Since Vladimir Putin’s election as president of Russia in 2000, there have been numerous counts of Russia’s provocations being met with pre-emptive measures and force that have worked in preventing further escalation. Appeasement, in stark contrast to confronting Russia, on the other hand, has not worked in this period of time. The misuse of this evident strategic possibility for democratic forces of the West is extremely wasteful. Henceforth, let’s go through all the notable examples of confronting Russia’s aggression since 2000.
2003 Tuzla Island conflict
The Tuzla Island conflict of 2003 was the first major Russian escalation regarding Ukraine’s territory since Putin came to power. The Russian government ordered the construction of a dam to connect its mainland with Tuzla Island in the Kerch Strait. Tuzla Island was recognized as part of Ukrainian territory under the administrative rule of The Crimean Autonomous Republic. After ignoring calls for ceasing to construct the dam connecting Tuzla Island to Russia, Leonid Kuchma, then president of Ukraine, cut his Latin American diplomatic tour short to manage the crisis back home. Kuchma then initiated a military general staff meeting to manage the crisis, brought Ukrainian troops into combat readiness and even brought artillery boats into the area. Only then did Putin agree to answer his phone. A compromise was agreed on, one of which we will never truly know the full details. However, the Russian plan to link Tuzla Island to its mainland was abandoned.
2008 Russo-Georgian War
After eight long years without waging war (the Second Chechen War, in its hot phase, ended in 2000), Russia struck Georgia. The lack of a unified vision for Georgia and its place in NATO by the West prevented any chance of any preventive measures regarding the risk of war from taking place. However, after five days of war, world leaders rallied in Tbilisi in support of Georgia on August 12th, including the leaders of Ukraine, all Baltic States and Poland. It was exactly then that Polish president Lech Kaczynski delivered one of his most iconic lines: “Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow – the Baltic States and later, perhaps, time will come for my country, Poland”. The war ended within five days (the day of the rally), and many saw the international response as a factor that prevented further escalation. With a mere 50 km away from Tbilisi, who knows how far the Russian army could have been ordered to advance if there was no reaction at all.
2014 Annexation of Crimea and the Donbas War
After the annexation of Crimea, there was no symmetrical response. Although sanctions were imposed on Russia, thereby hurting its economy, they were too lenient and ineffective to change Russia’s plans on wiping its neighbour out. Even though almost no other nation recognised Crimea as part of Russia, the fact that the response to the annexation changed nothing for Crimea and Ukraine as a whole spoke volumes. The lack of prevention and subsequent inaction in 2014-2022 gave Russia the green light to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
2015 Russian Sukhoi Su-24 Jet Shot Down
After violating Turkish airspace from the territory of Syria, Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 jet. The premeditated violation of Turkish airspace was no accident; Russia was testing Turkey’s readiness to react in Syria, and in particular, it was a test for Turkish support for Syria’s rebels. Russia never violated Turkish airspace again.
2015 Syrian War
Russia entered the Syrian Civil War in 2015 in support of the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Their intervention was met with concern and resistance from a U.S.-led coalition that was already operating in the region. Direct confrontations were avoided, but on several occasions, both countries had near misses. The U.S. shooting down a Syrian jet in 2017 and the subsequent Russian response showed the fine line both powers treaded. While Russia continued its operations, it had to be mindful of its strong U.S. presence and confrontational stance. Nevertheless, Russia avoided the US for the most part. Thus far, the Free Syrian Army still holds its stronghold in Idlib and other regions. Although the US intervened in Syria to combat ISIS as its primary goal, it indirectly stood in the way of Russia’s and Assad’s attempts to completely wipe out the Syrian opposition.
2018 The Kerch Strait incident: Without warning, Russia seized three Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait. Ukraine’s President at the time, Petro Poroshenko, declared martial law in certain parts of the country and rallied international support. Ukraine’s main allies, including the EU and the US, condemned Russia’s actions. This incident did not see an immediate Russian reversal, but the strong Ukrainian and international response ensured the situation did not escalate into a larger conflict.
2022-2023 Nuclear Threats
The evolution of Russia’s nuclear threats to the world has subsided since 2023. After consistently expressing his readiness to use nuclear threats if the so-called ‘Russian’ territory came under threat (i.e. Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine). Two major reasons why we haven’t heard nuclear blackmail from the Kremlin in a while: the UK, France and the US all expressed their readiness to respond with a conventional strike on Russia directly should Putin decide to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. The other reason is Xi Jinping, who personally warned Putin against using nuclear weapons.
Throughout the list, one can clearly see that Russia duly noted any inaction or weak response. At any given opportunity, Russia would strike in this area precisely. Wherever confrontation and reaction were strong, Russia would back down. Over the last 23 years, it has always been about estimation and measurement. The world’s, including the West’s, weak record on responding to crises in Ukraine made the Russians think they had enough data and a rough estimate that any Western response to their invasion into Ukraine would be satisfactory for their needs (i.e. they would be unopposed). Of course, the collective reaction after Russia’s invasion and the subsequent military aid to Ukraine was far higher than the Russians anticipated, in particular, due to many unexpecting the scale of Russia’s brutality in the war. However, the strategy regarding 2014-2022 never indicated that this would be the case. For a mad and highly motivated dictator prepared to pay a high price for his actions when contemplating invading Ukraine, this would seem like a no-brainer in 2022. In fact, the level of deterrence against Russia in 2014-2022 was astonishingly low, hence the war of today. You can clearly see this in the much lower amount of lethal weapons delivered to Ukraine in 2014-2022 compared to what it stands at after 24 February 2022 and onwards.
