Attempts to finish the war with the Minsk agreements have demonstrated which mistakes should be avoided – demonstrated for both Ukraine and Europe how to build a working security policy on the continent.
By the end of January 2022, the advisers of the four countries’ leaders in the Normandy format (France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia) met in Paris. Despite the constant warnings by the US that Russia is prepared to invade Ukraine, the meeting was considered a success. The four advisers and their teams have sat behind closed doors for nine hours. Subsequently, a rumour started to circulated among the press – the teams have agreed to issue a joint communique for the first time since 2019. Furthermore, it seemed that the group collectively reiterated their support for an ‘unconditional ceasefire’.
Most of the optimism that was projected was done so by the guests of the meeting. ‘In a very uneasy environment, when Putin’s intentions are not clear, we must move forward nonetheless’ was written in a statement by the Élysée Palace. It was also stated that Ukraine must draft a law to be viewed in the next multilateral meeting in Berlin in February. According to this draft, a new vision of Donbas with a special (autonomous) status within Ukraine was to be presented.
The Normandy meeting was assessed quite optimistically by the highest officials. The assessment changed however, when taking into account the confrontational areas of interest. On the day that the presidential representatives were meeting each other in Paris, an important call was taking place simultaenously. The call was part of the so-called Trilateral Contact Group – a group of representatives which was designed to work on the practicality of the implementations of prior agreements.
‘Nothing has changed. Everything took place in the usual format. It was quite calm, without any excessive episodes. As usual, no real agreements have been reached. Just the occasional meeting taking place’ – stated one of Ukraine’s representatives Denys Kazanskyi when asked to comment on the outcome of the meeting. The ‘nothing has changed’ notion actually summarised not only on the current situation but also the entire 8-year-long Minsk process.
I think that the coming consultations with the Trilateral Contact Group will be influenced by today’s meeting of the political advisers of four national leaders in the Normandy format. ‘Sometimes it seems as if the Russian side is simply waiting something out’ – stated another Ukrainian representative, Oleksandr Merezhko. That Trilateral Contact Group meeting became ‘historic’ as it was the last of its kind before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. One can hope that it could also be the last of its kind altogether, but one must stay realistic – there are many people interested to end this war with another pseudo-peace treaty (although such calls have dropped sharply as of late).
‘There is no alternative to the Normandy format’. This is the sentiment that persisted for years and was constantly reiterated by the Ukrainian government. What else could they say though? It is difficult to outline the precise events of the night of the 12th of February 2015 in Minsk, when the Mink II agreement was prepared and signed. Francois Hollande, one of the members of the negotiations, who was the first to retire from the process (as he was not re-elected and subsequently retired from politics) already described his experience during the negotiations in his memoir. In the memoirs, there were many interesting accounts: the rejection of dinner, which became ‘an unfortunate event but an important sacrifice’, displeasing sandwiches that were served to the negotiators and much more. There was also a recollection of how Putin threatened Ukraine, if president Poroshenko did not go for concessive steps. In Debaltseve, Donetsk region, Ukrainian forces were fighting against a larger Russian forces – right at the time of the negotiations. All four sides of the Normandy negotiation process were aware of the presence of Russian forces in the area, but three of them acted as if they were not there at all. Interestingly enough, even Angela Merkel admitted that the Minsk process was unsuccessful (she expressed this thought a year before the large-scale invasion in 2022). However, this would not have any significant impact anyways. In fact, Ukraine was forced into a farce after the multilateral signatures on the 12th of February 2015. Moldova and Georgia have already experienced a similar fate beforehand.
The main issue of the Minsk Agreements was not only the emergence of a ‘special status’ for regions that were in fact occupied by Russia, it was that those regions were a ‘shadow’ that was cast on the internal policies of the country. In the meantime, establishment in the West (European establishment in particular), was happy to discuss the ‘widespread corruption problem’ in Ukraine – the main reason as to why reforms were struggling in Ukraine (allegedly). Despite the fact that corruption is indeed a big problem in Ukraine, generalising all of the country’s problems into this one realm was wrong.
