Throughout February 2024, there were many strategic statements and decisions made by both Western politicians and leaders of the Russian regime. At the annual Munich Security Conference, Europe showed its readiness to increase efforts to contain Moscow amid the US election race leaning towards isolationism. Meanwhile, Putin’s impudent assassination of the pro-Western opposition leader Navalny and his disregard for the remnants of Russian pseudo-democracy during the so-called presidential elections further heightens threats against the West.
Moreover, by the end of February, tensions were on the rise – French President Emmanuel Macron, for the first time, suggested the possibility of deploying troops from France and other NATO countries in Ukraine. At the same time, Putin, precisely on the second anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, redefined the borders of military districts, bolstering military presence along the Russian borders with the Baltic states and Finland.
Adding to this, Putin’s widely publicised and rather uneventful speech held at the Russian Federal Assembly on February 29, aside from the usual promises to improve the lives of Russians, notably included a threat of a nuclear strike against Western nations. This was something Putin had not done before—unlike lower-level officials and propagandists such as Medvedev and Solovyov.
With growing speculation about a potential Russian invasion of the Baltic states, all of which are NATO members, the question remains: what should we anticipate from the dictator in 2024?
Regarding the new borders of the military districts – the draft decree of the Russian president actually surfaced back in September 2023, anticipating changes from January of the following (i.e. this) year. Military divisions during Putin’s tenure have been undergoing regular adjustments every few years, with a previous iteration happening in 2020.
Experts are pointing out the annexation of the occupied territories of Ukraine (Zaporizhzhia, Kherson Oblast, Donetsk, and Luhansk Oblasts) to Russia’s Southern District, which is yet another example of Russia’s criminal activity and continued aggression. However, these actions are a mere formality, as Crimea and Sevastopol have also been “included” there since 2014. Naturally, it is most convenient to control the troops in the annexed territories from Rostov.
However, there are also other significant changes. This includes the emergence of the Leningrad District, which aligns entirely with Russia’s Northwestern Federal District. Previously, Leningrad, Novgorod, and Karelia were part of the Central District (Moscow), while Komi, Arkhangelsk, and Murmansk were under the special jurisdiction of the Northern Fleet district. A separate district for this fleet was established precisely in 2020, with a focus on competing in the Arctic and bolstering Russia’s maritime influence. However, the Kremlin seems to be shifting away from emphasising the development of its naval power, which has proven ineffective.
Another important point is that the borders of the Leningrad District will completely coincide with the Northwestern Federal District. Moscow is trying to avoid such overlaps to prevent contacts between civilian and military authorities on the ground. In the previous iteration, this was only the case in the Far Eastern District (due to its geographical remoteness). The Leningrad District, in its current boundaries, existed in the 1990s and was disbanded in 2010, just when Putin’s power vertical strengthened. The return of the centre to St. Petersburg could indicate both fears of conflict in the Baltic Sea and a desire to strengthen control over the country’s second city, which the Putin clan originates from and later became the base of Prigozhin.
In any case, the main external reason for strengthening the northwestern border is clear – the integration of Sweden and Finland into NATO. Discussions about the possibility of escalation in this direction have been ongoing for months, with the preparatory process starting six months ago. It’s evident that we are dealing with a far-reaching Russian strategy. Furthermore, Russia’s military expenditures in the 2024 budget are projected to reach a staggering 29% of the GDP.
It’s important to remember that while Russian politics may often seem reactive out of necessity, they frequently feign an emotional approach, all the while executing carefully planned decisions.
Moreover, aggression against Georgia and Ukraine had been in the works for decades, with Russia concentrating troops and equipment in the European part under the pretext of the conflict in Ichkeria. This directly contravenes the obligations undertaken by the USSR under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1991.
On the European side, there is more talk and planning than actual action. Despite the bombshell announcements about potential French troops deployment to Ukraine, Macron has been forced to acknowledge that EU countries only managed to produce a third of the promised ammunition for Kyiv in 2023. Paris remains minimally involved in providing technical assistance to Ukraine’s Armed Forces, especially when compared to countries like Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany. Meanwhile, in Berlin, another issue arises – despite the deployment of a comprehensive aid package, the voices of so-called “peacemakers” continue to hold sway in politics. From Ukraine’s perspective, this signals a form of practical capitulation, albeit one that is drawn out over time.
In general, Ukrainian experts and military personnel agree that Western aid (especially when it comes to supplying long-range Western missiles) is valuable, but it comes with delays, allowing Russians to adapt. Additional means of air defence and a significant amount of aviation could significantly change the situation on the battlefield. Currently, the lack of parity in the air exacerbates problems on the front lines – in the battle for Avdiivka, the Russians extensively used guided aerial bombs, destroying Ukrainian fortifications.
Adding to the complexities are the close economic ties between the EU and China, which is taking a neutral but increasingly pro-Russian stance. This shift is evident from the speeches of former Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Munich Security Conference, where he likened China and Russia to “non-aligned states” oriented towards peaceful coexistence. During the same period, China’s representative at the UN, Zhang Jun, directly called on the US to halt arms supplies to Kyiv in the interest of achieving a swift peace.
There’s also the impression that Berlin and Paris are using issues surrounding Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s aggression in their competition with each other. On one hand, Macron’s suggestion of potential troop deployments comes with relatively tepid support. On the flip side, Germany’s Defense Minister, Boris Pistorius, proposed that Moscow should be contained in other regions – such as sending advisors to Africa, even if the regimes there, sensing the Russian threat, don’t completely align with European values. This delves into Paris’s longstanding sphere of influence, where Moscow has solidified its position in recent years through military interventions (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger). And it seems that Pistorius indirectly accused Paris of being unable to resolve the issue independently.
Overall, there are some glimmers of optimism—at least European policymakers are aware that a quick resolution is unlikely. They recognise the necessity to brace for a prolonged standoff with potential escalations in various regions. However, swift actions are still required after the corresponding statements for an effective response.
