President Zelensky has adeptly created a sense of anticipation around the victory plan, slated for presentation to current U.S. President Joe Biden, as well as both candidates for the role—Kamala Harris and Donald Trump—during the last week of September. However, it appears that this document is unlikely to sway the decisions of Western partners, at least until after the U.S. elections.
The unofficial response from some who reviewed the plan at the UN session has been rather sceptical: it’s described as a plan without substance, a “wish list” devoid of real surprises that, even if executed, wouldn’t significantly alter the situation. So why did the president deliver yet another document?
It seems the victory plan is a last-ditch effort to push back against growing calls for what would be an unjust peace, a message that’s shaped the course of the war since 2022: “The war is winnable,” Ukrainians insist. The West, however, asks, “What does victory look like against a nuclear power?”
Republicans aren’t entirely wrong when they argue that the Biden Administration lacks a clear path to Ukraine’s victory. However, the vision for ending the war held by some Republicans—most notably J.D. Vance, a potential vice president—relies on the same wishful thinking he criticises in Democrats.
Moscow has lost wars before, even with nuclear weapons at its disposal, including in Afghanistan and the First Chechen War. The fallout from Afghanistan didn’t result in the feared spread of nuclear arms under a weakened Kremlin (the Soviet Union peacefully dissolved soon after). Chechnya’s fate, however, is a sobering example of what happens to a nation that doesn’t receive adequate international support in its fight against Russian imperialism.
Thus, the issue at hand isn’t about overthrowing the Russian regime through military force, as was the case with Nazi Germany, but rather securing peace on terms that don’t favour the aggressor. Even in the 21st century, it appears that concessions from a smaller nation long accepted as a victim are viewed as a more realistic route to peace than providing full-scale support for its defence.
Victory Plan vs. President Zelensky’s Peace Formula
Both documents share a common goal: to articulate Ukraine’s vision for preserving its independence, factoring in the intricate political dialogue on the global stage, which is clouded by doubts over Ukraine’s ability to win and driven by economic, political, and personal interests in maintaining cooperation with Russia. As American historian Timothy Snyder pointed out, the West has long viewed Russia as a “real state,” while the nations it once colonised—now independent—see it very differently.
These layers of interests, biases, narratives, and political and economic realities complicate peace plans and make it harder for Ukrainians to communicate a simple truth: Russia can only be deterred through strength. Gradual arms deliveries, fears of escalation, and concessions—especially on security—will only feed the Kremlin’s ambitions.
This reality, so evident across the former Soviet sphere of influence, requires ever more arguments as you move further west and south. Yet refining debating skills seems odd when the situation became starkly clear after Bucha’s liberation by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Alongside the Brazilian-Chinese peace plan, the efforts of Prime Minister Orbán, President Erdoğan, and proposals from Indonesia, the Vatican, and South Africa, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is also aiming to position himself as the “chancellor of peace,” drafting a proposal that echoes the 2014-2015 Minsk agreements. This comes amid waning support for Germany’s Social Democratic Party. Add to this the deeply polarised views within the U.S. expert community and political elite, and it’s clear the landscape is anything but straightforward.
The peace formula emerges from the need to counter persistent calls for negotiations and compromises—compromises that, for Ukraine, would mean sacrifices in lives, land, and the chance to join NATO, while for Russia, it would only mean missing its full set of objectives. Accusations against Ukraine’s leadership for allegedly resisting a diplomatic solution have, in part, led to the creation of the Peace Summit format.
This diplomatic move achieved two key goals: first, it showcased Ukraine’s willingness to discuss an end to the war and its commitment to achieving lasting peace rather than settling for a frozen conflict or a short-lived truce dictated by the aggressor. It also helped Ukraine avoid being coerced into talks from a weak position. Secondly, it underscored Ukraine’s significance on the global stage and the necessity of restoring justice by involving the international community in concrete actions based on a carefully crafted “menu” of points that align with the broader interests of all parties involved.
It’s already clear that Russia will not take part in the second Peace Summit—a decision that comes as no surprise, given Moscow’s objective from the start has been to impose its own terms, not negotiate. In doing so, Russia has inadvertently handed Ukraine’s advocates another compelling argument: no peace formula can quell the Kremlin’s relentless pursuit of “respect” through terror, nor will it stop parts of the Russian population from dying on Ukrainian battlefields for a few thousand dollars.
Achieving the broader, long-term goals of the peace formula hinges primarily on continued military and economic support from Ukraine’s partners, a pressure that will force Russia to the negotiating table.
This strategy is embodied in the victory plan—a catalogue of urgent needs to ensure Ukraine’s place on the global political stage and secure at least some semblance of justice. In many ways, it is a rebranded reiteration of the repeated calls to prevent Ukraine from being sacrificed on the altar of political shortsightedness.
At its core, the plan addresses Ukraine’s long-term security and geopolitical standing, particularly through fast-tracked NATO membership and more flexible conditions for Western military assistance. This includes requests for the use of long-range missiles on Russian targets and for a no-fly zone over Ukraine. It also focuses on tightening sanctions against Russia and driving investment into Ukraine, especially in the defence sector.
Zelensky’s latest trip with the new document is a strategic gamble, playing multiple angles in the closing stages of the U.S. presidential race.
First, the plan is framed as an opportunity for Joe Biden, whose political career is set to conclude at the end of his term due to his age, to cement a lasting legacy—or even define the arc of history. Yet, until the November election, it remains speculative. The current administration is unlikely to take any steps that could potentially jeopardise Kamala Harris’s standing.
Second, it’s a forward-looking move, as Ukraine will have to navigate its relationship with the White House, regardless of who sits in the Oval Office. Although Harris holds a narrow lead over Donald Trump, placing bets on a clear victor at this stage is risky. With Trump’s track record of ambiguous comments, especially regarding ending the war under uncertain terms even before his potential return to office, it’s crucial for Ukraine to begin laying its diplomatic groundwork now.
Zelensky told The New Yorker that the victory plan is primarily focused on securing Biden’s backing and needs to be coordinated urgently, with Ukraine set to strengthen its position throughout October, November, and December. He has previously said that this autumn will be pivotal in shaping the future of the war, stressing that, alongside its partners, Ukraine can solidify its standing.
In essence, the plan acts as a safeguard to prevent a repeat of last year’s stalled aid to Ukraine and, in the worst case, to avert a sharp reduction in U.S. support next year. As for Harris, her specific approach to aiding Ukraine if elected remains uncertain. History shows that simply “staying the course” with Ukraine is not a strategy. If the current approach of avoiding escalation persists, it risks resembling a situation where, instead of delivering critical aid to an injured party, one merely holds their hand as they bleed out.
