Following the parliamentary elections, India has witnessed the return of Narendra Modi to power, marking a historic triumph for him and his party. However, the election outcome diverged significantly from the predictions of exit polls and fell short of the Prime Minister’s expectations. Modi now faces the challenge of leading a coalition government for the first time. What factors contributed to this outcome, and what implications does it hold for domestic and foreign policy, as well as relations with Ukraine?
“Even opposition leaders now say ‘abki baar 400 paar’ (Hindi for ‘this time 400+’) for the National Democratic Alliance,” – a reference to the “400+” seats in the lower house of parliament for the leading coalition called the National Democratic Alliance, a phrase once voiced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and repeatedly heard during the election campaign in India from both the Prime Minister and his allies. Securing over 400 seats in the lower house of the Indian parliament, out of the total 543 representatives, is deemed a ‘supermajority’, constituting more than 73% in percentage terms. Throughout India’s history, only the Indian National Congress (INC), one of the oldest and currently the largest opposition forces, managed to achieve this feat during the initial decades of India’s governance. This period is often referred to as the ‘Congress system’ by Indian political scientists, highlighting the INC’s dominance at both federal and state levels. Concurrently, the Indian National Congress functioned as an overarching ‘umbrella’ party during that era, giving rise to numerous regional and national political factions through subsequent splintering.
For the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), led by Narendra Modi with a clearly defined pro-Hindu ideology, this marks a starkly different trajectory. Unlike the INC, which aimed for inclusivity in its early years, with key members from various religious minorities, the BJP has prioritised its pro-Hindu stances. A pivotal event illustrating this stance occurred with the consecration of the Rama temple in Ayodhya in January of this year. This temple stands on the site where in the early 1990s, supporters of the aggressive Hindu wing demolished a mosque dating back to the 16th century. Hindu advocates argue that the mosque was built by the ruling Mughal dynasty atop the supposed birthplace of the god Rama, where a temple in his honour once stood until the 16th century. However, historical evidence supporting the claim of the temple’s destruction by the Mughals remains inconclusive.
Symbolic of these elections was the outcome in the district that includes the city of Ayodhya, where the newly constructed temple stands (located in the Uttar Pradesh state). In this district, the BJP was defeated by a candidate from the regional Samajwadi (Socialist) party. Undoubtedly, one of the noteworthy outcomes of these elections in the world’s largest democracy is the notable performance of such regional parties.
Is 2024’s victory shaped by regional political forces?
According to many Indian and Western analysts, the 2024 election outcomes predominantly indicate a rejection by Indian voters of the path aimed at making India a nation centred solely around one religion. “The BJP’s often divisive Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) rhetoric failed to resonate in large parts of the country, particularly those with a more cosmopolitan and secular outlook, and parts of the country with strong regional identities, such as the south, as well as with India’s religious minorities”, elaborates Chetan Bajpai, a Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House.
In India’s electoral system, which operates under a first-past-the-post framework, each state is assigned a specific number of seats in the lower house of parliament. Following these elections, numerous large states will have substantial representation from regional parties. In total, 41 parties have secured seats in the lower house of parliament, an increase from 36 in the previous term.
Certainly, two regional parties play a significant role in Narendra Modi’s newly formed coalition government—the Janata Dal (United) party, which holds considerable sway in the eastern state of Bihar, and the Telugu Desam Party, which secured 16 seats in the lower house of parliament with support from Andhra Pradesh in the southeast.
While the Janata Dal (United) and Telugu Desam Party align with Narendra Modi’s coalition, the Socialist Party and DMK form part of the opposition coalition I.N.D.I.A (Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance), which clinched 232 parliamentary seats in these elections. The pivotal force in this alliance remains the largest opposition party—the Indian National Congress, which exceeded exit poll predictions by securing 99 parliamentary seats.
Interestingly, the leader of one of the two parties with a ‘golden share’ in Modi’s coalition, the Janata Dal (United), Nitish Kumar, played a key role in forming the opposition coalition I.N.D.I.A but switched to the National Democratic Alliance led by Modi in early 2024. Given his history of changing coalitions, analysts speculate that the current coalition government may not complete its full term. In the 1990s-2000s, India experienced coalition and minority governments, often leading to early elections. Moreover, Narendra Modi has never led a coalition government before, presenting an additional challenge for him as a politician.
India’s foreign policy during Modi 3.0 and Ukraine
The year 2024 kicked off with significant activity in bilateral relations between Ukraine and India. President Volodymyr Zelensky and Prime Minister Narendra Modi have had several phone conversations since the beginning of the year. In March, Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba visited India, marking the first visit by a Ukrainian minister to New Delhi in the last six years. Additionally, a meeting of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Indian Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technical, Industrial, and Cultural Cooperation took place, the first since 2018. This political dialogue plays a crucial role in enhancing relations between the two countries across various sectors.
During the Indian elections, which span over a month, Narendra Modi confirmed India’s participation in the G7 Summit in Italy and the Peace Summit scheduled for June 15-16 in Switzerland. While the newly re-elected Indian Prime Minister plans to attend the G7 Summit in Italy for one day on June 14, marking his first foreign visit after re-election, it remains uncertain who will represent India at the Peace Summit. Indian media speculate that a lower-ranking politician, rather than the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister, will attend. Meanwhile, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar will continue to serve as Foreign Minister in the new government.
The Ukrainian and Indian leaders last met on the sidelines of the G7 Summit in Japan in May 2023, so it’s probable that Zelensky and Modi will have the chance to converse at this upcoming event.
The Indian press also indicates that the inaugural session of the newly elected lower house of the Indian parliament is expected to commence around June 15 and extend until June 22. During this session, Narendra Modi intends to introduce members of his new cabinet, prompting him to attend the G7 Summit for only one day. These circumstances significantly diminish the likelihood of his personal attendance at the Kyiv Peace Summit; however, no definitive decision has been announced yet.
India’s foreign policy orientation typically remains consistent regardless of which of the main political parties—Bharatiya Janata or INC—are in power or leading the ruling coalition. New Delhi’s leaders are notably attentive to the increasing alignment between Russia and China, prompting efforts to bolster cooperation with key Western partners such as France or the USA whenever feasible. Nevertheless, the promise of economic advantages, should it endure, won’t dissuade them from pursuing economic collaboration with Moscow. Kyiv would do well to consider these dynamics when forging new avenues of cooperation between the nations.
Another noteworthy aspect emerges regarding Russia’s tactics in its war against Ukraine. Employing a typical colonial strategy, Russia is deploying individuals from nations of the Global South to the forefront of the Russian-Ukrainian war. This not only affects citizens of India, who have also fallen prey to Russian human trafficking schemes, but also individuals from Nepal, Cuba, and various African countries. Such actions exemplify a colonialist mindset wielded by the Kremlin, hypocritically positioning itself as an anti-colonial force to these nations. Kyiv should address this matter in its diplomatic interactions with these countries, including India, which aspires to advocate for the interests of the Global South in its foreign policy approach.
