusions to draw from this. I agree that Ukraine should not rush to draft such important laws and must focus on making them as systematic as possible.
— What other priorities do you see in the fight against corruption in Ukraine?
Firstly, continuous support for investigative journalists and civil society. One can criticise Ukrainian investigative journalism for its lack of professionalism when it quickly fuels a scandal, but again, in my opinion, it is a rather positive sign. It is very promising that there are people who are very vigilant on these issues, and it actually shows to what extent corruption has been recently rejected in Ukraine. Civil society in Ukraine is very active and important; it is also an essential component of this fight against corruption.
Regarding the reforms, the problem of competition within the state administration, especially between the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), remains. The creation of NABU, an independent body aimed at fighting corruption, was a very positive step. It is crucial that the fight against corruption is transparent and doesn’t become a potential factor in political play. The SBU is an intelligence service that has long been competent in economic crimes and the fight against corruption. Such competition between the SBU and NABU is inappropriate and even detrimental. After all, the SBU is a special service, so it has practices that are not always public, creating a risk that the fight against corruption could be instrumentalised, fueling suspicion in society.
