Russians are installing defensive structures on the Kerch Bridge. OSINT researcher Tom Bike shared satellite images on X, revealing that Russian forces have begun installing defensive structures on the Kerch Strait Bridge, likely in response to recent strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on military targets in occupied Crimea. According to Bike’s analysis, these barriers are currently being placed on the southeastern section of the bridge. He noted rapid progress in constructing these structures, with 17 barges and 2 docks observed on the southern main span spanning the Kerch-Yenikalsky Canal. Progress is also evident at the docks on Tuzla Spit and the temporary bridge. Additionally, Bike noted the installation of inset pillars on the seabed by the Russian forces and developments on the northern part of the Crimean Bridge, mentioning ongoing efforts to deploy supports underwater. While Russia had previously installed supports temporarily after an earlier explosion, this latest effort appears to be more strategically positioned relative to the bridge itself.
Head of Ukraine’s intelligence: Russia deployed new air defence in temporarily occupied Crimea. During a national live news programme, Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, revealed that the Russian army had deployed elements of the advanced S-500 air defence missile system in temporarily occupied Crimea to bolster their air defence capabilities on the occupied peninsula. He described this deployment as an “experimental use of the new S-500 complexes.” The S-500, a new-generation Russian air defence missile system, is designed to engage medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, aircraft, and low-orbit satellites, boasting a range of up to 600 km and able to detect and engage up to ten supersonic targets simultaneously.
Budanov also noted that Russian forces continue to utilise the Kerch Strait Bridge to transport military supplies. “The Kerch Strait Bridge has historically served as a vital route for Russian military movements and will retain this role for the foreseeable future. While the majority of cargo is transported via ferries, the bridge primarily facilitates personnel transport. Although less frequent, cargo transport via the bridge remains crucial for logistical purposes,” noted Budanov.
Stoltenberg says Ukraine’s exercise of self-defence does not amount to escalation. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, speaking in Brussels ahead of the Ukraine-NATO Council meeting, urged NATO members to ease or eliminate restrictions on using Western weaponry to target military sites in Russia. He expressed gratitude for several NATO countries’ recent commitments to security aid to Ukraine and anticipated additional support in the future. “We must fully comprehend the seriousness of war and aggression. Russia’s attack on Ukraine constitutes a breach of international law. According to international law, Ukraine has the right to self-defence, including targeting military installations within the aggressor’s territory — Russia,” Stoltenberg stressed.
He clarified that Ukraine’s exercise of self-defence does not amount to escalation and will not entangle NATO in the conflict. Stoltenberg noted Russia’s establishment of a new front in northern Ukraine, facilitating artillery attacks from its own territory with impunity. “As Russian artillery continues to operate near the border on Russian soil, Ukraine’s defence efforts will face considerable challenges,” he concluded.
A survey shows that 60% of Ukrainian citizens believe Russia’s goal is to destroy Ukrainians. According to a survey conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) from May 16 to 22, 2024, a significant majority of Ukrainians, comprising 60%, perceive Russia’s intentions as gravely threatening. Among them, 34% believe Russia “aims to obliterate the Ukrainian nation,” while 26% fear Russia “intends to commit physical genocide against the majority of the population.” Another perspective held by 6% of Ukrainians is that Russia seeks control over all territories but may grant them limited non-political, cultural autonomy within Russia. In contrast, 12% of respondents suspect Russia’s objective in the war is “to alter Ukraine’s government and establish a puppet state obedient to Russia.” A mere 7% hold the view that Russia’s ambition is limited to maintaining control over currently occupied territories without seeking further expansion into Ukraine. KIIS also noted an option in the survey resembling Russian propaganda, proposing ‘denazification’ and demilitarisation of Ukraine without compromising its independence. Only 5% of respondents favoured this proposition, highlighting divergent perspectives on Russia’s intentions among the Ukrainian populace.
While Russian-speaking Ukrainians discussed Russia’s intentions to destroy the Ukrainian nation somewhat less frequently, yet 62% of them strongly believe that Russia continues to harbour hostile intentions. Only 7% of Russian-speaking Ukrainians share the Russian-invented narrative of “denazification” and “demilitarisation.” Executive Director of KIIS Anton Hrushetsky commented on these results: “From west to east, Ukrainians understand the existential nature of Russia’s war against Ukraine. These results should provide another unequivocal explanation to our Western friends as to why Ukrainians do not want ‘just any’ peace with Russia. They need a peace that guarantees that the war will not repeat itself again and again, with the annexation of new territories, until nothing is left of Ukraine.”
Resistance movement “Yellow Ribbon” says Russians are targeting locals on occupied territories for ignoring ‘Russia Day’. The Russian occupation forces have intensified repression against residents of the temporarily occupied cities of Henichesk, Skadovsk, and Melitopol for “disregarding the Russia Day”, which the occupation authorities marked on 12 June. The underground civil resistance movement known as the “Yellow Ribbon”, active in temporarily occupied regions of Ukraine, has reported a number of raids, police searches and inspections targeting residents of Henichesk and Skadovsk to determine whether the residents have already been issued Russian passports. Reports indicate that Russian occupiers are actively hunting down individuals suspected of “collaborating with the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU),” with men aged 18 and older reportedly facing threats of conscription into the Russian military.
Previously, activists from the “Yellow Ribbon” movement shared several photos showing local residents in Russian-occupied territories burning Russian newspapers on ‘Russia Day’, adding that “If you hear the occupiers’ claims of 90% support, remember these photos – our people are burning hundreds of such newspapers.”
ISW: “Armenia’s formal withdrawal from the CSTO would be a significant blow to Russia.” The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) analysed recent Armenian statements indicating that Armenia intends to leave the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). During a June 12 session with the Armenian National Assembly, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenia planned to exit the CSTO and emphasised Armenia’s autonomy in deciding the timing of its departure, signalling a clear shift away from ties with Russia. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan clarified that Pashinyan did not explicitly announce Armenia’s exit from the CSTO but stressed Armenia’s right to decide when to leave without the intention to return. According to ISW, during the session, Pashinyan criticized the CSTO for failing to fulfil its security obligations to Armenia and accused CSTO member states of planning military action against Armenia alongside Azerbaijan while indirectly implicating Russia and directly blaming Belarus for aiding Azerbaijan’s preparations for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War in May 2024.
ISW noted that Armenia has been gradually diminishing its bilateral security relations with Russia, exemplified by Pashinyan’s announcement in March 2024 that Russian border guards will leave Yerevan International Airport by August 1, 2024. Armenia’s potential withdrawal from the CSTO would formalize an already existing de facto stance, as the country has abstained from participating in CSTO events since mid-to-late 2023 under Pashinyan’s leadership. This decision would become a”significant blow” to Russia, which has previously used the CSTO as a tool to wield influence and undermine the sovereignty of a number of countries, including Armenia.