The way that the ‘anchor’ of the Minsk Agreements worked can be seen in detail in the example of the reforms aimed at decentralisation of government, which have been carefully observed by the author of this article. This reform is often deemed to be the most successful of all since the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 in Ukraine. Its importance can hardly be overstated. From the time the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine had not constructed a functioning system which would clearly delegate different responsibilities to different branches of government (i.e. local government). After Yanukovych was overthrown, early elections were held in at least 50 cities in Ukraine, including the capital. This shows that under Yanukovych, the function of local governments was carried out by the central government, as removing an unfavourable mayor could be done easily – there was no legal way to prevent this. This issue was one of the key focuses that the reforms of decentralisation was trying to resolve. The standard direction of reform went from the central to the local scale – going from the constitution to the particular set of laws in an updated constitution. However, this method was blocked. The Minsk Protocol entailed a special status for two regions – Luhansk and Donetsk, which would have to be reflected in the constitution. Most Ukrainians were against this change, feeling that this was a step away from national sovereignty. Before the Russian invasion in 2022, reports showed that 50% supported the same status for the two regions as existed before 2014, and only 18% supported any autonomous status (according to the Institute of Sociology). These numbers have remained constant throughout the years.
On the 31st of August 2015, it became clear that the Minsk Agreement was no longer feasible. The process of decentralisation was being nudged into the Ukrainian constitution without success, explained by the need for the so-called ‘special status’ for Donbas. The parliament quarter in Kyiv was engulfed by demonstrators. Someone threw a grenade at the crowd of policemen and demonstrators – four people were killed. Changes to the constitutions were quickly taken off the table. After that day, no politician in their right mind (in Ukraine) would ever speak of any ‘special status’ for Donbas. Finding 300 MPs to vote for such changes, would only be possible in a parallel universe. It would mean the termination of political careers for all those who would vote for such a change, as well as guaranteed domestic instability. Over time, the ‘special status’ for Donbas became a scarecrow, used to threaten one another while fighting internal political rivalries, trying to use it to one’s own advantage. If you want to throw dirt at an opponent, you can always say that they supported or initiated the special status law for Donbas (and thus were in synchrony with Moscow’s policy) and subsequently supportive of the loss of sovereignty.
The very idea of decentralisation was held hostage. Any attempt to come back to the issue of changes to the constitution even without mentioning Donbas, always ended up being labelled as a threat to sovereignty. Sometimes, these accusations were not strongly supported by evidence but nevertheless, the toxic environment surrounding this issue persisted. Decentralisation was thus carried out differently – drafting bills were adapted to the old (existing) constitution. This often yielded different results. Sometimes, this led to an enormous usage of time and resources as well as an uncertain future – who knows what was stopping further amendments to such laws to serve someone’s political or business appetite in particular? Or perhaps, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine would simply deem these laws unconstitutional. The new structure of local government remained out of sync with the central laws of Ukraine. That was why local governments felt constantly pressured. Therefore, building trust between local governments and Kyiv would have to happen step by step.
A similar set of problems can be observed in almost every branch of government. Ukraine has often taken years to process structural change in its electoral system, due to legal obstructions. In the case of Donbas, local elections would not be possible without Ukrainian forces being in control of those areas – otherwise, the entire electoral system would have to be scrapped. This was exactly the way that Steinmeier’s Formula saw the outcome – first, elections would occur and only after that, the emergence of government forces. This ‘formula’ was the cause of a great deal of political debates and instability in Ukraine. When looking at the judicial system, everyone was afraid of the ‘Bosnian model of transitional justice’ and any other analogies connecting the two. This is because Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrated a lack of internal functionality, as larger decisions were almost impossible to implement internally due to its structural obstacles. This is well known by the Ukrainian government.
Written by Andriy Holub
